State v. Matusky
Decision Date | 01 September 1995 |
Docket Number | No. 124,124 |
Citation | 343 Md. 467,682 A.2d 694 |
Parties | STATE of Maryland v. Michael Stewart MATUSKY |
Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
Gwynn X. Kinsey, Assistant Attorney General (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General, on brief), Baltimore, for petitioner.
Edward C. Covahey, Jr. (Covahey & Boozer, P.A., on brief), Towson, for respondent.
Argued before MURPHY, C.J., and ELDRIDGE, RODOWSKY, CHASANOW, KARWACKI, BELL and RAKER, JJ.
We granted certiorari in this case to determine whether the trial court correctly applied the declaration against penal interest exception to the rule precluding admission of hearsay evidence. We shall hold that the trial court interpreted the exception too broadly, erroneously admitting collateral portions of the hearsay declaration that did not directly incriminate the declarant.
In May, 1993, Respondent Michael Stewart Matusky was indicted in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County on two counts of first-degree murder in connection with the stabbing deaths of Gertrude and Pamela Poffel. When the police initially investigated the crime in January, 1993, they questioned Matusky, as well as Pamela Poffel's estranged husband, Richard Dean White, and White's fiancee, Rebecca Marchewka. In these interviews, White told the police that he knew nothing about the crimes. He also told the police that he spent the entire day of the crime shopping with Marchewka. Marchewka corroborated White's account.
According to Marchewka's subsequent testimony at trial, three months after the initial police interviews, White told Marchewka in confidence that he knew who committed the crimes. White's declaration to Marchewka implicated Matusky as the murderer. Two days after White related his account to Marchewka, she contacted the police. Marchewka retracted her prior statements, which corroborated White's alibi, explaining that she lied at White's request because he feared revocation of his parole if the police knew he had actually been drinking at a bar. Marchewka then recounted White's statements to the police.
White and Matusky were both indicted on two counts of first-degree murder in violation of Maryland Code (1957, 1992 Repl.Vol., 1996 Cum.Supp.) Article 27, § 410. They were tried separately, and Matusky's trial was scheduled to take place before White's. Prior to the commencement of Matusky's trial, both the State and defense counsel sought a ruling on the admissibility of White's declaration to Marchewka. At the initial pre-trial hearing, the court denied the defense motion to exclude the declaration without hearing Marchewka's testimony, but informed the State that the declaration might later be excluded, depending on Marchewka's live testimony.
Immediately before trial, the court again considered the admissibility of the declaration. At this hearing, the court heard testimony from Marchewka, outside the presence of the jury. After hearing Marchewka's testimony as well as oral argument from counsel, the court again concluded that the declaration was admissible, stating that:
[Defense counsel's] argument with respect to the penal interests would be the thing that I really have to make the call on, talking here about admissibility not the weight; the jury will decide that. I find, from a reasonable person standard, as [the State's Attorney] articulated, would know that there is something against your pecuniary, proprietary or penal interests by discussing a homicide or violent act and then driving someone to the place where that act was to be carried out and driving them away, then giving a statement to the police which was a truthful statement; so, assuming the declarant is unavailable, in accordance with the other standard, I am prepared to rule that the statements are admissible.
Matusky was tried before a jury in January, 1994. White did not testify at Matusky's trial because he asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege. The court therefore found that White was unavailable. 1 Marchewka, the State's key witness at trial, gave the following testimony regarding White's statements to her:
In addition to Marchewka's testimony, the State also presented evidence of a bloody shoeprint found at the crime scene. A police expert testified that the shoeprint was consistent with the size and style of a pair of shoes belonging to Matusky, although the expert could not declare a conclusive match between Matusky's shoe and the shoeprint. No other physical evidence connected Matusky to the crime scene.
Matusky testified in his own behalf and denied any involvement in the crimes. Contrary to Marchewka's account, he testified that he did not drive to the Poffels' home with White on the night of the murders. He also denied harboring any animosity toward the Poffels for the death of Ted Poffel, instead attributing Ted Poffel's suicide to his cocaine addiction. Matusky also suggested that White had a much stronger motive to kill the Poffels. Matusky testified that White, who was Pamela Poffel's estranged husband and Gertrude Poffel's son-in-law, was angry with the Poffels for depriving him of money and investments. 2
The jury convicted Matusky on both counts of first-degree murder. The court sentenced him to two terms of life imprisonment without possibility of parole, to be served consecutively.
Matusky noted a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, challenging the trial court's admission of White's hearsay declaration to Marchewka. The Court of Special Appeals reversed Matusky's convictions, concluding that the trial court should not have admitted White's declaration in toto. Matusky v. State, 105 Md.App. 389, 660 A.2d 935 (1995). Writing for the court, Judge Joseph Murphy, Jr., reasoned that:
Applying Simmons, Wilson, and Williamson to the facts of this case, we conclude that the trial judge should have excluded the statements in White's declaration that identified appellant as the killer and supplied appellant's motive for the murders. Those statements were simply not self-inculpatory as to White.... With respect to those portions of the declaration in which White described his role, cross-examination of White would have been of marginal utility to appellant. The same cannot be said, however, about other statements in the declaration. It is obvious that appellant had an important interest in cross-examining White with respect to those portions of the declaration in which White (1) identified appellant as the killer and (2) discussed appellant's motive for the murders. Those statements should have been redacted from White's declaration against interest.
Id. at 403, 660 A.2d at 941. We granted the State's petition for a writ of certiorari to answer the following question:
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