State v. Mayfield

• Jurisdiction: Oregon
• Parties: STATE of Oregon, Petitioner on review/respondent on review, v. John Edgar MAYFIELD, Respondent on review/petitioner on review. CC 10-84-01096/CA A32196/SC S33165; S33237.
• Citation: 733 P.2d 438,302 Or. 631
• Court: Oregon Supreme Court
• Decision Date: 03 March 1987

Page 438

733 P.2d 438

302 Or. 631

STATE of Oregon, Petitioner on review/respondent on review, v. John Edgar MAYFIELD, Respondent on review/petitioner on review.

CC 10-84-01096/CA A32196/SC S33165; S33237.

Supreme Court of Oregon In Banc.

Argued and Submitted Jan. 21, 1987.

Decided March 3, 1987.

Terry Ann Leggert, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salem, argued the cause for the State of Oregon. With her on the petition for review were Dave Frohnmayer, Atty. Gen., and James E. Mountain, Jr., Sol. Gen., Salem.

Daniel N. Gordon, of Daniel N. Gordon, P.C., Eugene, argued the cause and filed the petition for review for John Edgar Mayfield.

JONES, Justice.

The state petitions for review of the Court of Appeals' reversal of defendant's conviction for sodomy in the first degree. The state argues that the trial court did not err in admitting testimony describing defendant's alleged sexual abuse of the alleged victim's sister, which ruling was the basis for the Court of Appeals' 5-to-4 decision reversing the trial court and remanding the case to the circuit court for a new trial. 80 Or.App. 305, 722 P.2d 1250 (1986). We allowed review to clarify some basic concepts of relevancy. ¹ We affirm the Court of Appeals.

Defendant was indicted for sodomizing Kristina, the eight-year-old daughter of his then fiancee, Katherine, between March 18 and June 18, 1983. In March 1983, Kristina, her mother, her three-year-old sister, her newborn brother and defendant moved into an apartment. The alleged victim's mother and defendant were the parents of the infant brother, Brian. The relationship between defendant and his fiancee deteriorated after the boy was born and, on June 18, 1983, defendant moved out of the apartment.

In his opening statement at trial, defense counsel outlined defendant's main line of defense. Defendant's theory was that the mother and Kristina concocted the story of sexual abuse of the eight-year-old by defendant in order to deny him visitation privileges of the infant boy and to keep him from ever seeing that child again. Defense counsel told the jury:

"John moved out at Katherine's request, this was the day before Father's Day of 1983, that would make it June 18 and 19, I believe, and he moved out because Katherine gave him a letter asking him to move out. * * * Katherine prevented John from seeing his son, Brian. In fact, the evidence will show that Katherine had two other children[,] * * * Stacey and Kristina, and those children are by two different fathers and Katherine has prevented the fathers of those children from seeing them. Apparently after she had the child she wants nothing more to do with the father.

"Well, she tried to prevent John from seeing her son and John went as far as in December of 1983 to file a legal action to gain visitation rights, to make a court make her give him visitation rights.

"It is our contention that the evidence will indicate that, basically, Katherine has arranged this in order to prevent Mr. Mayfield from ever seeing Brian again."

We detail the defense theory because the state claims that the defense opened the evidentiary door for testimony offered by the state that otherwise would have been irrelevant. In evaluating the evidence offered by the state, it should be kept in mind that defendant based his case on the accusation that the mother and, for that matter, eight-year-old Kristina, conspired in December 1983 to fabricate a story to exclude him from visitation and custody of the infant son.

Kristina, the eight-year-old, testified at the trial during the state's case-in-chief that while defendant was living at the apartment he had forced her to engage in sexual intercourse and oral and anal sodomy. She testified that defendant threatened that she would never see her mother again if she told anyone. On cross-examination she admitted that in September 1983, during an interview with a Children's Services Division (CSD) caseworker named Routzahn, she denied that defendant had ever sexually abused her. On redirect examination Kristina explained to the jury that she had denied any sexual abuse by defendant when she was talking to the caseworker because she feared that she would not see her mother again if she accused defendant of abusing her.

