State v. Maynard

Decision Date05 June 1984
Docket NumberNo. 178A81,178A81
Citation316 S.E.2d 197,311 N.C. 1
CourtNorth Carolina Supreme Court
PartiesSTATE of North Carolina v. Anson Avery MAYNARD.

Rufus L. Edmisten, Atty. Gen. by Donald W. Stephens, Asst. Atty. Gen., Raleigh, for the State.

Adam Stein, Appellate Defender by Ann B. Petersen, Asst. Appellate Defender, Raleigh, James R. Glover, Chapel Hill, for defendant-appellant.

MEYER, Justice.

On 15 June 1981 a fisherman discovered the body of Stephen G. Henry in the Cape Fear River near Erwin, North Carolina. The body had been weighted down with cinder blocks tied to the body by ropes. An autopsy revealed gunshot wounds and blunt force wounds to the head and eight stab wounds in the abdomen. The gunshot wounds were the cause of death. The blunt force wounds to the head were inflicted before death and the stab wounds had been inflicted after death.

The defendant and Gary Bullard were arrested and charged with first-degree murder. Within a week of his arrest, Mr. Bullard agreed to testify for the State in exchange for immunity from all charges arising out of Stephen Henry's death.

The State's evidence at trial tended to show that the defendant was the leader in a breaking and entering and larceny ring. Defendant, together with Jerry Scott and Stephen Henry, had stolen building supplies, jewelry, guns, a boat and a heavy equipment trailer. The stolen property was eventually sold. One evening defendant's girlfriend called him and said that the police were at his home. Defendant sent Scott and Stephen Henry to verify this information. Scott and Henry were arrested. An agreement was reached with the prosecutors that if Scott would assist the police in recovering the stolen property, he would be granted immunity on all charges arising out of the theft ring. An additional agreement was reached with the victim, Stephen Henry, whereby in exchange for his testimony against defendant and his plea of guilty to all criminal charges against him, the State would recommend that he receive a probationary sentence.

Jerry Scott testified that when defendant heard of Stephen Henry's plea bargain agreement with the State, defendant notified Henry through Scott that defendant would give Henry money and a bus ticket if Henry would leave town and not testify. When Henry refused, defendant began the first of several plans to kill Henry.

Bullard testified that the defendant, on several occasions, asked him to arrange for Henry to come to Bullard's trailer to facilitate Henry's murder. On one occasion, Henry came to the trailer but was accompanied by his girlfriend which thwarted the defendant's plan. On another occasion, Bullard was to bring the victim to a pond near the Black & Decker Plant where the defendant was waiting to kill him. Bullard went to visit Henry but, due to his own reservations, failed to carry out the plan. Instead, he left Henry at his trailer home and told defendant that Henry would not come. In short, there were several plans, none of which materialized.

Bullard further testified that on 12 June 1981, defendant spent the night at Bullard's home. On Saturday morning, 13 June 1981, Bullard left his home to help Henry move. It was planned that Bullard would find Henry alone and take him to the Bullard residence where defendant would be waiting. Henry and Bullard arrived at Bullard's home at about 8:30 p.m. When they arrived, Bullard's wife was there but Bullard did not see the defendant. Bullard and Henry then went out behind the house at which point they decided to walk to a Defendant contended that Gary Bullard had a problem with Henry arising out of Henry's selling marijuana; that Bullard attempted to involve defendant in a plan to isolate Henry so that Bullard could beat him; and that defendant refused Bullard's repeated requests to assist in the plan.

                local store to buy beer.  As they walked through the woods, defendant attacked them from behind, knocking both men to the ground.  Bullard heard sounds of blows being dealt to Henry and saw defendant on top of him.  Bullard sat up and said, "[w]hat in the goddamn hell are you doing?"   Defendant pointed the gun at him and told him to "shut my ... mouth or he was going to blow my brains away."   Bullard testified that defendant made him tape Henry's hands behind his back and that he [Bullard] thereafter ran back to his apartment.  Before he left, Bullard saw the defendant hit Henry several times with a pistol and heard Henry beg "No man.  Don't man.  Stop man."   When he returned to his apartment, Bullard told his wife that defendant had jumped Henry in the woods.  He then disabled defendant's truck in an effort to prevent defendant from using it to take the body away.  Defendant, however, took Bullard's Moped, drove off, and returned a few minutes later with a light blue pickup truck.  Defendant ordered Bullard to accompany him and Bullard replied that he wasn't going anywhere.  Defendant responded that Bullard was "in it" and ordered him to drive.  Bullard drove the blue pickup truck to where Henry's body was lying.  They carried some blankets in which they wrapped the body and then they put it into the back of the truck.  Defendant drove to Dunn to a gravel pit and into the woods.  The two men were unsuccessful in their attempt to dig a grave and decided to throw the body into the river.  Defendant drove to a nearby building and got some cinder blocks and a rope.  They tied cinder blocks around the body and inflicted six or more stab wounds into it to insure that it would sink.  The body was then thrown into the water.  Defendant also threw the gun into the water
                

