State v. Mayor

• Citation: 58 N.J.L. 604,33 A. 850
• Parties: STATE (JOHNSON, Prosecutor) v. MAYOR, ETC., OF BOROUGH OF ASBURY PARK.
• Decision Date: 20 February 1896
• Court: United States State Supreme Court (New Jersey)

33 A. 850

58 N.J.L. 604

STATE (JOHNSON, Prosecutor)

v. MAYOR, ETC., OF BOROUGH OF ASBURY PARK.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

Feb. 20, 1896.

Certiorari, on the relation of George C Johnson, against the mayor and council of the borough of Asbury Park, to remove an ordinance providing for licensing certain trades and occupations.

Argued February term, 1896, before DEPUE, VAN SYCKEL, and GUMMERE, JJ.

R. T. & W. B. Stout, Claude V. Guerin, and Alan H. Strong, for prosecutor.

Hawkins & Durand and Collins & Corbin, for defendant.

DEPUE, J. This writ brings up for review an ordinance of the borough of Asbury Park relating to licenses, approved May 7, 1895. The first section ordains that it shall not be lawful for any person to pursue any occupation or business therein mentioned within the limits of Asbury Park unless he shall first obtain a license for such privilege, and pay a license fee therefor as thereinafter mentioned. The prosecutor is a butcher, carrying on business within the limits of Asbury Park, soliciting orders, and delivering meat with a wagon drawn by one horse. The section of the ordinance which relates to his business is section 5, which is in these words: "That the owners of each and every grocer, butcher, baker, oyster, fish, clam, milk, kindling wood, photographer, dry goods, furniture, lumber, brick, coal, builder, stone, cabinet maker, hawking, or peddling wagons, and 'all other soliciting or delivery wagons not herein particularly specified,' engaged or used within the limits of the borough of Asbury Park for the purposes of soliciting orders, or for delivering goods, wares, or merchandise of any kind, drawn by two horses, shall pay to the mayor and council a license fee for said privilege of fifteen dollars for each and every wagon so used and employed; and a license fee of ten dollars for each and every butcher, grocer, baker, oyster, fish, clam, milk, kindling wood, photographer, dry goods, furniture, lumber, brick, coal, builder, stone, cabinet maker, hawking, or peddling wagons drawn by one horse, so used and employed; and any person or company violating the provisions of this section or any part hereof shall on conviction thereof forfeit and pay to this borough the sum of one hundred dollars."

The language used in drafting this section and the collocation of words and sentences in it are not felicitous, but the object and purpose of the ordinance are sufficiently expressed. The object of this section is to subject to the payment of license fees the owners of the vehicles named for the privilege of transacting their business within the borough limits. The ordinance fixed the license fees at such a sum as to indicate a taxation for revenue purposes. It was adopted in virtue of an act of the legislature entitled "An act to amend an act respecting licenses in the boroughs of this state." P. L. 1895, p. 490. This act in express terms empowers the municipal authorities of boroughs to pass ordinances "to license and regulate the owners or drivers of all vehicles used in connection with any business or occupation for the purpose of soliciting orders or delivering goods within the limits of the municipality," and to fix the license fees therefor which may be imposed "for the purpose of revenue," and also to fix and prescribe penalties for the violation of any such ordinance in a sum not less than $10 nor more than $100. It is unnecessary to discuss the limitation on the amount of license fees that may be exacted by ordinances adopted under the police power of regulation. North Hudson Co. Ry. Co. v. City of Hoboken, 41 N. J. Law, 71-78. The act above referred to expressly authorizes ordinances imposing license fees for revenue purposes, and legalizes ordinances adopted for that purpose. Flanagan v. Treasurer, 44 N. J. Law, 118; Morgan v. Orange, 50 N. J. Law, 389, 13 Atl. 240; Haynes v. City of Cape May, 52 N. J. Law, 180, 19 Atl. 176. The penalty named in the ordinance for transacting business without taking out a license is also within the power conferred by the act. Haynes v. City of Cape May, supra.

The title of the act of 1895 sufficiently expresses its object, in compliance with the constitutional requirements. The title is "An act respecting licenses in the boroughs of this state." The object sought in the end which the legislative act purposes to accomplish, and not the details provided to reach that end, is all that is required in the title of the act. Walter v. Town of Union, 33 N. J. Law, 350. Nor does the act violate that constitutional provision which forbids special or local laws, in that it applies only to boroughs. The act of 1878 (P. L. p. 403) which authorizes the formation of boroughs, is a general act for the formation of a minor...