State v. Maughan, 20100348–CA.

• Decision Date: 19 April 2012
• Docket Number: No. 20100348–CA.,20100348–CA.
• Parties: STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Wade Garrett MAUGHAN, Defendant and Appellee.
• Court: Utah Court of Appeals

276 P.3d 1258

706 Utah Adv. Rep. 39

2012 UT App 121

STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.Wade Garrett MAUGHAN, Defendant and Appellee.

No. 20100348–CA.

Court of Appeals of Utah.

April 19, 2012.

Mark L. Shurtleff and Christopher D. Ballard, Salt Lake City, for Appellant.

Richard P. Mauro, Salt Lake City, for Appellee.

Before Judges McHUGH, DAVIS, and ROTH.

OPINION

ROTH, Judge:

¶ 1 The State of Utah appeals the magistrate's decision declining to bind over Defendant Wade Garrett Maughan for trial on an obstruction of justice offense. In particular, the State challenges the magistrate's conclusion that the evidence was insufficient to establish that Maughan acted with the specific intent to hinder the prosecution of Glenn Griffin for capital murder. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 Brad Perry was murdered in May 1984. Over two decades later, DNA taken from the crime scene was matched to a man named Glenn Griffin. Griffin was charged with capital murder in 2005. In conducting further investigation, the police interviewed several people who had been friends with Griffin at the time of the murder, including Maughan. In November 2005, during an interview with the police, Maughan made statements that put him at the scene and implicated him in the murder. The State then charged Maughan with capital murder as well, seeking life without the possibility of parole.

¶ 3 Griffin was tried first, and the State sought to use Maughan as a witness against him. The State anticipated that Maughan would refuse to testify at Griffin's trial by invoking his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, and so, in June 2006, the State granted Maughan use immunity in order to compel his testimony. See generallyUtah Code Ann. § 77–22b–1 (2008) (providing that a witness who is likely to refuse to testify based on a privilege against self-incrimination may be required to testify after being granted use immunity, and that testimony, with some exceptions, may not be used against him). The written grant of immunity informed Maughan that “testimony, evidence, or other information compelled by the State may not be used against [him] in any criminal or quasi-criminal case, nor any information directly or indirectly derived from [his] testimony, evidence, or information, unless the testimony, evidence, or information is volunteered by [him] or is otherwise not responsive to a question.” Accord id. § 77–22b–1(2). The written grant of immunity also informed Maughan that he “may not refuse to testify or provide evidence or information based upon any right against compelled self-incrimination,” under penalty of contempt sanctions or obstruction of justice charges. Accord id. § 77–22b–1(1)(b); id. § 77–22b–2.

¶ 4 Maughan filed several motions objecting to the use immunity grant, arguing that there was an “obvious conflict in compelling one facing loss of life or liberty to testify and provide evidence in the very case where that person is [a co]defendant.” Maughan expressed distrust of the scope of the protection afforded by the use immunity grant, asserting that its “protections are not co-extensive with” his right to be free from self-incrimination; he also raised issues concerning the reliability of the statements he had made to the police in November 2005, asserting that the statements were coerced and untrustworthy. ¹ Generally, Maughan expressed “fear[ ] that his constitutional rights needed to be protected.” The district court rejected Maughan's arguments and issued multiple orders requiring that he submit to police interviews and testify at Griffin's trial. The court's orders further warned Maughan that “[a]ny refusal to answer or cooperate may be punished as a contempt of this [c]ourt, may result in prosecution for obstruction of justice by the [S]tate, or both.” Despite these warnings, Maughan refused to answer any questions during two separate police interviews in February and September of 2007.

¶ 5 In October 2008, the State called Maughan as a witness at Griffin's trial. When he took the stand, Maughan declined to answer any questions and instead responded to all of the State's inquiries simply by stating, “I choose not to answer any questions.” Maughan provided no explanation for his refusal to testify, but Maughan's counsel was present and explained that, although Maughan “ha[d] been advised of the use immunity agreement in this case,” he nonetheless “reassert[ed] his rights under the Fifth Amendment” not to incriminate himself by testifying in a trial in which he “is a codefendant” also “charged with ... capital murder.” Even without Maughan's testimony, Griffin was convicted of capital murder and is currently serving a life sentence without the possibility of parole. Maughan himself was later tried and acquitted of capital murder in June 2010.

