State v. Mayor

• Decision Date: 01 June 1891
• Citation: 53 N.J.L. 277,21 A. 1026
• Parties: STATE v. MAYOR, ETC., OF BOROUGH OF CLAYTON.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

21 A. 1026

53 N.J.L. 277

STATE

v. MAYOR, ETC., OF BOROUGH OF CLAYTON.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

June 1, 1891.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

On demurrer to a plea to an information filed by the attorney general ex officio, calling the mayor and council of the borough of Clayton to answer by what warrant it claimed to act as a municipal corporation.

Argued at November term, 1890, before the Chief Justice and Dixon and Magie, JJ.

John P. Stockton, Atty. Gen., Mr. Westcott, and G. A. Vroom, for the State.

Mr. Jessup, for defendant.

MAGIE, J. The only contention in support of the demurrer is that the legislative act, under which defendant by its plea claims to have acquired its corporate rights, is unconstitutional. The act thus challenged is entitled "An act for the formation of borough governments," and was approved April 5, 1878, (Supp. Revision, p. 44.) The insistment is that this act falls within the prohibition of paragraph 11, §7, art. 4, of the constitution, against the enactment of private, local, or special laws regulating the internal affairs of towns, etc. No other question has been presented. The act in question provides for the incorporation of the inhabitants of any township or part of a township, embracing an area not exceeding four square miles, and containing a population not exceeding 5,000, whenever, at an election called and conducted in a specified manner, a majority of the electors therein, qualified to vote for state or township officers, approved. To. the corporation thus formed is granted certain municipal powers, greater in extent and variety than those possessed by townships. The form of government of the corporation is also more complex than our simple township government, and the powers conferred are to be exercised by a local legislative body. Such legislation manifestly regulates the internal affairs of towns, within the settled meaning of the constitutional clause relied on by the state. Therefore the only problem to be solved in this case is whether the act complained of is general. By the obvious construction of this constitutional clause,—a construction uniformly put upon it when brought in question in this court or the court of errors,—a law respecting municipal corporations, and regulating their internal affairs, will be general, although it operates only on a class of municipalities, provided that class is composed of all municipalities, which, considering the purpose of the legislation, are distinguished from others by qualities or characteristics such as make the legislation appropriate to them and inappropriate to others. In determining whether this act is general, within this meaning, its purpose is first to be considered, and it is then to be determined whether the municipalities on which it operates have substantial distinctions segregating them from other municipalities, and evincing that such legislation is germane to them, and not to others. The design of the act is to give authority and opportunity to the inhabitants of townships—the lowest grade of municipality in our system—to acquire, by the act of a majority of legally qualified voters, another and somewhat higher grade of municipal government, with increased powers for the management of local affairs. Experience has shown that, as communities grow and develop, a necessity arises for the acquisition of a wider range of municipal powers. As the hamlet becomes a village, or the village develops into the town or city in size and density of population, it becomes essential, in order best to protect property, insure public order, and promote public convenience, to endow the local government successively with increased powers and capacities. This necessity must be taken into account in framing any code of municipal laws. Under the requirement that such legislation must be by general laws, it has been thought that, when the legislature has enacted a complete system of laws for all classes or for any class of municipality, it may, by other acts from time to time, select localities and designate boundaries, the inhabitants within which should thereafter be incorporated as a municipality within one or another of such classes. This notion has found expression in section 19 of this act, which provides that, if the legislature shall, by any special statute, name, lay out, and designate the boundaries of any borough, not exceeding in area and population the limits specified, said borough shall be held and taken to be a borough, as if its incorporation had been voted upon in the manner required by the act.

It is unnecessary to determine whether the enactment of section 19 is within the legislative power, the present corporation was not organized under it, and the provisions of this section are evidently so...