State v. Matushefske

Decision Date01 October 1965
Citation9 Storey 163,59 Del. 163,215 A.2d 443
Parties, 59 Del. 163 The STATE of Delaware v. John MATUSHEFSKE.
CourtDelaware Superior Court

Jay H. Conner and Charles L. Paruszewski, Wilmington, for the State.

Victor F. Battaglia and Hiram W. Warder, Wilmington, for defendant, John Matushefske.

DUFFY, President Judge, charging the Jury:

Members of the Jury, in this case the defendant, John Matushefske, is charged with violating the law in the performance of his duties as a Justice of the Peace. You are concerned only with this charge. You are not to determine the guilt or innocence of any other person with respect to any other charge or possible charge. The case which you are called upon to decide is the case of State v. John Matushefske, and this case only.

The charge is based on an indictment returned by the Grand Jury of this County on September 17, 1963. Specifically, it is charged that on or about July 3, 1963, the defendant violated a Delaware statute in the way in which he proceeded in and disposed of a case brought before him as a Justice of the Peace. That particular case involved a prosecution by the State against one William T. Chipman upon a charge of driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor in violation of 21 Del.C. § 4111(a).

The defendant denies that he is guilty of any offense charged against him by the State. And at this time I should also note that the fact that the Grand Jury indicted the defendant is not to be considered by you as evidence of his guilt of any crime. Whether he is or is not guilty is for you to determine from the evidence which has been presented during the trial. If your recollection of the evidence differs from anything said about it by counsel, or by the Court, you must be guided entirely by your recollection. Determination of the true facts, and the drawing of any inferences from the proven facts, are matters solely within your province. State v. Winsett, Del.Super., 205 A.2d 510 (1964).

It is the Court's duty to instruct you as to the law to be applied by you to the facts, and it is your duty to follow the law as outlined to you by the Court, and apply it to the facts as you find them to be.

As to the law, I first call to your attention a Delaware statute, 11 Del.C. § 5910(a), dealing with the issuance of a warrant of arrest. That statute provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

'When complaint is made in due form to a justice of the peace, alleging that an offense has been committed, the justice shall carefully examine the complainant on oath or affirmation and if he considers there is probable ground for the accusation, he shall issue his warrant.'

This means that when a complaint is made to a Justice of the Peace that a crime has been committed, the Justice must swear the person who makes the complaint. And after that person takes an oath to tell the truth the Justice is to examine him or question him or take his story. In short, the person who makes the complaint must state the basis for it under oath to the Justice. And then if the Justice is satisfied that there is probable ground for the accusation, he issues a warrant of arrest for the person accused.

In proceedings on arrest and when the arrested person is taken before a justice of the peace, this then brings into play another statute which the defendant is here accused of violating. That statute, which is 11 Del.C. § 5913, reads in full as follows:

'Upon the arrest of any person according to the provision of this chapter, the justice of the peace, before whom he is brought in the county where the offense was committed, shall try the case so far as to determine whether the defendant ought to be discharged, or bound for his appearance at court, or held to answer finally before the justice. In which last case, the justice shall proceed to hear fully and to determine the case. But if the matter is not properly cognizable before the justice for final decision, he shall commit, or bind the party for his appearance at the court having cognizance of the case.'

This statute means that when a person under arrest is brought before a Justice of the Peace he must try the case, or hear the case, up to a point where he can determine which of three categories applies to the case. These are:

(1) The State does not have enough evidence to support a case against the person accused and that person should therefore be discharged; or

(2) The Justice does not have jurisdiction to hear the case because a justice may not hear cases involving the offense charged, and therefore the person accused should be held to appear in another court; or

(3) The State does have at least a prima facie case against the accused and the Justice has jurisdiction to hear the case and he should therefore proceed to hear all the evidence fully and determine the case.

