State v. Mattison, No. 3590.

• Court: Court of Appeals of South Carolina
• Writing for the Court: ANDERSON, J.
• Citation: 575 S.E.2d 852,352 S.C. 577
• Parties: The STATE, Respondent, v. Anthony Leroy MATTISON, Appellant.
• Docket Number: No. 3590.
• Decision Date: 21 January 2003

352 S.C. 577
575 S.E.2d 852

The STATE, Respondent,
v.
Anthony Leroy MATTISON, Appellant

No. 3590.

Court of Appeals of South Carolina.

Submitted December 9, 2002.

Decided January 21, 2003.

352 S.C. 580

Assistant Appellate Defender Eleanor Duffy Cleary, of Columbia, for Appellant

Attorney General Henry D. McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Charles H. Richardson and Assistant Attorney General W. Rutledge Martin, all of Columbia; and Solicitor Druanne D. White, of Anderson, for Respondent.

ANDERSON, J.:

Anthony Leroy Mattison appeals his conviction for possession of crack cocaine. He argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence where (1) his consent was coerced and involuntary; (2) the search exceeded the scope of his consent; (3) the search was not based on reasonable suspicion; and (4) the search exceeded any scope authorized by Terry v. Ohio.¹ We affirm.²

FACTS/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On January 7, 2000, Patrol Officer William Jones, with the City of Anderson Police Department, stopped a car traveling in Anderson because the car had no rear license plate. There

352 S.C. 581

were three people in the car. Mattison was seated in the back of the car, while the driver and another passenger were seated in the front

When Officer Jones approached the vehicle, he observed the front seat passenger "concealing something in his left hand and reaching between his legs." A consensual search of the front seat passenger revealed he possessed crack cocaine. He was subsequently arrested.

Officer Jones noticed Mattison in the back seat of the car. Jones opened his door and asked Mattison, "Do you have anything on you?" Mattison replied, "No." Jones then asked Mattison, "Do you mind if I check?" Mattison responded, "Go ahead." At Jones' request, Mattison exited the vehicle unassisted. Jones conducted a pat-down of Mattison. Officer Jones testified:

When I got around to the waistband area, [Mattison] kept, in a nervous manner, reaching his hands back down, which led [to] more suspicion that there might be something down there. He kept putting them down. I told him several times, `Keep your hands on the hood or on the trunk.' He complied. He was very cooperative.

At that point, I checked the crotch area and I felt a hard rock-like substance, which I immediately recognized to be crack cocaine.

Jones asked Mattison, "What do we have here?" Mattison replied, "Oh, that's my thing." As a safety precaution, Jones placed handcuffs on Mattison.

Jones unbuttoned the front of Mattison's pants and, while wearing a glove, retrieved a plastic bag wrapped in yellow tissue paper located near Mattison's genitalia. The plastic bag contained approximately 6 grams of crack cocaine.

At no time did Mattison verbally express a desire for the pat-down to cease. Officer Jones stated that Mattison did not appear to be under the influence of drugs or alcohol. Jones declared there was no question in his mind that Mattison "gave voluntary consent" to the pat-down. Jones asserted he did not have his gun drawn and used no coercion to solicit Mattison's consent.

352 S.C. 582

With the assistance of a police dog trained to detect illegal drugs, officers found more crack cocaine under the driver's seat. The driver of the car was placed under arrest

At the arrest scene, four police officers, including Officer Jones, were present. In addition, Staff Chaplain Lloyd Robinson was riding in the car with Officer Jones and was at the scene. Finally, Randall Human accompanied one of the officers to the scene. There were four police cars at the arrest location.

Mattison was charged with possession of crack cocaine with intent to distribute and possession of crack cocaine with intent to distribute within proximity of a park.

At trial, Mattison moved to suppress evidence found from his frisk by the police officer, claiming his consent was not given voluntarily. In denying Mattison's suppression motion, the trial court, considering the totality of the circumstances, ruled Mattison freely and voluntarily consented to the search because he did not think police would search his genital area for drugs. Additionally, the court concluded that, after Mattison gave consent, he "stood by silently while the search occurred[,] without objection." At the close of evidence, Mattison moved for a directed verdict "on the basis that the evidence that has been identified as crack cocaine should have been excluded." He further requested "that Officer Jones and anybody else[`]s testimony that [Mattison] consented should be excluded under all the arguments" he made at the previous motion to suppress hearing. The court denied the motions.

A jury convicted Mattison of simple possession of crack cocaine but found him not guilty of the charge of possession of crack cocaine with intent to distribute within proximity of a park.

ISSUES

I. Was Mattison's consent coerced and involuntary?

II. Did the pat-down search of Mattison exceed the scope of his consent?

III. Was the pat-down search based on reasonable suspicion?

352 S.C. 583

IV. Did the pat-down search exceed any scope authorized by Terry v. Ohio?

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In criminal cases, the appellate court sits to review errors of law only. State v. Wilson, 345 S.C. 1, 545 S.E.2d 827 (2001); State v. Missouri, Op. No. 3563, 352 S.C. 121, 572 S.E.2d 467 (Ct.App.2002). This Court is bound by the trial court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. State v. Quattlebaum, 338 S.C. 441, 527 S.E.2d 105 (2000). The appellate court does not re-evaluate the facts based on its own view of the preponderance of the evidence, but simply determines whether the trial judge's ruling is supported by any evidence. Wilson, 345 S.C. at 6, 545 S.E.2d at 829.

The admission or exclusion of evidence is left to the sound discretion of the trial judge. State v. Gaster, 349 S.C. 545, 564 S.E.2d 87 (2002); State v. Saltz, 346 S.C. 114, 551 S.E.2d 240 (2001). A court's ruling on the admissibility of evidence will not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion or the commission of legal error which results in prejudice to the defendant. State v. Hamilton, 344 S.C. 344, 543 S.E.2d 586 (Ct.App.2001); State v. Mansfield, 343 S.C. 66, 538 S.E.2d 257 (Ct.App.2000). An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's ruling is based on an error of law. State v. McDonald, 343 S.C. 319, 540 S.E.2d 464 (2000).

LAW/ANALYSIS

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV. The South Carolina Constitution provides similar protection against unlawful searches and seizures. See S.C. Const. art. I, § 10. Evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment is inadmissible in both state and federal court. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 34 S.Ct. 341, 58 L.Ed. 652 (1914); State v. Forrester, 343 S.C. 637, 541 S.E.2d 837 (2001); State v. Missouri, Op. No. 3563, 352 S.C. 121, 572 S.E.2d 467 (Ct.App.2002); State v. Austin, 306 S.C. 9, 409 S.E.2d 811 (Ct.App.1991).

352 S.C. 584

I. Voluntary Nature of Consent to Search

Mattison contends the consent to search was coerced, rendering it involuntary. We disagree.

Whether a consent to...