State v. Masters

Citation144 S.E. 718
Decision Date18 September 1928
Docket Number(No. 6186.)
CourtWest Virginia Supreme Court
PartiesSTATE. v. MASTERS.

144 S.E. 718

STATE.
v.
MASTERS.

(No. 6186.)

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Sept. 18, 1928.


[144 S.E. 718]
(Syllabus by the Court.)

Error to Circuit Court, Berkeley County.

Criminal proceeding by the State against Doyle Masters. To review a judgment sustaining demurrer to indictment and discharging defendant therefrom, the State brings error. Reversed.

Howard B. Dee, Atty. Gen., W. Elliott Nefflen, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Herbert E. Hannis, Pros. Atty., of Martinsburg, for the State.

Kilmer & Byrer, of Martinsburg, for defendant in error.

WOODS, J. The state, by virtue of section 31, chapter 135, Code, complains of the judgment of the circuit court of Berkeley county in sustaining the demurrer and notice to quash an indictment, and discharging defendant therefrom. But two points are raised here: (1) The sufficiency of the in dictment; and (2) the constitutionality of section 97 of chapter 43, Code, under which the same was drawn. The indictment charges:

" * * * That Doyle Masters heretofore, to wit, on the —— day of August, 1927, in the county and state aforesaid, did operate on the public highway in said county a motor vehicle, and while operating said motor vehicle on said public highway in the said county did have an accident, in that he did hit with said motor vehicle and seriously injure and kill one Elmer L. Hicks; and the grand jurors aforesaid, upon their oaths aforesaid, do further represent that the said Doyle Masters then and there after he had hit the said Elmer L. Hicks as aforesaid, did unlawfully fail to stop immediately and give his name, address, and number of his operator's license, and render such assistance as was reasonable and necessary against the peace and dignity of the state. * * *"

The first attack on the substance of the indictment is that it is defective in not alleging that accused "knowingly" did have an accident. The indictment is drawn in the language of the statute. Ordinarily such is sufficient. State v. Riffe, 10 W. Va. 794; State v. Schnelle, 24 W. Va. 767; State v. Boggess, 36 W. Va. 713, 15 S. E. 423; State v. Pennington, 41 W. Va. 599, 23 S. E. 918; State v. Watts, 43 W. Va. 182, 27 S. E. 302. In the case of the sale of liquors, as to minors, where the statute simply prohibited such sale without some word like "knowingly" or other expression, the doing the act fixed the offense, no matter about the knowledge or ignorance or intent of the accused. In such case this court held it need not be alleged in the indictment that the party knew the purchaser to be a minor, or intoxicated, or in the habit of becoming so. State v. Baer, 37 W. Va. 1, 16 S. E. 368; State v. Smith, 61 W. Va. 332, 56 S. E. 528. The statute in the instant case does not make knowledge of the accident a part of the offense, and, under the general rule, it is not necessary for the state to so allege. To hold otherwise would be to defeat the very object of the statute, namely, the protection of the person and property of the traveling public from motorists who seek to dodge all responsibility in cases of accident on the highway to which they are parties. In most cases it would be impossible for the state to prove scienter beyond a reasonable doubt, while the accident itself might properly be proven.

Another point made is that the indictment does not contain the words "upon request." It is true the statute provides that, "upon request, " the operator of an automobile shall give his name, address, and the number of his operator's license. The indictment under consideration alleges that the defendant did not stop upon the happening of the accident, and hence there was no opportunity for any request to be made of him as to the

[144 S.E. 719]

information he is required to give. The statute does not require impossible or idle acts. People v. Scofield (Cal. App.) 258 P. 656. The words in question pertain alone to situations where the defendant does stop.

The defendant also argues that the indictment charges three separate and distinct offenses in one count, and was therefore properly quashed. In case of accident, where the operator of a motor vehicle fails to stop immediately, he is guilty of an offense; if he does stop, and then drives on without making any attempt to render assistance which he must have seen...

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28 cases
  • State ex rel. Johnson v. Hamilton
    • United States
    • West Virginia Supreme Court
    • April 28, 1980
    ... ... Our research of the law discloses in great detail that a multi-count indictment setting forth in separate counts each separate and distinct offense arising out of the same transaction is perfectly permissible. State v. Cutlip, 131 W.Va. 141, 46 S.E.2d 454 (1948); State v. Masters, 106 W.Va. 46, 144 S.E. 718 (1928); State v. Tomlin, 86 W.Va. 300, 103 S.E. 110 (1920). The Court can envisage occasions where a trial for multiple but distinct offenses arising out of the same transaction might, indeed, prejudice the defendant in his defense of any one of the alleged offenses ... ...
  • State ex rel. Heck's Inc. v. Gates
    • United States
    • West Virginia Supreme Court
    • April 13, 1965
    ... ... the law. State v. Lantz, 90 W.Va. 738, 111 S.E. 766, 26 A.L.R. 894; United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Company, 255 U.S. 81, 41 S.Ct. 298, 65 L.Ed. 516, 14 A.L.R. 1045. See also State v. Harrison, 130 W.Va. 246, 43 S.E.2d 214; State v. Mangus, 120 W.Va. 415, 198 S.E. 872; State v. Masters, 106 W.Va. 46, 144 S.E. 718. In the last cited three cases this Court recognized the principle enunciated in the Lantz case but denied its application to the particular statutes under consideration in those cases ...         The contention of the petitioners that the quoted provisions ... ...
  • Pyles v. Boles
    • United States
    • West Virginia Supreme Court
    • April 15, 1964
    ... ... person convicted of the crime of kidnapping, and which punishments depend upon and are governed by the evidence introduced at the trial, do not state or prescribe any element of the offense created by the statute ... Page 694 ...         3. An indictment for a statutory offense is ... See State v. Masters, 106 ... Page 700 ... W.Va. 46, 144 S.E. 718; State v. Perry, 101 W.Va. 123, 132 S.E. 368; State v. Joseph, 100 W.Va. 213, 130 S.E. 451; State ... ...
  • State ex rel. Watson v. Ferguson
    • United States
    • West Virginia Supreme Court
    • December 19, 1980
    ... ... 934, 92 S.Ct. 2852, 33 L.Ed.2d 747 (1972). We have evolved a somewhat analogous joinder rule through case law and by virtue of certain statutes. E. g., W.Va.Code, 61-3-12; W.Va.Code, 62-2-5; W.Va.Code, 62-2-24; State v. Cutlip, 131 W.Va. 141, 46 S.E.2d 454 (1948); State v. Masters, 106 W.Va. 46, 144 S.E. 718 (1928) ...         Several courts have concluded that the problem of multiple trials can be solved to a large degree by a joinder rule that requires multiple offenses to be tried together unless the defendant moves for a severance. In State v. Gregory, 66 ... ...
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