The Justice of the Peace is not obliged or required to determine which of these categories applies when a person is first brought before him following the issuance of a warrant of arrest. The Justice may grant the accused a continuance for a reasonable time. And the Justice of the Peace is not required to make the determination as to these categories at the same time, that is, on the same day or at the same hearing. At one time he may hear enough of the case to determine that he has jurisdiction, and hear the balance of the case later. Or he may do it all at one time or in one hearing.

But once the Justice of the Peace has determined or decided that the State has a prima facie case and that it should be heard in his Court, the Justice then must 'proceed to hear fully and to determine' that case.

When must he do this? As to this, the statute fixes no special time, but the law is that he must do this within a reasonable time. And what is reasonable depends upon all the circumstances surrounding the case.

How must he hear the case on its merits? Several things are pertinent as to this. First, the Justice must give the parties reasonable notice of the time of a hearing. The parties in a criminal case are the State, on the one side, and the accused, on the other side. Notice to the State could be given by either notice to the Attorney General or notice to the person who made the complaint on which the warrant was based. It could also be given in any other way reasonably likely, under the facts of the case, to advise the State of the time fixed for hearing. The Justice of the Peace has no duty to give notice to individual witnesses. He has no duty to call persons to testify before him. His duty is to given notice to the parties, that is, to the State and to the accused. Second, the Justice must give reasonable opportunity to the parties, that is, to the State and to the accused, to present witnesses, to hear the witnesses presented by the opposing side and, of course, to cross-examine those witnesses. And, third, he must decide the case upon the evidence presented by the witnesses at the hearing. The Justice cannot decide the case on its merits by taking into consideration, in any way, the evidence which he took or received before he issued the warrant of arrest.

Such is the law with respect to proceedings before a Justice of the Peace.

I turn now to the specific charges in this case. The State makes two contentions, both of which I will submit for your determination. The first of these is a charge known as nonfeasance in office. Specificially, the State contends that the defendant did not give it notice, through its witnesses or in any other way, of the date of a hearing and that the defendant did not hear its witnesses before deciding the case against William T. Chipman. I should note here that a Justice of the Peace has jurisdiction to hear and determine a charge of driving or operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor.

Nonfeasance by a public officer is a crime. A Delaware Justice of the Peace is a public officer. And nonfeasance by a public officer is the willful failure or neglect to perform a duty imposed upon him by law. Under a charge of nonfeasance the State is not required to show that an accused who wilfully failed or neglected to perform his duty was influenced by a corrupt or evil motive. Such a bad motive is not a necessary element of the crime of nonfeasance. The State must show, rather, the existence of a duty imposed upon the accused by law, and the wilful or intentional failure or neglect by the accused to perform that duty. See State v. Winne, 12 N.J. 152, 96 A.2d 63 (1953); State v. Lally, 80 N.J.Super. 502, 194 A.2d 252 (Super.Ct.,1963). Compare In re Tull, 25 Del. 126, 78 A. 299 (Super.Ct.,1910); 43 Am.Jur., Public Officers § 278; 3 Wharton's Criminal Law...

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32 cases
  • Chao v. State
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Delaware
    • January 7, 1992
    ...(the jury is the sole judge of a witness' credibility and is responsible for resolving conflicts in testimony), State v. Matushefske, Del.Super., 215 A.2d 443, 446 (1965) (determination of true facts and the drawing of any inferences from the proven facts are matters solely within the jury'......
  • McCoy v. State
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Delaware
    • January 20, 2015
    ...sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and responsible for resolving conflicts in the testimony.” (citing State v. Matushefske, 215 A.2d 443, 448–49 (Del.Super.Ct.1965) )).103 Brooks, 40 A.3d at 350.104 Id. at 348.105 Bland v. State, 263 A.2d 286, 289–90 (Del.1970).106 Brooks, 40 A.......
  • Maddrey v. State, 533, 2008.
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    • June 15, 2009
    ...the jury is the sole judge of a witness' credibility and is responsible for resolving conflicts in testimony); State v. Matushefske, 215 A.2d 443, 446 (Del.Super.Ct. 1965) (stating that the determination of true facts and the drawing of any inferences from the proven facts are matters solel......
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