State v. Maynard

• Decision Date: 28 May 2015
• Docket Number: No. 89786–7.,89786–7.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Christopher Nelson MAYNARD, Petitioner.

183 Wash.2d 253

351 P.3d 159

STATE of Washington, Respondent

v.Christopher Nelson MAYNARD, Petitioner.

No. 89786–7.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

Argued Dec. 6, 2014.

Decided May 28, 2015.

John A. Hays, Attorney at Law, Longview, WA, for Petitioner.

Lacey Lorene Lincoln, Cowlitz County Prosecutor's Office, Kelso, WA, for Respondent.

Todd Layton Dowell, Kitsap County Prosecutors Office, Port Orchard, WA, Pamela Beth Loginsky, Washington Assoc. of Prosecuting Atty., Olympia, WA, for amicus counsel for Washington Association of Prosecuting Attorneys.

Travis Stearns, Washington Appellate Project, Seattle, WA, for amicus counsel for Washington Defender Association.

George Yeannakis, Office of Public Defense, Olympia, WA, for amicus counsel for Team Child.

Suzanne Lee Elliott, Attorney at Law, Seattle, WA, for amicus counsel for Washington Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.

Opinion

MADSEN, C.J.

¶ 1 The State charged Christopher Nelson Maynard in juvenile court with six counts of malicious mischief. Less than one month later, he turned 18 years old. Maynard's counsel did not move for an order to extend the court's statutory jurisdiction as provided in RCW 13.40.300(1)(a) before Maynard turned 18. As a result, the juvenile court ruled that it had lost jurisdiction and dismissed the case without prejudice. The State then filed the case in superior court. Maynard moved to dismiss, arguing that preaccusatorial delay and ineffective assistance of counsel deprived him of the benefits of juvenile court jurisdiction, including the opportunity to accept a plea offer from the State. The trial court agreed and dismissed the case with prejudice.

¶ 2 On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that ineffective assistance of counsel, not preaccusatorial delay, caused the loss of jurisdiction. We agree. The court, however, determined that remand to adult trial court for a new trial was the proper remedy. We vacate that order and, instead, direct the State to reoffer the plea proposal of deferred disposition and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with the Juvenile Justice Act of 1977 (JJA), chapter 13.40 RCW.

FACTS

¶ 3 On August 18, 2010, Woodland City police officers arrested Maynard on suspicion of malicious mischief after he went to take photographs of a skate park that he had recently tagged with graffiti. Maynard gave a signed confession. He admitted that he had defaced several local properties with graffiti and also provided the names of other participants. Maynard had just turned 17 years old on August 1.

¶ 4 On September 14, the Woodland City police finished their investigation in the case and turned over their reports and supporting documents to the Cowlitz County Juvenile Court. These documents included a probable cause statement, which gave amounts for each victim's property damage along with Maynard's confession. The prosecutor assigned to the case requested more information from police. The prosecutor received the requested information on November 17, and turned the case over to the juvenile court for consideration of diversion. The juvenile court denied diversion on December 10.

¶ 5 On July 7, 2011, the prosecutor formally charged Maynard by filing an information in juvenile court. Maynard received a summons to appear in court on July 12—19 days before his 18th birthday. The prosecutor delayed filing in juvenile court in order to seek “ ‘more information, specifically in regards to restitution amounts owed to the victims.’ ” Clerk's Papers (CP) at 108. On July 12, Maynard appeared in court and the court appointed him an attorney. The court scheduled arraignment for the following week.

¶ 6 On July 19, Maynard appeared for arraignment with his attorney and entered a plea of not guilty. Maynard's attorney did not notice that her client would soon turn 18, even though the information clearly stated her client's date of birth. She also did not ask her client about his birthday. Consequently, Maynard's attorney did not move at the arraignment to extend juvenile court jurisdiction, which the court must extend before the juvenile defendant turns 18 or else it loses authority to adjudicate the case. See RCW 13.40.300(1)(a).

¶ 7 On July 25, the prosecutor sent Maynard's attorney a plea proposal that included a recommendation of deferred disposition if Maynard pleaded guilty to two of the charges. The offer stated that it expired on August 9, and Maynard intended to accept the offer.

¶ 8 After the prosecutor sent the plea proposal, she noticed that Maynard would turn 18 on August 1, so she e-mailed Maynard's attorney and informed her about his impending birthday. Maynard's attorney, however, did not read this e-mail before he turned 18. Without an extension of jurisdiction, the juvenile court lost authority over the case and dismissed the charges without prejudice.

