State v. Mastracchio

Decision Date13 July 1992
Docket NumberNos. 91-79-C,s. 91-79-C
Citation612 A.2d 698
PartiesSTATE v. Gerald MASTRACCHIO, Jr. STATE v. Christopher G. ROFFO. A., 91-138-C.A. and 91-200-C.A.
CourtRhode Island Supreme Court
OPINION

KELLEHER, Justice.

Four individuals, Gerald Mastracchio, Jr. (Mastracchio), Christopher G. Roffo (Roffo), Norman Laurence (Laurence), and John DeCosta (DeCosta), were charged in 1988 with various crimes arising out of an assault at the maximum-security facility of the Adult Correctional Institutions (ACI). Specifically the four men were charged with conspiracy to commit the crime of assault with intent to murder Craig Ruzzo (Ruzzo), assaulting Ruzzo with intent to murder, assaulting Ruzzo with a dangerous weapon, conspiracy to commit assault with intent to murder Henry Stacy III (Stacy), assault with intent to murder Stacy, conspiring to assault Ruzzo with a dangerous weapon, and assaulting Stacy with a dangerous weapon.

The state dismissed the charges of assault with intent to murder and conspiracy to commit assault with intent to murder pursuant to Rule 48(a) of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure. DeCosta and Laurence pleaded prior to trial. Mastracchio and Roffo proceeded to trial, which began on February 22, 1990, with motions to suppress identification testimony. Following the denial of those motions, trial commenced before a jury on February 27, 1990. On March 7, 1990, the jury returned with guilty verdicts on the four remaining counts.

Subsequent to the jury's return of guilty verdicts on all the remaining counts, Mastracchio and Roffo moved for a new trial pursuant to Rule 33 and also filed applications for postconviction relief with the Superior Court pursuant to G.L.1956 (1985 Reenactment) chapter 9.1 of title 10. Thereafter the trial justice denied Mastracchio's and Roffo's motions for a new trial and also denied their applications for postconviction relief. Mastracchio's and Roffo's direct appeals and their appeals from denial of postconviction relief have been consolidated for this court's consideration. We affirm the convictions.

The collective facts of this case relate a tale of the viciousness that can inhere in life behind prison walls. On January 10, 1988, Ruzzo and Roffo engaged in conversation in the prison gymnasium regarding a woman whom both men had apparently dated at one time or another prior to their incarceration. With their jealousies aroused, the conversation escalated into a confrontation as the two men exchanged words. Ruzzo testified that he got "fed up" with the exchange and uttered a retort that ended the conversation. About a half hour later Roffo returned to the gym with another inmate, DeCosta, who then challenged Ruzzo to go outside and fight. Ruzzo stated that he demurred "[b]ecause [he] didn't know who would be out there."

The following day, at approximately 12:45 p.m., Ruzzo and his step-brother, Stacy, approached the steps leading to the gym and encountered Mastracchio, whom Ruzzo recognized from prior incarceration, although he did not recall his name at that time. Ruzzo testified that Mastracchio asked him, "What's up?" to which Ruzzo responded, "Not much. What's up with you?" Ruzzo reached out to shake hands, but Mastracchio refused, saying, "You'll see what's up in about three seconds."

Ruzzo testified that almost immediately after this exchange, he was grabbed from behind and held while Mastracchio punched him in the face and kicked him. Stacy testified that he observed Roffo, whom he knew by name, grab Ruzzo and pin his arms to his sides. Ruzzo was then thrown to the ground where a more serious attack ensued--inmate Laurence, who had a grudge to settle with Ruzzo, struck Ruzzo several times with "an ice chopper," causing him serious injuries. Stacy testified that while Ruzzo was being knocked down, he was struck by a metal object; and as he fell to the ground, he saw inmate DeCosta swinging a square shovel at him. Stacy testified that he was struck six or seven times before correctional officers came out through the gym doors and stopped the attack. It was discovered at trial that the ice chopper and the shovel had been assigned to other inmates for the purpose of clearing snow and ice from the prison yard.