Defendant further contended that he had nothing to do with Stephen Henry's murder, but that he was at a bar on Gillespie Street in Fayetteville when Henry was murdered. In support of his alibi, defendant offered the testimony of two people who saw him at Ruby's Bar on the night of 13 June 1981. One woman testified that she arrived there at approximately 6:30 or 7:00 p.m. that evening and saw defendant off and on throughout the night, and that there was never more than a period of thirty minutes when she did not see the defendant. When she left at closing time, about 1:00 a.m., the defendant was standing outside. The second witness also testified that the defendant could not have been out of his sight for more than twenty or thirty minutes. In addition, defendant presented the testimony of a number of witnesses who said they heard Gary Bullard admit that he was the one that killed Stephen Henry and that at one point he discussed how he and Scott could place the blame for the killing on the defendant.

GUILT PHASE
I.

Defendant first contends that he was denied a fair trial because several jurors were improperly excluded from the jury panel due to their beliefs concerning the death penalty. Specifically, defendant claims: (a) that two jurors were excused in violation of the standard set out in Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968); (b) that the process of death qualifying a jury prior to the guilt phase is such as to render all of the jurors selected predisposed to return a verdict of guilty during the guilt phase of the trial; and, (c) that six other jurors were improperly excluded because they were not given detailed instructions on the death penalty process before stating unequivocally that they could not impose the death penalty in any case.

A.

Defendant contends that two jurors were excluded from the jury panel in violation

                of the rule in Witherspoon.   We have examined the voir dire conducted to ascertain the expressed personal beliefs of jurors McKoy and McMillan regarding the death penalty.  Although both jurors' initial responses indicated that they were less than certain about their beliefs concerning the death penalty, nevertheless, when pressed, they unequivocably responded that in good conscience they could not impose a sentence of death.  Specifically, juror McMillan stated that North Carolina's Death Penalty Statute "conflict[s] with my own moral judgments" and indicated that in resolving this conflict he would make a decision based upon his own conscience and not the law of [311 N.C. 9] this State.  Juror McKoy responded in a similar fashion.  Thus, these two jurors were properly excused under the rule enunciated in Witherspoon:  to-wit, that jurors who state that their personal beliefs would not allow them to impose a sentence of death may properly be excluded.  Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776.   Defendant's assignment of error is overruled
                
B.

With respect to defendant's contention that the process used in death qualifying a jury prior to the guilt phase is such as to render the jury selected "guilt prone," defendant acknowledges that this Court has already determined that the current jury selection process in this State in first-degree murder cases is constitutional. State v. Avery, 299 N.C. 126, 261 S.E.2d 803 (1980). See also State v. Pinch, 306 N.C. 1, 292 S.E.2d 203, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1056, 103 S.Ct. 474, 74 L.Ed.2d 622 (1982), reh. denied, --- U.S. ----, 103 S.Ct. 839, 74 L.Ed.2d 1031 (1983); State v. Taylor, 304 N.C. 249, 283 S.E.2d 761 (1981), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1213, 103 S.Ct. 3552, 77 L.Ed.2d 1398, reh. denied, 463 U.S. 1249, 104 S.Ct. 37, 77 L.Ed.2d 1456 (1983). We decline to reconsider our decision on this issue.

C.

Defendant recognizes that the answers which six other jurors gave in response to questions asked about their beliefs regarding the death penalty constituted a proper basis for excusal in conformance with the standard set out in Witherspoon. The six jurors, in essence, stated that they could not impose the death penalty in any case, answers upon which the trial court could support its decision to excuse them under Witherspoon. However, defendant contends that "jurors cannot properly be struck for cause unless they give this type of unequivocal response after th...

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