State v. Matson
| Decision Date | 12 July 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 73125,73125 |
| Citation | 921 P.2d 790,260 Kan. 366 |
| Parties | STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Michael C. MATSON, Appellant. |
| Court | Kansas Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. K.S.A. 22-3201(e) states that the court may permit a complaint or information to be amended at any time before a verdict or finding if no additional or different crime is charged andif substantial rights of the defendant are not prejudiced. A two-part 2. Premeditated and felony murder are not separate and distinct offenses but are two separate theories under which the crime of first-degree murder may be committed. An amendment at the close of the State's case charging the defendant under the alternative theory of first-degree premeditated murder when the defendant had been charged with felony murder does not charge an additional or different crime.
analysis determines whether an amendment prior to submission of the case to the jury may be permitted: (1) Does the amendment charge an additional or different crime? (2) Are the substantial rights of the defendant prejudiced by the amendment?
3. In evaluating the voluntariness of a confession, an appellate court must decide whether the State has adequately proved (1) that the accused knowingly and intelligently waived his or her constitutional right; (2) that interrogation ceased for an appreciable period when the accused exercised a constitutional right; and (3) that the statements made by the police after the exercise of the right did not amount to questioning, its functional equivalent, or statements known to be likely to produce an incriminating response.
4. In determining whether events subsequent to the exercise of a constitutional right constitute a waiver of the previously asserted right, a court must first determine whether the accused actually invoked the right and, if so, the court must then determine whether the accused (a) initiated further discussions with the police and (b) knowingly and intelligently waived the previously asserted right. Waiver of the right must be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent under the totality of the circumstances.
5. K.S.A. 60-420 states that for the purpose of impairing or supporting the credibility of a witness, any party including the party calling the witness may examine the witness and introduce extrinsic evidence concerning any conduct by him or her and any other matter relevant upon the issues of credibility.
6. Determining whether a new trial is warranted based on newly discovered evidence involves a two-part test: (1) The defendant bears the burden of proving that the evidence is in fact "new" and could not with reasonable diligence have been produced at trial, and (2) the evidence must be of such materiality that there is a reasonable probability it would produce a different result upon retrial.
Steven R. Zinn, Deputy Appellate Defender, argued the cause, and Jessica R. Kunen, Chief Appellate Defender, was with him on the brief, for appellant.
Debra S. Peterson, Assistant District Attorney, argued the cause, and Nola Foulston, District Attorney, and Carla J. Stovall, Attorney General, were with her on the brief, for appellee.
Defendant was convicted by a jury of one count of first-degree premeditated murder and one count of second-degree murder. He was acquitted of alternate charges of first-degree felony murder and of additional charges of aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary. Defendant appeals his convictions and sentences, claiming the trial court erred in: (1) permitting the State to amend the complaint's charge of first-degree premeditated murder during trial, (2) failing to suppress portions of the defendant's statement to police, (3) refusing to permit the defendant to introduce into evidence the prior inconsistent statements of a witness, (4) admitting into evidence gruesome photographs, (5) failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the defendant's second motion for a new trial, and (6) denying the defendant's post-trial motion for an independent examination of the tape recordings of his statements to police. Additionally, the defendant raises the following issues pro se: (1) error in failing to instruct the jury on the defense of compulsion and (2) abuse of discretion in sentencing.
Defendant Mike C. Matson was charged with various crimes relating to the shooting deaths of Dale Pavey, who was described by Matson as a cocaine addict and a seller of drugs connected with a group of Jamaican drug dealers, and Pavey's girlfriend Julie Voyles. Matson was arrested in Illinois and returned to Kansas to stand trial for the Matson related the following version to the police. Matson claimed Pavey had threatened to have him killed if Matson did not pay $500 or $600 by a certain date for cocaine he had purchased. The night before the debt was due, Matson, who had approximately $300, was unable to sleep. The next morning, because he had been threatened, Matson armed himself with a gun and drove to Pavey's. Matson knocked on the door. Voyles admitted him. Matson talked to Pavey. When Pavey informed Matson that he had better have the money, Matson said he had the money. As Pavey turned, Matson shot Pavey in the back of the head or neck. Pavey fell face down and then rolled over. Matson stated that after he shot Pavey, Voyles began firing at him with an SKS rifle. Matson shot at Voyles until his gun was out of bullets. He took the SKS rifle from Voyles and shot her. The shot nearly decapitated her. Matson again shot Pavey "to make sure" and so Pavey would not suffer. Matson said that he took Pavey's billfold, but did not take drugs.
murders. Matson admitted to the police that he shot and killed Pavey and Voyles. Matson met Pavey through Pavey's daughter. Pavey eventually began selling cocaine to Matson. Shortly before he was killed, Pavey told his son that Matson owed him money for drugs Matson had purchased.