William Curtin (Curtin), a correctional officer for ten years at the ACI, was assigned to the area inside the gym doors on the day of the attack. Curtin testified that he was responsible for monitoring "the flow of traffic" from the yard through the gym doors to the cell block. Curtin said he knew Mastracchio and Roffo from seeing them "mostly every day" for at least a year before the incident in question. Curtin testified that he was at his post downstairs in the gymnasium on January 11, 1988, when his attention was drawn by "a pounding of something outside the gym door area." Curtin testified that as he proceeded up the stairs to the steel door leading outside, he passed a large window through which he could see into the yard and observed inmate Laurence striking Ruzzo, who was on the ground, with an ice chopper and inmate DeCosta striking Stacy with a shovel. Curtin glanced to his right and "saw inmate Mastracchio with his back up against the steel door that [he] would have to go through to get out into the yard." Curtin recalled that he rushed to the door and tried to force it open with his "full weight" but was unsuccessful because of resistance he felt from the other side. Curtin then stepped back and charged the door, forcing it open and pushing Mastracchio off the staircase into the snow.

Curtin testified that when he entered the yard, "inmates Laurence and DeCosta just stood there and looked at me with their weapons in their hands, and then dropped their weapons." At trial Curtin identified both an ice chopper admitted as the weapon Laurence had held and a shovel admitted as the weapon DeCosta had held. Curtin stated that when he entered the yard, inmate Roffo "was walking away from the incident with his back towards [him]" and soon blended in with the rest of the crowd as Curtin tended to the victims.

After the state completed its case in chief, the defense called Mr. N to the stand. 1 Mr. N, an inmate at the ACI at the time of the assault, testified that on January 11, 1988, he and Mastracchio headed to the gym to work out after lunch. Mr. N stated that he and Mastracchio were standing on the top steps in front of the gym door when they witnessed the assault on Ruzzo and Stacy. Mr. N stated that during the assault the door partially opened and hit him in the foot. Mr. N testified that shortly thereafter the door flew wide open, and he was knocked behind the door and Mastracchio was thrown off the steps. Mr. N's testimony implies that Curtin could not initially open the door because it hit Mr. N on the foot and thus Mastracchio's presence on the steps was wholly innocent.

After his direct testimony, the prosecutor proceeded to cross-examine Mr. N by asking him how he became acquainted with Mastracchio and how well he knew him. The following exchange then took place:

"Q: How is your health, Mr. [N]?

"A: Good.

"Q: Mr. [N], have you tested positive for HIV?

"MR. ANDERSON: Objection.

"THE COURT: What was the last question?

"(Question read)

"THE COURT: I am going to sustain the objection. I don't see what the, where this has any--how this will assist the jury. Next question."

Some thirty-five questions and several minutes after this exchange, Mr. N appeared to falter and asked for a glass of water. The trial justice invited Mr. N to "have a seat" and to take his time. After a pause the questioning resumed, continuing for several minutes, apparently without incident, followed by brief redirect and recross-examinations. Mr. N's testimony ended the court day. The following day both sides rested, and counsel presented closing arguments. During his closing, the prosecutor discussed the credibility of the defense witnesses generally and Mr. N specifically:

"Look at people's conduct on the stand, and what all of this goes to is our own unique human ability to look at a person and form an opinion as to whether that person is telling the truth or not. Or whether he stands before you, whether he looks you in the eye and is telling you what he is saying, or whether he is nervous and fidgity [sic ] and looks the other way like [Mr. N] did when he was getting sweaty on the stand and had to sit down.

"You get the feeling that you get from the pit of your stomach that tells your head that there is something wrong here. That this person is not being completely honest with you, and I can point out several instances in this trial when you probably felt it.

"Did you also get the feeling that I am talking about, the feeling from the pit of your stomach that goes to the top of your head, when [Mr. N] took the stand? When he started sweating? When he had to be seated? When he couldn't look at you when he was delivering his testimony?"

Mastracchio and Roffo raise several issues on direct appeal. However, we first turn our attention to Mastracchio's and Roffo's collateral attack on the convictions in the form of an appeal from the denial of their applications for postconviction relief.

Posttrial proceedings revealed that Mr. N had tested positive for HIV 2 while incarcerated at the ACI. Mr. N testified in camera that the HIV question precipitated his physical reactions on the witness stand, including the sweating and feeling faint. Defense counsel contends that the prosecutor's asking of Mr. N whether he was HIV positive was solely designed to upset the witness and to fluster him on the witness stand. Defense counsel argues that the prosecution destroyed Mr. N's composure and then used his demeanor as a basis for arguing to the...

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