¶ 9 The prosecutor then filed charges in Cowlitz County Superior Court. Maynard appeared with new representation. He moved to dismiss the charges with prejudice based on two arguments. First, he argued that negligent preaccusatorial delay violated his due process rights because the delay resulted in the loss of juvenile jurisdiction. Second, he argued that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to extend juvenile court jurisdiction before he turned 18. The trial court dismissed the charges with prejudice, finding both arguments provided a separate and distinct basis to dismiss.

¶ 10 The Court of Appeals reversed in a partially published opinion. State v. Maynard, 178 Wash.App. 413, 418–19, 315 P.3d 545 (2013). The court held that ineffective assistance, not preaccusatorial delay, caused Maynard to lose the benefits of juvenile court jurisdiction. Id. As a remedy, the court concluded that remand for trial as an adult would adequately resolve the harm caused by counsel's ineffective assistance.

¶ 11 Maynard petitioned this court for discretionary review, which we granted. State v. Maynard, 180 Wash.2d 1001, 321 P.3d 1207 (2014).

ANALYSIS

¶ 12 We review de novo whether preaccusatorial delay violated a defendant's right to due process and whether a defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel. State v. Oppelt, 172 Wash.2d 285, 290, 257 P.3d 653 (2011) (reviewing the issue of preaccusatorial delay de novo); State v. Sutherby, 165 Wash.2d 870, 883, 204 P.3d 916 (2009) (reviewing ineffective assistance of counsel claim de novo).

Preaccusatorial Delay

¶ 13 The State argues that preaccusatorial delay did not violate Maynard's right to due process because he had an opportunity to extend jurisdiction before he turned 18. We agree.

¶ 14 A court will dismiss a prosecution for preaccusatorial delay if the State's intentional or negligent delay violates a defendant's due process rights. Oppelt, 172 Wash.2d at 288–89, 257 P.3d 653. To determine if preaccusatorial delay violated a defendant's due process rights, we apply a three-pronged test: (1) the defendant must show he or she was actually prejudiced by the delay; (2) if the defendant shows actual prejudice, the court must determine the reasons for the delay; and (3) the court must weigh the reasons for delay and the prejudice to determine whether fundamental conceptions of justice would be violated by allowing the prosecution. Id. at 295, 257 P.3d 653.

¶ 15 Although a defendant has no constitutional right to be tried as a juvenile, we have recognized that juvenile court offers an offender important benefits. See State v. Dixon, 114 Wash.2d 857, 860, 792 P.2d 137 (1990). For example, an adjudication as a juvenile avoids the stigma of an adult criminal conviction. Id. It also provides less harsh penalties. Id. By statute, a juvenile defendant loses the benefits of the JJA if the court does not extend jurisdiction before the defendant turns 18. RCW 13.40.300(1)(a). We have therefore held that a defendant meets his or her burden to show actual prejudice when the preaccusatorial delay causes the loss of juvenile jurisdiction. State v. Salavea, 151 Wash.2d 133, 139, 86 P.3d 125 (2004).

¶ 16 In this case, Maynard cannot meet the first prong—actual prejudice—because preaccusatorial delay did not cause the loss of juvenile jurisdiction. We agree with the Court of Appeals that preaccusatorial delay does not cause the loss of jurisdiction when the State files charges before juvenile jurisdiction expires and the defendant has an opportunity to extend it. See Maynard, 178 Wash.App. 413, 315 P.3d 545 ; see also Oppelt, 172 Wash.2d at 290, 257 P.3d 653. Maynard appeared for arraignment on July 19—12 days before he turned 18 years old on August 1. Maynard's attorney did not move to extend jurisdiction at that time or at any time before he turned 18, but she could have. This failure and the consequential loss of jurisdiction was not the result of the State's actions.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

¶ 17 To prove ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show (1) that counsel's conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) that this deficient conduct resulted in prejudice to the defendant—that there is a reasonable probability that, but for the deficient conduct, the outcome of the proceeding would be different. State v. Reichenbach, 153 Wash.2d 126, 130, 101 P.3d 80 (2004). Although courts strongly presume that defense counsel's conduct was not deficient, a defendant rebuts this presumption when no conceivable legitimate tactic exists to explain counsel's performance.Id.

¶ 18 Here, the conduct of Maynard's counsel fell below objective standards of reasonableness. She did not notice her client's impending birthday, even though the information clearly stated it. Consequently, she did not move to extend the juvenile court's jurisdiction before he turned 18, not because of a legitimate tactic but because of an absence of judgment. An attorney who represents a juvenile should promptly learn his or her client's birthday because the client may lose the benefits of...