State v. Matasek

• Decision Date: 23 May 2014
• Docket Number: No. 2012AP1582–CR.,2012AP1582–CR.
• Citation: 2014 WI 27,353 Wis.2d 601,846 N.W.2d 811
• Parties: STATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff–Respondent, v. Andrew J. MATASEK, Defendant–Appellant–Petitioner.
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

353 Wis.2d 601

846 N.W.2d 811

2014 WI 27

STATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff–Respondent,

v.Andrew J. MATASEK, Defendant–Appellant–Petitioner.

No. 2012AP1582–CR.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

Argued Feb. 20, 2014.

Decided May 23, 2014.

For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs by Jeffrey J. Guerard and Ahmad & Guerard, LLP, Milwaukee, and oral argument by Jeffrey J. Guerard.

For the plaintiff-respondent, the cause was argued by Christine Remington, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general.

An amicus curiae brief was filed by Kaitlin A. Lamb and Colleen D. Ball, assistant state public defenders, and Kelli S. Thompson, state public defender, on behalf of the Wisconsin State Public Defender. There was oral argument by Kaitlin A. Lamb.

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, Chief Justice.

¶ 1 This is a review of a published decision of the court of appeals affirming a judgment of the circuit court for Ozaukee County, Thomas R. Wolfgram, Judge.¹ The defendant, Andrew J. Matasek, pled no contest to the manufacture or delivery of THC (tetrahydrocannabinols), contrary to Wis. Stat. §§ 961.41(h) 2, 939.50(3)(h), 939.05 (2011–12). ²

¶ 2 The conviction is not at issue. Only expunction of the record pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 973.015 is at issue. Wisconsin Stat. § 973.015 grants circuit courts discretion to order a record expunged.

¶ 3 The instant case requires this court to determine when a circuit court is to exercise its discretion to expunge a record. The circuit court and the court of appeals held that the circuit court's decision whether to expunge an offender's record must be made at the time of sentencing. In other words, the circuit court may order expunction or may deny expunction, but the circuit court must do so at the sentencing proceeding.

¶ 4 The defendant challenges the circuit court's conclusion that the statute requires a circuit court to make its expunction decision at the sentencing proceeding.

¶ 5 The defendant argues that the statute allows a circuit court to delay the expunction decision until the offender's successful completion of the sentence. ³

¶ 6 We disagree with the defendant and agree with the circuit court and the court of appeals. We interpret the phrase “at the time of sentencing” in Wis. Stat. § 973.015 to mean that if a circuit court is going to exercise its discretion to expunge a record, the discretion must be exercised at the time of the sentencing proceeding. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals.⁴

I

¶ 7 The facts are undisputed for purposes of this review. At the time of the commission of the offense, the defendant was under 25 years of age; the defendant pled no contest and was found guilty; and the maximum sentence for the offense for which he was found guilty has a maximum period of imprisonment of six years or less. The defendant thus fulfilled the initial requirements for expunction.⁵

¶ 8 After announcing that it would place the defendant on probation with one year of confinement as a condition of probation, the circuit court addressed the defense counsel's request that the circuit court withhold its decision on expunction until the defendant successfully completed his sentence. The circuit court acknowledged that making an expunction decision later might be better procedure on policy grounds, but decided that the expunction statute clearly restricted the circuit court to make its expunction decision at the sentencing proceeding.

¶ 9 The following exchange between the circuit court and the defense counsel ensued:

THE COURT: .... [Defense counsel], I wish they'd write [the expunction] statute differently, because I think it might be appropriate for someone to be able to come back to the court that sentenced them four, or five, or six, seven years and say, here, see what happened to me. I'm a good person. This was just an anomaly. But that's not the way the statute's written. I wish it was. And I've talked to ... our representative to provide for something like that. Or even later in the term of probation or the confinement period. But that isn't the way the statute's written. Okay?

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Well, your Honor, I have had courts—

THE COURT: I know you have.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: —interpret it that way.

THE COURT: Everyone has had it. But until someone tells me I can do it differently I have to interpret the statute by what it says. What it says is the court shall at the time of sentencing determine eligibility. And that's the way I read it.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: But I think eligibility, your Honor, is different than necessarily ordering it at the end of a probationary period.

