State v. Mayor

• Decision Date: 11 November 1890
• Citation: 20 A. 886,53 N.J.L. 4
• Parties: STATE (DEMPSEY, Prosecutor) v. MAYOR, ETC., OF NEWARK.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

20 A. 886

53 N.J.L. 4

STATE (DEMPSEY, Prosecutor)

v. MAYOR, ETC., OF NEWARK.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

Nov. 11, 1890.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Application for mandamus.

Price, Runyon & Stevens, for prosecutor. Coult & Young; for respondent.

BEASLEY, C. J. The question presented in this instance for decision is whether or not the recent act of the legislature, approved the 18th of April, 1889, relating to the coordination, in certain circumstances, of the boundaries of the wards of cities and those of assembly districts, be constitutional. The pertinent section of that act is in these words: "That in any city of this state, which now or hereafter shall contain more than two assembly districts within any such city, which assembly districts are completely and exclusively within the limits of such city, and embrace no territory outside of such city, it shall be the duty of the mayor and common council, or other municipal board corresponding thereto, and such mayor and common council, or other municipal board, of every such city are hereby directed, by resolution, to divide such city into wards corresponding in number and boundaries to such assembly districts exclusively embraced, as aforesaid, within the limits of such city." This act, according to its terms, went into effect immediately, but at that time there was no city in which it could operate, as there was no one containing "more than two assembly districts wholly within it." On the 4th of July of the same year, this requisite was supplied by the coming into operation of the act approved 27th March, 1889, and which rearranged the assembly districts of the state, creating wholly within the city of Newark several of such districts. It produced this effect within no other city. It will be observed, therefore, that the effect of this legislation, if it be enforceable, is to alter certain of the ward lines in the city of Newark, and that it has no effect whatever elsewhere. Under these circumstances, the mayor and common council have refused to divide, by resolution, according to the section of the act already cited, this city into wards corresponding in number and boundaries to these new assembly districts; hence the application for a peremptory mandamus. In justification of this recusancy on the part of the city, its council insists that the legislative regulation so repudiated, applying as it does to the city of Newark alone, is void on the ground that it is inconsistent with that particular provision of the constitution which prohibits local and special legislation regulative of the internal affairs of cities. Before entering into the discussion of the subject thus presented, it seems to me proper to premise that there are two lines of argument, quite elaborately urged in behalf of the city, which have been altogether discarded. One of these is the attempt to show, by an historical examination of a series of statutes relating to the city of Newark, that the present legislation is a designed contrivance' fabricated by the law-makers, in furtherance of an illegitimate purpose, to violate the constitutional provision in question; and, in the second place, that the policy of the acts thus criticised are adverse to the public well being. It will require but little reflection to satisfy any one that such considerations as these are wholly foreign to the inquiry before us. The legislature is a branch of the government co-ordinate with the judiciary, and it would be both highly indecorous as well as highly illegal for either to criticise, in a moral point of view, the conduct of the other. On such occasions as the present, the sole and exclusive question is whether the given legislation is consistent or not with constitutional requirements,—an inquiry that cannot be forwarded in the least degree by a knowledge of the purpose, whether good or bad, that led to its enactment. And, in like manner, a decision of the question whether the policy embodied in a statute be consistent or inconsistent with the public welfare is in no wise a judicial, but altogether a legislative, function. Consequently, in matters of this kind, it must be assumed as postulates not to be questioned that the challenged statute was passed from proper motives, and that if put in force it will be conducive to the well-being of the community. Passing these irrelevancies I find three important subjects discussed in the briefs before me. These subjects are: (1) The question whether the legislation now in question is local and special in the constitutional sense. (2) If it be such, is it within the interdiction of the constitution? And (3) what is the effect of a certain alleged imperfection of the assembly district act an imperfection which will be specified in the sequel. These questions will be briefly considered in the order in which they are thus stated.

Is this legislation "special," in the constitutional sense of that term? On the part of the city of Newark it is insisted that this question must be answered in the affirmative, inasmuch as the act affects the political organization of that city only. That the statute has, under present circumstances, no scope beyond this cannot of course be denied; for there is no other city in the state that has more than two assembly districts wholly within its boundaries, and that is the quality of the situation that calls into operation the statutory regulation now impugned. That an alteration of the boundaries of the wards of a city constitutes a regulation of its internal affairs is a proposition that is entirely indisputable. Nor is any attempt made in the argument in this case to put it in question; for the contention of the counsel of the relator is that upon the assumption of this statute having the effect thus ascribed to it, and that at present its operation is localized in this particular city, nevertheless, it is in point of law a general, and not a special act. In support of this position the course of reasoning was to this effect. viz.: That this law, according to its terms, is made applicable to every city in the state, and that, although it is at the present moment operative in the city of Newark alone, under future legislation recasting the assembly districts, it may become operative in other places; and that when the law in question went into effect there was no place in the state which it affected; and that, being then constitutional, it could not be bereft of such legality for the reason that the assembly district act subsequently caused it to be operative in the city of Newark alone. That the statute under consideration when it first went into force was constitutional may well be conceded. The system it established was a general one, and by appropriate legislation might have been established in every city in the state; and, under such circumstances, the legislation would have been plainly unobjectionable. But it is manifest, being in its inceptive stage absolutely inert, it was possessed of a potentiality of becoming, in effect, either general or special, as extrinsic legislation might dictate, and the inquiry therefore supervenes, what is the constitutional complexion of the statute when such extrinsic legislation has imparted to it a purely local and special force? Primarily, it was possessed of no operative force; now, with the assistance of the assembly district act, it has force in the city of Newark alone. Granting validity to these two statutes, it is plain that by their co-operation the internal affairs of this city will be subjected to a special and exclusive regulation. As this end, it is conceded, could not be accomplished by the force of a single statute, the question at this point to be...