The defendant gave a similar version of the shooting at trial but for the first time claimed to the jury he had shot Pavey in self-defense. Matson testified that there was a pistol on the floor and Pavey's hands were by or on the pistol. To defend himself, Matson shot Pavey. Matson testified that after he shot Pavey, he heard a gun blast and thought that he had been shot. Matson turned and fired in the direction of the blast. Voyles, who had shot at him, was wounded by his shots. He took the SKS rifle from Voyles, stepped back, and shot Voyles. Matson stated that he then turned and again shot Pavey.
The jury convicted Matson of first-degree premeditated murder in the death of Pavey and of second-degree murder in the death of Voyles. The jury acquitted the defendant of first-degree felony murder in the deaths of Pavey and Voyles and of aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary. Matson was sentenced to consecutive terms of life with parole eligibility in 15 years and 15 years to life. Matson's trial counsel timely appealed the convictions. In addition to the brief filed by Matson's appellate counsel, Matson was allowed to file a pro se brief raising additional issues.
The original complaint charged the defendant with the crimes of first-degree premeditated murder and, in the alternative, first-degree felony murder in the deaths of Dale Pavey and Julie Voyles.
At the time of these offenses, December 1992, first-degree premeditated murder was defined as "the killing of a human being committed maliciously, willfully, deliberately and with premeditation." K.S.A.1992 Supp. 21-3401(b). Effective July 1, 1993, the statute was amended to define first-degree premeditated murder as "the killing of a human being committed ... [i]ntentionally and with premeditation." K.S.A.1993 Supp. 21-3401(a). Thus, in the 1993 version the elements of "maliciously" and "deliberately" were deleted.
Although the crimes charged occurred in December 1992, the State charged the defendant according to the statute which took effect July 1, 1993. The complaint originally charged the defendant with first-degree premeditated murder, stating: The defendant "did then and there unlawfully, willfully, kill a human being ... intentionally and with premeditation by shooting...." The complaint listed "Section 18(a), chapter 291, 1993 Session Laws of Kansas" as the statutory basis for the crime and specified that the crime was first-degree murder, an "Off-Grid, Person Felony." By using the 1993 version of the statute, the State omitted the requisite elements of "maliciously" and "deliberately" from the complaint.
The defendant did not challenge the first-degree premeditated murder charges for the failure to allege all the statutory elements of the crime until the instructions conference--after the close of the evidence but before the case was submitted to the jury. At that time The State's right to amend a complaint or information is statutory. K.S.A. 22-3201(e) states: "The court may permit a complaint or information to be amended at any time before verdict or finding if no additional or different crime is charged and if substantial rights of the defendant are not prejudiced." A two-part analysis determines whether an amendment prior to submission of the case to the jury may be permitted: (1) Does the amendment charge an additional or different crime? (2) Are the substantial rights of the defendant prejudiced by the amendment? See State v. Starr, 259 Kan. 713, Syl. p 1, 915 P.2d 72 (1996); State v. Barncord, 240 Kan. 35, 38, 726 P.2d 1322 (1986).
the defendant moved for dismissal of the first-degree premeditated murder charges, arguing that the complaint was defective [260 Kan. 370] for failing to allege the statutory elements of "maliciously" and "deliberately." The State moved to amend the complaint to include the missing elements. The State argued that the amendment to the complaint was proper because the defendant had adequate notice of the charges and that amending the charge to include the...To continue reading
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...not assert a right to refuse to answer any questions, ask that questioning come to a halt, or request counsel"); State v. Matson, 260 Kan. 366, 921 P.2d 790, 797-98 (1996) (accused declined to answer questions about whether he had told a friend that he had committed the murders, "but did no......
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...a reasonable opportunity to escape or avoid the criminal act without undue exposure to death or serious bodily harm. State v. Matson, 260 Kan. 366, 385, 921 P.2d 790 (1996). In State v. Myers, 233 Kan. 611, 615-16, 664 P.2d 834 (1983), this court concluded that compulsion was not available ......
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State v. Donesay, 77558
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