State v. Mata

• Decision Date: 08 February 2008
• Docket Number: No. S-05-1268.,S-05-1268.
• Citation: 745 N.W.2d 229,275 Neb. 1
• Parties: STATE of Nebraska, Appellee, v. Raymond MATA, Jr., Appellant.
• Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

745 N.W.2d 229

275 Neb. 1

STATE of Nebraska, Appellee, v. Raymond MATA, Jr., Appellant.

No. S-05-1268.

Supreme Court of Nebraska.

February 8, 2008.

James R. Mowbray, Jerry L. Soucie, and Jeff Pickens, of Nebraska Commission on Public Advocacy, Lincoln, for appellant.

Jon Bruning, Attorney General, and J. Kirk Brown for appellee.

HEAVICAN, C.J., and WRIGHT, CONNOLLY, GERRARD, STEPHAN, McCORMACK, and MILLER-LERMAN, JJ.

CONNOLLY, J.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

                  I. Introduction .......................................................................  240
                 II. Background .........................................................................  240
                     1. Events Preceding Mata's Direct Appeal ...........................................  240
                     2. Mata's Direct Appeal and Order of Resentencing ..................................  241
                     3. Resentencing Proceedings ........................................................  241
                

                III. Assignments of Error ...............................................................  243
                 IV. Standard of Review .................................................................  243
                  V. Analysis ...........................................................................  243
                     1. Jurisdiction ....................................................................  243
                     2. Arguments That This Court Erred in Ordering Mata's Resentencing Under L.B. 1       244
                     3. The Exceptional Depravity Aggravator Is Not Unconstitutional ....................  248
                     4. Capital Sentencing Statutes Did Not Prejudice Mata's Right to a Jury Trial ......  248
                     5. The Division of Roles Between the Jury and the Three-Judge Panel Does Not Violate
                         the 8th and 14th Amendments ....................................................  249
                     6. Jury Was Properly Instructed ....................................................  252
                         (a) Use of the Term "Apparently Relished" Did Not Render Aggravator Instruction
                              Unconstitutionally Vague ..................................................  252
                         (b) Jury Was Not Required to Unanimously Agree on Alternative Theories of
                              Exceptional Depravity .....................................................  253
                     7. Proportionality Review ..........................................................  254
                     8. Constitutionality of Electrocution ..............................................  255
                         (a) Nebraska Constitution Governs the Issue ....................................  256
                               (i) Early U.S. Supreme Court Decisions on Electrocution ..................  257
                              (ii) This Court's Duty to Safeguard Constitutional Rights .................  260
                         (b) Legal Standards Defining Cruel and Unusual Punishment ......................  261
                               (i) Substantial Risk That Prisoner Will Suffer Unnecessary and Wanton Pain  261
                              (ii) Evolving Standards of Decency ........................................  262
                             (iii) Dignity of Man .......................................................  264
                

                              (iv) No Requirement to Show Legislature Intended to Cause Pain or Lingering
                                    Death ...............................................................  265
                         (c) Standard of Review .........................................................  266
                               (i) Questions of Law and Fact ............................................  266
                              (ii) Deference Due Legislature ............................................  267
                

                         (d) Parties' Contentions .......................................................  267
                         (e) Nebraska Statutes Require a Continuous Electric Current but Fail to Specify
                              Its Strength or Force .....................................................  268
                         (f) Preparations for Electrocution .............................................  269
                         (g) The Prisoner's Body Is Burned ..............................................  269
                         (h) 2004 Protocol Will Not Eliminate Risk of Prisoner Burning or Catching Fire    270
                         (i) District Court Found Some Prisoners Would Experience Unnecessary Pain
                              and Torture ...............................................................  270
                               (i) Heart Capable of Restarting ..........................................  272
                              (ii) State's Theories of Instantaneous Loss of Brain Function .............  273
                             (iii) Defense Experts Reject State's Theories ..............................  274
                              (iv) Evidence Shows Some Prisoners Still Alive ............................  275
                               (v) Sources of Pain in an Electrocution ..................................  277
                              (vi) Evidence Supports Court's Finding That Some Prisoners Will Experience
                                    Unnecessary Pain, Suffering, and Torture ............................  277
                         (j) Conclusion: Electrocution Is Cruel and Unusual Punishment ..................  278
                         (k) Resolution .................................................................  278
                 VI. Conclusion .........................................................................  279
                

