State v. Matthews

Citation58 S.E.2d 625,231 N.C. 617
Decision Date29 March 1950
Docket NumberNo. 74,74
PartiesSTATE, v. MATTHEWS et al.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of North Carolina

Harry McMullan, Atty. Gen., T. W. Bruton, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

Robert S. Cahoon, Greensboro. for defendants, appellants.

SEAWELL, Justice.

The record on appeal is voluminous and contains a multitude of exceptions. These required and have received careful consideration but space forbids elaboration here.

The phases of the trial most stressed in the appellants' brief and oral argument, and in which they find the more serious challenge to its validity, will be discussed.

1. The theory that defendants were entitled to a discharge as upon acquittal as grounded in the motions in arrest of judgment and similar motions affecting the verdict, has neither technical nor circumstantial merit. The theory is that there was only one charge against them,---that of felonious secret assault,---and the manner in which the court dealt with it had the effect of nonsuiting the state thereon, which, under the statute operates as an acquittal, G.S. § 15-173.

Consonant with the practice here we regard the effect of the action taken by the court as simply withdrawing from the consideration of the jury the more aggravating and more serious elements of the offense charged, leaving to their consideration the lesser crime or degree of the offense. This, within the frame of the case presented, was favorable to the defendants, and certainly within the law and approved practice. Without it, it would still have been competent for the jury to convict the defendants of a lesser degree of crime charged. G.S. §§ 15-169, 15-170; State v. Jackson, 199 N.C. 321, 154 S.E. 402; State v. Williams, 185 N.C. 685, 116 S.E. 736; State v. High, 215 N.C. 244, 1 S.E.2d 563; State v. Jones, 222 N.C. 37, 38, 21 S.E.2d 812; State v. Bentley, 223 N.C. 563, 27 S.E.2d 738; State v. Weinstein, 224 N.C. 645, 31 S.E.2d 920, 156 A.L.R 625; State v. Oxendine, 224 N.C. 825, 32 S.E.2d 648.

The withdrawal of the more aggravated charge from consideration by the jury and submission of the less aggravated phase of the offense was within the discretion of the trial judge.

Closely parallel with the foregoing subject was the exception taken to the fact that the trial judge did not receive the verdict of the jury as first tendered, in response to the formal question of the court as to how they had found. In it they found both defendants guilty, answering, 'Yes, guilty of aiding and abetting,' but the judge sent the jury back for further deliberation after further instructing them as to the significance of aiding and abetting while present.

The answer to this objection may be found in State v. Perry, 225 N.C. 174, loc. cit. 176, 33 S.E.2d 869, 870; 'When, and only when, an incomplete, imperfect, insensible, or repugnant verdict or a verdict which is not responsive to the issues or indictment is returned, the court may decline to accept it and direct the jury to retire, reconsider the matter, and bring in a proper verdict. State v. Arrington, 7 N.C. 571; State v. McKay, 150 N.C. 813, 63 S.E. 1059; State v. Bazemore, supra [193 N.C. 336, 137 S.E. 172]; State v. Noland, 204 N.C. 329, 168 S.E. 412; Queen v. DeHart, 209 N.C. 414, 184 S.E. 7.' See also State v. Wilson, 218 N.C. 556, 11 S.E.2d 567.

The conclusion to which the jury had come was not materially changed by their further consideration. State v. Forshee, 228 N.C. 268, 45 S.E.2d 372; State v. Thompson, 227 N.C. 19, 40 S.E.2d 620.

The instruction given was called for by the evidence that tended to show that the defendants acted in concert. State v. Gibson, 226 N.C. 194, 37 S.E.2d 316; among other things accommodating the person chosen to do the shooting by jockeying the car so that upon its return the shot could be fired out of the right window by a righthanded person.

Defendants were tried for an assault with a deadly weapon and no special evidence was required beyond the intent to commit the unlawful act, and this will be inferred or presumed from the act itself. 1 McClain's Criminal Law, secs. 239, 240.

2. The appellants urge that the confessions made by these defendants were involuntary and should have been denied admission in evidence. There is no suggestion that either of them was coerced, threatened, subject to torture, physical or mental, worn down by repeated questioning or otherwise mistreated in order to produce a confession as the purchase price of surcease from pain or weariness. The contention is that there was some implied promise, or at least hope held out in the conversation between Wyatt and Cook that the defendant would be treated more leniently. Wyatt had said, 'Jim, we know it was you. You had better come clean.' There was no further inducement.

As careful as this court has always been to see that incriminating statements made by persons accused of crime are in fact and in deed voluntary before admitting them in evidence, free from the influence of promise or undue persuasion, and fully recognizing that necessity, we are unable to class the remarks made by Wyatt to his nephew Cook in any of the objectionable categories.

The evidence discloses that Wyatt went to talk with Cook on his own initiative without any evidence that he went, as contended by appellants, with official procurement. He does not appear to have been an emissary, stooge or agent provocateur of the officials. However, the sheriff was present during part of the conversation and this must be given due consideration. The sheriff also warned him that what he said could be used as evidence for him or against him, and this warning, while not required in this state, State v. Dixon, 215 N.C. 438, 2 S.E.2d 371; State v. Grier, 203 N.C. 586, 166 S.E. 595, has been uniformly considered as bearing on the voluntariness of the statement.

Matthews, when first arrested was asked by Sheriff Bardin: 'What in the world were you thinking about?' And Matthews replied, 'I don't know.' The sheriff then said, 'You...

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16 cases
  • Brock v. State of North Carolina
    • United States
    • United States Supreme Court
    • February 2, 1953
    ...continued.' The petitioner objected. The Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed the convictions of Cook and Matthews. State v. Matthews, 231 N.C. 617, 58 S.E.2d 625. The State then proceeded to impanel a jury for the second time, and this time it tried the petitioner to conclusion before ......
  • State v. Ray
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of North Carolina
    • February 1, 1980
    ...will not be disturbed.' State v. Bentley, 223 N.C. 563, 27 S.E.2d 738, 740; State v. Roy, 233 N.C. 558, 64 S.E.2d 840; State v. Matthews, 231 N.C. 617, 58 S.E.2d 625; State v. Harvey, supra, (228 N.C. 62, 44 S.E.2d 472); State v. Robertson, 210 N.C. 266, 186 S.E. More recently the Court car......
  • State v. Kluckhohn, 442
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of North Carolina
    • January 13, 1956
    ...than he had any right to expect. In any event, a person is presumed to intend the natural consequences of his act. State v. Matthews, 231 N.C. 617, 58 S.E.2d 625. Let me add that if the homicide had been accomplished with any instrumentality other than a deadly weapon I would concur in the ......
  • Frazier v. State
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Florida
    • November 21, 1958
    ...tell the truth because we have the evidence against you.' State v. Ross, 1947, 212 La. 405, 31 So.2d 842, 845. In State v. Matthews, 1950, 231 N.C. 617, 58 S.E.2d 625, 627, the accused was told 'we knew it was you' and 'you had better come clean'. The court found this did not invalidate the......
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