To this juncture of the trial, the child's testimony had been restricted by the prosecution solely to prove the sexual abuse of Kristina. However, the prosecutor elected to press for the admission of evidence of uncharged misconduct by defendant toward Kristina's three-year-old sister, Stacey. The prosecutor argued to the court outside the presence of the jury as follows:

"I would submit that we should be able to develop the fact that the reason that she was being questioned by Children's Services Division authorities was the fact that they were investigating sexual misconduct between this Defendant and a sibling.

"I can tell you that the evidence is basically as follows: That during mid-June of 1983 Katherine, the victim's mother, while she was living with the Defendant went to change the three-year-old sibling, change her diaper. When she did that she noted that the rectum of the three-year-old sibling was bloody and appeared to be torn.

"She inquired of the three-year-old sibling what had happened and she said 'Daddy doctor' had done that to her. That was ultimately reported to CSD workers and the CSD workers followed up on that and questioned the victim in this particular case.

"As a second alternative theory for the admissibility of this evidence or related evidence, I can represent to you that the victim is prepared to testify that, basically, the reason why she did not report what had occurred between she and the Defendant when initially questioned by CSD authorities, was that she was frightened that she would be taken away from her mother if she did so.

"And, secondly, that the Defendant at that time was out of her home and was no longer posing a threat to her. Two, three, maybe four months later she observed a document or heard about a document that had been served upon her mother which the Defendant was seeking, either visitation rights or custody rights of the victim's infant brother.

"She decided to report what had occurred between she and the Defendant at that point because she was concerned that the same thing would happen to her brother that had happened to she and her sister. She was familiar with what had happened to her sister and the evidence relating to that. She had, also, observed firsthand an incident of sexual abuse between the Defendant and the three-year-old sister.

" * * * * *

"We are not offering this evidence to blacken the character of the Defendant. We are not offering it to prove that because he molested or possibly molested this three-year-old [i]t is more likely he molested this particular victim. We are offering it to show two things: First of all, to complete the picture as to why she was being questioned by CSD authorities and her mother and her grandmother and Springfield Police Department authorities in August of 1983, as the evidence indicates now. And the second reason is to explain, first of all, her motivations for denying that any sexual contact had occurred in August, and, then, her motivations for ultimately reporting it."

The court then commenced to evaluate whether this evidence was relevant and, if so, whether its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value. See OEC 403. ² The court stated:

"Well, if the jury is wondering why a CSD worker or an officer in August of that year is interviewing Kristina, I think State's interest and motivation in explaining why that is being done, at that time, in order to do so has to show evidence of other sexual contact with a younger sibling.

"On a balancing test State's interest would lose because it is highly prejudicial. State's interest in explaining why the youngster is being interviewed, at that time, falls by the wayside in comparison with the prejudicial effect of showing that in this case.

"More serious concern to the Court is the jury's possible concern and wonderment at why Kristina has told two different versions. One involving the Defendant in her testimony, here, and one excluding the Defendant during those earlier interviews. That is a more vital interest to the State, it seems to me in giving explanation of why that is the case. It comes more closely in on favorable admissibility on a balancing test on any motives that could explain why she is being interviewed, at all."

The court continued to mull over the problem, commenting:

"In the usual case where it has been shown to the jury that a witness made a different statement at a different time, the witness is permitted, at that time, to explain that inconsistency. Doesn't have to wait until rebuttal to explain it, but I--I don't know. When you have something that's highly prejudicial and the Court is involved maybe in a balancing test, I'm not sure that a crack in the door is the same as the door wide open."

After a brief recess, the trial judge ruled:

" * * * Court is of the opinion that key and essential to the issues being present to this jury, the very gist of the issue whether the Defendant did the acts alleged in the Indictment or did not do, the only direct evidence that he did apparently is going to come from the testimony of Kristina, the alleged victim, and her powers of observation, her memory, her honesty, truth and veracity are essential to the determination of the case or the resolution of it by the jury if her testimony or version of it, or any part of it, is disputed. And it has been shown that in August of * * * '83, in an interview concerning it she did not involve anyone, did not have anyone. As a matter of fact, as I recall, whereas several months later her position was different, did involve the Defendant and does now in this trial.

" * * * * *

" * * * [B]ut reading these cases I hope closely, at least the rationale of them, they don't...