I. INTRODUCTION

A jury convicted Raymond Mata, Jr., of first degree murder and kidnapping. A three-judge panel sentenced Mata to death for the first degree premeditated murder of 3-year-old Adam Gomez. The presiding judge sentenced him to life imprisonment for kidnapping. Between his sentencing and our decision in his first direct appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Ring v. Arizona,¹ which required juries to find whether aggravating circumstances exist in death penalty cases. In State v. Mata (Mata I),² we affirmed both of Mata's convictions, but applying Ring, we vacated his death sentence and remanded the cause for resentencing. After a jury found the existence of an aggravating circumstance, a three judge panel resentenced Mata to death.

In this appeal, Mata argues that this court and the trial court erred in numerous respects regarding his resentencing. He also argues that electrocution is cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the U.S. and Nebraska Constitutions.

II. BACKGROUND

In June 2000, a three-judge panel sentenced Mata to death for premeditated murder. The three judge panel found the existence of an aggravating circumstance, exceptional depravity, under Neb.Rev.Stat. § 29-2523(1)(d) (Cum.Supp.2002). While Mata's direct appeal was pending, the U.S. Supreme Court promulgated a new constitutional rule and the Nebraska Legislature responded by amending Nebraska's capital sentencing statutes.

1. EVENTS PRECEDING MATA'S DIRECT APPEAL

In June 2002, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Ring.³ The Court determined, under the Sixth Amendment, that Arizona's aggravating circumstances in capital cases are the functional equivalent of elements that expose a defendant to greater punishment. Therefore, it determined that they must be found by a jury. In November the Governor signed into law L.B. I,⁴ emergency legislation that reassigned responsibility for determining the existence of aggravating factors from judges to juries, as required by Ring, for any capital sentencing proceeding occurring on or after November 23, 2002.

In March 2003, this court decided State v. Gales.⁵ We stated that new constitutional rules apply to pending direct appeals. Therefore, under Ring, we vacated the defendant's death sentence because the sentencing judge, not a jury, had determined the existence of aggravating circumstances. We remanded the cause for resentencing and set out a new procedural rule for capital cases in the wake of Ring. We recognized that L.B. 1 had amended Neb.Rev.Stat. § 29-1603 (Reissue 1995) to require that when the State seeks the death penalty, the information must contain a "notice of aggravation which alleges one or more aggravating circumstances." But we concluded that the notice requirement did not apply to the defendant's resentencing because it is a procedural rule that has no retroactive effect.⁶ We limited, however, the aggravating circumstances the State could seek to prove at the resentencing hearing to those "which were determined to exist in the first trial, and as to which [the defendant] is therefore on notice."⁷

2. MATA'S DIRECT APPEAL AND ORDER Of RESENTENCING

In September 2003, this court affirmed Mata's convictions and his sentence of life imprisonment for kidnapping in his direct appeal.⁸ Although Mata had not raised the constitutionality of Nebraska's capital sentencing scheme at trial, we vacated his death sentence. We found plain error because a sentencing panel had found the existence of a statutory aggravating circumstance. We recognized that double jeopardy concerns attach to capital sentencing hearings in Nebraska. But we decided that Mata's resentencing would not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause because the three judge panel had not acquitted him of the death penalty. There was no acquittal because the evidence was sufficient to (1) find under § 29-2523 the existence of aggravator (1)(d) and (2) conclude that the aggravating factor outweighed the mitigating factors. Under Gales, we directed that on remand, the State could attempt to prove only whether aggravator (1)(d) existed because that was the only aggravator proved at the first trial.

3. RESENTENCING PROCEEDINGS

On remand, before the jury trial on the aggravating circumstance, there were three hearings on defense motions. Mata first moved to prohibit a trial on the existence of aggravator (1)(d) because (1) the original information did not allege any aggravators; (2) Ring had rendered unconstitutional the capital sentencing procedures in effect in 1999, when Mata was originally charged by information; and (3) L.B. 1 had repealed the death penalty statutes in effect in 1999 and now mandated that the State allege aggravators in the information, Mata argued...