State v. Maynard

• Decision Date: 23 May 1904
• Citation: State v. Maynard, 76 P. 937, 35 Wash. 168 (Wash. 1904)
• Parties: STATE ex rel. STRATTON v. MAYNARD, State Treasurer.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

76 P. 937

35 Wash. 168

STATE ex rel. STRATTON v. MAYNARD, State Treasurer.

Supreme Court of Washington

May 23, 1904

Appeal from Superior Court, Thurston County; O. V. Linn, Judge.

Application for a writ of mandamus by the state, on relation of W. B Stratton, against C. W. Maynard, as State Treasurer. From a judgment for relator, defendant appeals. Reversed.

Frank C. Owings, for appellant.

E. W Ross and C. C. Dalton, for respondent.

PER CURIAM.

This is an application for a writ of mandate, made by respondent, who is Attorney General, to compel the State Treasurer of the state of Washington to receive the amount recovered in a judgment which the state of Washington obtained against the city of Seattle, less 10 per cent. of the amount of said judgment, which has been retained by the Attorney General and which he claims he is entitled to under the provisions of the law. This money was recovered in an action brought by the Attorney General, claiming the same to be due the state on account of liquor licenses collected by said city of Seattle. To a complaint setting up substantially these facts, the appellant demurrer generally in the lower court, which demurrer was overruled, whereupon appellant refused to plead further, and the court entered judgment against him. From that judgment this appeal is taken.

Section 8, c. 7, p. 9, of the acts of the territorial Legislature of 1887-88, reads as follows: 'The Attorney General shall receive an annual salary of $1,800, payable out of the territorial treasury. He shall also receive the further sum of ten per centum on all money collected and paid into the territorial treasury, upon legal process instituted to enforce the payment of any claim due the territory for money property, or damages which per centum, in addition to the other legal costs incident to the procedure, shall, unless otherwise directed by the court, be paid by the party defendant, and allowed as costs in the action.' Section 21, art. 3, of the state Constitution, is as follows 'The Attorney General shall be the legal adviser of the state officers, and shall perform such other duties as may be prescribed by law. He shall receive an annual salary of two thousand dollars, which may be increased by the Legislature but shall never exceed thirty-five hundred dollars per annum.' There has been no compensation for the Attorney General fixed by legislative enactment since the admission of the state into the Union, and the adoption of its Constitution; and it is the contention of the respondent that the territorial provision in relation to the per centum to which the Attorney General is entitled is now in force, and that the constitutional provision affected only that portion of the territorial law which related to the salary, while the appellant contends that, upon the admission of the state into the Union, the territorial statute became inoperative, because of its repugnance to section 21, art. 3 of the state Constitution, quoted above, and that the word 'salary,' as used in the Constitution, should be construed to be synonymous with the word 'compensation.' Conceding the contention of the respondent that existing laws are not to be changed by the adoption of the Constitution, except so far as they may be inconsistent with its provisions, we are of the opinion that the provisions of the territorial act are in conflict with the provisions of the Constitution in relation fo the compensation of the Attorney General, and that the Constitution sought, in section 21, supra, to prescribe the compensation for such officer. The language of the Constitution appears to us to plain that it seems scarcely susceptible of construction, but, if construction be resorted to, there are two rules of construction which must be applied, and which, it seems to us, are controlling: (1) If the intention of the lawmaking power is plainly discernible from the language employed, the law must be construed in accordance with such manifest intention, without the aid of other rules of construction, for the object of all canons of construction is to aid in properly arriving at the intention of the framers of the law in question; (2) a Constitution being adopted by the votes of the common people, its language must be particularly construed in accordance with the common understanding of the words and language employed, although, if there were no difference in the rule of construction employed in interpreting constitutional and legislative enactments, it would be equally clear to us that the contention of the respondent could not be maintained. For we think it is plain, not only from the language used, but from the connection of the language with other provisions of the Constitution, that it was the intention of the framers of the Constitution that the Attorney General should be fully compensated by the salary prescribed. Article 3 undertakes to define the duties and fix the salaries of all the executive officers of the state. Section 14 provides that the Governor shall receive an annual salary of $4,000, which may be increased by law, but shall never exceed $6,000. Section 16 prescribes the qualifications of the Lieutenant Governor, and provides that he shall receive an annual salary of $1,000, which may be increased by the Legislature, but shall never exceed $3,000 per annum. Section 17, after prescribing the qualifications of the Secretary of State, provides that he shall receive an annual salary of $2,500, which may be increased by the Legislature, but shall never...