¶ 6 In April 2009, however, the State charged Maughan with obstruction of justice for refusing to cooperate in police interviews and refusing to testify at Griffin's trial.² To commit obstruction of justice, Maughan must have acted with the specific intent to “hinder, delay, or prevent the investigation, apprehension, prosecution, conviction, or punishment” of Griffin. SeeUtah Code Ann. § 76–8–306(1) (Supp.2011). At the preliminary hearing, Maughan moved to dismiss the obstruction of justice charge, arguing that the State had presented insufficient evidence to prove that, in refusing to testify and submit to police interviews, he had acted with the specific intent to hinder Griffin's prosecution.

¶ 7 The magistrate concluded that although the State had provided evidence of the other elements of obstruction of justice, “[t]here [we]re no facts in evidence to suggest that [Maughan] had any intent to hinder, delay, or prevent ... Griffin's prosecution or trial.” In reaching this conclusion, the magistrate considered the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing and observed that the State “merely presented evidence that [Maughan] refused to provide or concealed non-privileged information” and “appear[ed] to expect the [c]ourt to infer from the refusals to answer questions at the interview and trial, that such [conduct] demonstrate[d]the required element of intent.” The magistrate, however, reasoned that “[n]one of the facts suggest that [Maughan] had any reason to prevent ... Griffin's conviction.” Rather, the magistrate noted that “[t]he facts suggest that [Maughan] provided assistance in the investigation and prosecution of ... Griffin until [Maughan] himself was charged with the same murder,” and only “[a]fter being charged [with capital murder did Maughan] ... refuse[ ] to further assist in the investigation and prosecution of ... Griffin in order to protect his [own] ... rights.” The magistrate thus determined that “[a]ll the facts in evidence support the inference that, notwithstanding the use immunity, [Maughan] still feared that his constitutional rights needed to be protected.” The magistrate reasoned that “[t]his is not a case in which the facts give rise to two alternate inferences” but rather “the facts demonstrate that the only reasonable inference to be drawn from the evidence presented is that [Maughan] refused to provide or concealed non-privileged information to protect his interests against the prosecution of himself for murder.” Having concluded that “the State ... failed to present any evidence that [Maughan] intended ... to hinder, delay, or prevent the investigation, prosecution or conviction of ... Griffin,” the magistrate refused to bind Maughan over for trial and dismissed the obstruction of justice offense.

ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 8 The State challenges the magistrate's decision at the preliminary hearing that it had presented insufficient evidence to bind Maughan over for trial. “ ‘This matter presents a mixed question of law and fact because a decision to bind a defendant over for trial includes the application of the appropriate bindover standard to the facts presented in [this] case.’ ” State v. Droesbeke, 2010 UT App 275, ¶ 14, 241 P.3d 772 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Ingram, 2006 UT App 237, ¶ 11, 139 P.3d 286). “Accordingly, ‘in reviewing a ... bindover decision, [we] should afford the [lower court's] decision limited deference.’ ” Ingram, 2006 UT App 237, ¶ 11, 139 P.3d 286 (omission and alterations in original) (quoting State v. Virgin, 2006 UT 29, ¶ 26, 137 P.3d 787).

ANALYSIS

¶ 9 “To bind a defendant over for trial, the State must show probable cause at a preliminary hearing by present[ing] sufficient evidence to establish that the crime charged has been committed and that the defendant committed it.” State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, ¶ 10, 20 P.3d 300 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). This requires the State to “present sufficient evidence to support a reasonable belief that an offense has been committed and that the defendant committed it.” Id. ¶ 16;see also Virgin, 2006 UT 29, ¶ 17, 137 P.3d 787. This includes producing “believable evidence of all the elements of the crime charged.” Virgin, 2006 UT 29, ¶ 20, 137 P.3d 787 (internal quotation marks omitted). At this early stage of the proceedings “ ‘the evidence required [to show probable cause] ... is relatively low.’ ” Clark, 2001 UT 9, ¶ 10, 20 P.3d 300 (alteration in original) (quoting Evans v. State, 963 P.2d 177, 182 (Utah 1998)).

¶ 10 “[W]hen faced with conflicting evidence, the magistrate may not sift or weigh the evidence ... but must leave those tasks to the fact finder at trial.” Clark, 2001 UT 9, ¶ 10, 20 P.3d 300 (internal quotation marks omitted). “ ‘[T]he magistrate must view all evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the prosecution.’ ” Id. (quoting State v. Hester, 2000 UT App 159, ¶ 7, 3 P.3d 725). In circumstances where alternative but equally reasonable inferences may be drawn from the evidence in favor of either the defendant or the State, the magistrate...