State v. McAttee
| Decision Date | 09 October 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. 00-2803-CR.,00-2803-CR. |
| Citation | 2001 WI App 262,248 Wis.2d 865,637 N.W.2d 774 |
| Parties | STATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Eddie MCATTEE, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Wisconsin Court of Appeals |
On behalf of the defendant-appellant, the cause was submitted on the briefs of Russell D. Bohach, of Milwaukee.
On behalf of the plaintiff-respondent, the cause was submitted on the brief of James E. Doyle, attorney general, and James M. Freimuth, assistant attorney general.
Before Fine, Schudson and Curley, JJ.
¶ 1.
Eddie McAttee appeals from the judgment of conviction for first-degree intentional homicide and armed robbery, following a jury trial. He argues that the trial court's refusal to suppress his statements to police was erroneous because: (1) the police did not have probable cause to arrest him; (2) the police presented false information to the magistrate who found probable cause and, therefore, he did not receive a valid probable cause hearing; and (3) his statements were not sufficiently attenuated from the illegal arrest and probable cause determination to allow for their admission. We reject his first two arguments and need not address his third; accordingly, we affirm.
¶ 2. On May 8, 1998, Leroy Taylor was shot to death while sitting in his car. During the ensuing investigation, the police interviewed McAttee, whose mother had dated Taylor and borrowed money from him. McAttee voluntarily accompanied police to the police administration building for the interview and, following that interview, the police allowed McAttee to leave. On June 8, however, City of Milwaukee Police Detective Dennis Kuchenreuther and Officer Kenneth Smith received information from a confidential informant, which led to McAttee's arrest on June 10.
¶ 3. According to the testimony of Detective Kuchenreuther and Officer Smith at the January 5, 1999 hearing on McAttee's motion to suppress his statements to police, the informant provided information including: (1) that she was a "best friend" of Lakesha Holmon (McAttee's girlfriend and the mother of his children); (2) that Lakesha had said that McAttee had "confessed" to killing a person named "Leroy," in the presence of a female; (3) that Lakesha's sister, Latoya, had said that Lakesha had told her that she had been present at the killing and had seen the victim "take his last breath"; and (4) that Lakesha's mother, Colleen Holman, had said that McAttee had confessed to her that he had killed Leroy Taylor. Detective Kuchenreuther also testified that he had spoken directly with Colleen, and that she had told him that Lakesha had told her that McAttee "had killed someone" named "Leroy."
¶ 4. Based primarily on the information obtained from the informant, police arrested McAttee at 9:40 a.m. on June 10, and interviewed him six times between then and the morning of June 13. McAttee made inculpatory statements, but did not confess to the killing.
¶ 5. At the January 5, 1999 hearing on McAttee's motion, Officer Smith testified that, on June 10, he wrote a police report in support of probable cause for McAttee's continued detention. The report was presented to a court commissioner at 9:03 a.m. on June 12, forty-seven hours and twenty-three minutes after McAttee's arrest. At the February 1, 1999 hearing, defense counsel read into the record this portion of Officer Smith's report: "Eddie McAttee was implicated by a co[]conspirator as being the person who shot the victim causing his death on 5-8-98."2 Officer Smith testified that he used the term "co[]conspirator" to refer to Lakesha, based on the informant's statement that Latoya had said that Lakesha had admitted that she had been present at the homicide.
¶ 6. McAttee was charged with first-degree intentional homicide and armed robbery. The trial court denied McAttee's motion to suppress his statements to police. At his trial, the statements were introduced and they, together with other evidence, established that McAttee, who was sitting in the car arguing with Taylor, shot him in the head three times, causing his death, and took money from him. A jury found McAttee guilty of both charges.
¶ 7. McAttee first argues that the police did not have probable cause to arrest him because the informant "did not relate details which she personally observed, or which were directly attributed to [him]," but rather, "provided information to the police which was twice removed from [him]." He contends that the information provided by the informant "was inherently unreliable, and therefore could not be used to establish probable cause." McAttee points out that Detective Kuchenreuther testified that he had not had previous contact with the informant. McAttee also claims that Detective Kuchenreuther testified that he had no personal knowledge of whether the informant was reliable.3 Additionally, McAttee notes, nothing in the record "shows that any independent verification of the informant's information was attempted by the Milwaukee Police Department." McAttee's arguments miss the mark.
[1, 2]
¶ 8. In reviewing the trial court's denial of McAttee's motion to suppress evidence, we determine de novo whether the facts, here undisputed, satisfy the constitutional standards regarding probable cause to arrest. See State v. Mitchell, 167 Wis. 2d 672, 684, 482 N.W.2d 364 (1992)
; State v. Richardson, 156 Wis. 2d 128, 137-38, 456 N.W.2d 830 (1990); State v. Riddle, 192 Wis. 2d 470, 475, 531 N.W.2d 408 (Ct. App. 1995). "Probable cause to arrest refers to that quantum of evidence which would lead a reasonable police officer to believe that the defendant probably committed a crime." Browne v. State, 24 Wis. 2d 491, 503, 129 N.W.2d 175 (1964).
[3-5]
¶ 9. Probable cause to arrest may be based on hearsay information that is "shown to be reliable and emanating from a credible source." Laster v. State, 60 Wis. 2d 525, 532, 211 N.W.2d 13 (1973). Thus, information from a confidential informant may supply probable cause to arrest if police know the informant and "from their own direct knowledge know the informant to be reliable." Browne, 24 Wis. 2d at 506. Whether information from a confidential informant is sufficient to establish probable cause to arrest depends on the totality of the circumstances, including the informant's "veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge." See Richardson, 156 Wis. 2d at 140
(citation omitted).
¶ 10. McAttee's argument flows from at least two faulty premises: (1) that Detective Kuchenreuther, rather than Officer Smith, who had had previous dealings with the informant, was required to have had firsthand personal knowledge of the informant's reliability; and (2) that the police "had an independent obligation to ascertain the reliability of Lake[sh]a Holmon, whose statements the informant was transmitting."
¶ 11. First, Detective Kuchenreuther was entitled to rely on Officer Smith's knowledge of the confidential informant. See State v. Black, 2000 WI App 175, ¶ 17 n.4, 238 Wis. 2d 203, 617 N.W.2d 210
(), review denied, 2000 WI 121, 239 Wis. 2d 310, 619 N.W.2d 93, cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 1166 (2001). And Officer Smith had ample reason to rely on the information provided by this informant. At the January 5, 1999 hearing on McAttee's motion, Officer Smith testified:
See State v. Reed, 156 Wis. 2d 546, 555, 457 N.W.2d 494 (Ct. App. 1990)
().
¶ 12. Second, for purposes of probable cause to arrest, the police were entitled to rely on information from a known and reliable informant without independently determining the reliability of the informant's source or the source's information. The confidential informant, not Lakesha, was the person who provided police with Latoya's account of Lakesha's statement. As we have just recounted, Officer Smith had ample basis to rely on the informant. Evaluating the information obtained from the informant, the police then had discretionary authority to determine whether additional information from the informant's sources, or corroboration or confirmation of the underlying information, was necessary before making an arrest.
¶ 13. Here, as a matter of fact, Detective Kuchenreuther did obtain some corroboration when Colleen informed him that Lakesha had told her that McAttee had admitted killing "Leroy." Moreover, from their investigation and initial interview of McAttee, police already had information corroborating the relationships among McAttee, Lakesha, Latoya, Colleen, and Leroy. See State v. Lopez, 207 Wis. 2d 413, 426, 559 N.W.2d 264 (Ct. App. 1996)
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