THE COURT: But I'm not sentencing him at the end of a probationary period unless it's revoked. You know, why don't you appeal me, because I wish they'd change the statute or determine that I'm wrong. I can't read it any other way than the way—than what the words mean, okay?

Because the penalty structure, the expungement statute applies. Could he benefit, absolutely. Any individual who is this age could benefit from a disposition which keeps it off his record.

The next part is would society be harmed. Yeah, they would in my opinion. Because it would, in society's eyes, in this defendant's eyes, it would unduly depreciate the seriousness of what he's done. It wouldn't reflect delivering two pounds of marijuana. It would send a contrary message to this defendant. It would send a contrary message to society. And it would fail to put them on notice of what he's done here. So I can't make that finding.

Now, appeal me. Okay? Because if I'm wrong on that statute I think it's—I'd love to be able to come back at the end of three, or four, or five years, or whatever it might be, and evaluate the person based on what I see then. But the way I read the statute I have to evaluate him based on what he—where he is right now. And that's my evaluation as of today's date.....

....

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: If I'm clear on what you're saying, your Honor, is you would consider leaving the expungement issue open for a number of years. You simply don't believe that the statute allows you to do that?

THE COURT: I agree. That's what I said.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Okay.

THE COURT: I would say I'd defer that determination of whether it's appropriate or not to the end of the probation. But I don't think I can do that the way the statute's written.

II

¶ 10 The question posed is one of statutory interpretation. Statutory interpretation is ordinarily a question of law that this court determines independently but benefiting from the analysis of the circuit court and court of appeals.⁶

¶ 11 The court has developed various tools of statutory interpretation that we shall use in the instant case.

¶ 12 We interpret a statute by looking at the text of the statute.⁷ The statutory language is examined within the context in which it is used.⁸ Words are ordinarily interpreted according to their common and approved usage; technical words and phrases and others that have a particular meaning in the law are ordinarily interpreted according to their technical meaning.⁹ Statutes are interpreted to give effect to each word and to avoid surplusage.¹⁰ The definition of a word or phrase can vary in different statutes or under different circumstances.¹¹ When a word is used multiple times in the same enactment, we attribute the same meaning to the word each time.¹²

¶ 13 Statutes are interpreted in view of the purpose of the statute.¹³Moreover, words are given meaning to avoid absurd, unreasonable, or implausible results and results that are clearly at odds with the legislature's purpose.¹⁴

III

¶ 14 We turn to the text of the statute. The expunction statute, Wis. Stat. § 973.015(1)(a), provides that when the offender is under the age of 25 at the commission of the offense and has been found guilty of violation of a law for which the maximum period of imprisonment is six years or less, a circuit court may order at the time of sentencing the expunction of a record upon the offender's successful completion of the sentence.

¶ 15 Section § 973.015(1)(a) reads in relevant part as follows:

[W]hen a person is under the age of 25 at the time of the commission of an offense for which the person has been found guilty in a court for violation of a law for which the maximum period of imprisonment is 6 years or less, the court may order at the time of sentencing that the record be expunged upon successful completion of the sentence if the court determines the person will benefit and society will not be harmed by this disposition ... (emphasis added).

Section 973.015(2) reads in relevant part:

A person has successfully completed the sentence if the person has not been convicted of a subsequent offense and, if on probation, the probation has not been revoked and the probationer has satisfied the conditions of probation (emphasis added).

¶ 16 First, the defendant argues that the discretion granted to the circuit court about whether to expunge a record extends to when the circuit court may expunge a record. The defendant reasons that because the circuit court “may order at the time of sentencing that the record be expunged,” it may also order the record expunged at some other time.

¶ 17 The defendant's interpretation in effect reads the statutory phrase “at the time of sentencing” out of the statute, thus rendering the phrase surplusage. Such an interpretation does not comport with our approach to statutory interpretation.

¶ 18 We read statutes to avoid surplusage. We are to assume that the legislature used all the words in a statute for a reason. “[E]very word appearing in a statute should contribute to the construction of the statute....” ¹⁵

¶ 19 If we were to hold that the legislature intended that the circuit court's discretion whether to order expunction extends to when to order expunction, then the circuit court would have discretion to grant expunction at any time, rendering the phrase “at the time of...