State v. McBride, Appellate Case No. 2013–002391

Citation786 S.E.2d 435,416 S.C. 379
Decision Date17 February 2016
Docket NumberAppellate Case No. 2013–002391,Opinion No. 5381
CourtCourt of Appeals of South Carolina
PartiesThe State, Respondent, v. Justin McBride, Appellant.

Wendy Raina Johnson Keefer, of Keefer & Keefer, LLC, Joshua Preston Stokes, of McCoy & Stokes, LLC, and Adam Owensby, of Carolina Firm, LLC, all of Charleston, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant Deputy Attorney General David A. Spencer, both of Columbia, and Ernest Adolphus Finney, III, of Sumter, for Respondent.

SHORT

, J.:

Justin McBride appeals his conviction for first-degree criminal sexual conduct with a minor, arguing the following: (1) the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over McBride because he was a juvenile1 ; (2) numerous evidentiary and jury charge issues; (3) the evidence presented was insufficient to prove the required elements of the crime; and (4) the trial court erred in excluding only a portion of McBride's statement. We affirm.2

BACKGROUND FACTS

The victim3 testified that on June 21, 2010, she was attending summer school. When she arrived home on the school bus, her mother was not there. The victim went to her aunt's house next door.4 The victim testified her cousin, McBride, was home alone and let her in. The victim sat on the couch while McBride went into the kitchen. When McBride returned, the victim asked him to turn the television off. The victim testified McBride turned the television off, then “took out his manhood.

And then he told [me] to jerk it. And he grabbed my hand, and put my hand on his manhood. And I jerk it away from him. And then that's when he is going to grab my head, and pull it down to make me put my mouth on it.” The victim next testified she pushed McBride away from her, [a]nd that's when the white stuff and clear stuff came out of his manhood. It was in my mouth and on my shirt. And I ran in the bathroom.” The victim spit into the sink, wiped her shirt with tissue, and threw the tissue away. The victim testified she was wearing a black shirt and her “birthday pants that [her] grandmother gave [her].” According to the victim, when she returned to the living room, McBride was spraying the room with “man's perfume.” The victim testified she ran to the front door, was blocked by McBride, ran to the back door, and went home.

The victim's mother was home by then and opened the door when the victim knocked. The victim originally denied anything was wrong. The mother smelled the “man's perfume” on the victim and saw a deodorant stain on the victim's shirt. According to the victim, she had deodorant on the back of her shirt from where McBride had his arm around her neck when he forced her to touch him. The victim testified she spoke to Detective Wilma Trena Hamlet of the Kingstree Police Department and two other officers within ten to fifteen minutes of returning home.

Hamlet testified minor inconsistencies between the victim's first and second statements included which door she ran out of when exiting McBride's house. Hamlet also admitted that no deodorant was collected from McBride.

The victim's mother testified that on the day in question, when she arrived home, the victim was not there, but she arrived shortly thereafter. As the victim passed her in the entryway, the mother smelled men's cologne and saw the stain on the victim's shirt. After questioning the victim, the mother went next door and questioned McBride. She returned home and called her husband, her sister (the sister), and McBride's mother. The sister eventually called the police.

The sister testified she arrived at the victim's house after receiving the telephone call and confronted McBride after the victim told her what happened. According to the sister, McBride said he did not mean to do it, and “tr [ied] to compromise with [her].” The sister described it as McBride's confession.

At the close of the evidence, McBride moved for a directed verdict, arguing there was no testimony of penetration of the victim's mouth. The court reporter replayed the testimony of the victim's cross-examination, and the trial court denied the motion, finding direct and circumstantial evidence. The jury convicted McBride of first degree criminal sexual conduct. This appeal follows.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In criminal cases, this court reviews errors of law only and is bound by the trial court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. State v. Edwards , 384 S.C. 504, 508, 682 S.E.2d 820, 822 (2009)

. Thus, on review, the court is limited to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion. Id. An abuse of discretion occurs when the court's decision is unsupported by the evidence or controlled by an error of law. State v. Black , 400 S.C. 10, 16, 732 S.E.2d 880, 884 (2012). This [c]ourt does not re-evaluate the facts based on its own view of the preponderance of the evidence but simply determines whether the trial court's ruling is supported by any evidence.” Edwards , 384 S.C. at 508, 682 S.E.2d at 822.

I. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

McBride argues the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case because he was sixteen at the time of the alleged crime and the case was not properly transferred to the court of general sessions. We disagree.

The State argues this issue is not preserved for our review and is a matter of personal jurisdiction, not subject matter jurisdiction. We agree. This issue was not raised to the trial court; thus, unless it involves subject matter jurisdiction, it must have been raised to and ruled upon by the trial court to be preserved for appellate review. See State v. Dunbar , 356 S.C. 138, 142, 587 S.E.2d 691, 693 (2003)

(stating an issue must be both raised to and ruled upon by the trial court in order to be preserved for appellate review); Ex parte Cannon , 385 S.C. 643, 654, 685 S.E.2d 814, 820 (Ct. App. 2009) (“Lack of subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time, even for the first time on appeal, by a party or by the court.”). Because the circuit court has the power to hear criminal cases, we find the issue was not one of subject matter jurisdiction. See State v. Gentry , 363 S.C. 93, 100, 610 S.E.2d 494, 498 (2005)

(explaining issues relating to subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time and clarifying a court's subject matter jurisdiction is that court's power “to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong”). Thus, McBride has not preserved the issue for appellate review.

II. Evidentiary Rulings and Jury Charges

McBride argues numerous evidentiary and jury charge errors relating to the loss of the victim's clothing by the investigating police department, the admission of photographs, and the limitation of his cross-examination regarding the Department's investigation of the victim. We find no reversible errors.

A. The Victim's Shirt

McBride argues the trial court erred in limiting his ability to cross-examine witnesses regarding the victim's shirt, which law enforcement lost. Further, McBride maintains his due process rights were violated by the loss of the victim's shirt. McBride also argues the trial court erred in denying his motion for an adverse inference jury charge on the issue. We affirm.

The mother testified she bagged the victim's clothing and three days later, she took it with the victim to the victim's forensic and medical examination. The facility double-bagged the clothing, labeled the bag, and instructed the mother to deliver it to the police department, which she did later that day. The mother testified she gave it to a bald man at the department.

Lieutenant Thomas McCrea, of the Kingstree Police Department, testified the only bald employee of the department was the evidence custodian, Sergeant Grant Huckabee. McCrea testified only Huckabee and the Chief of Police had access to evidence at the department and both had left the department. McCrea testified the mother came to the department to retrieve the clothing and, at that time, McCrea's understanding based on protocol was that the clothing would have been at the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division (SLED) for testing. However, he had never seen a report indicating the clothing was sent to SLED. He admitted the department did not have the clothing, an intake sheet reporting receiving it, or an analysis from SLED, and that SLED had no record of receiving it. He also admitted other evidence in the department had been lost during Huckabee's tenure with the department.

The allegedly improper limitation of cross-examination arose during McCrea's cross-examination. McBride asked, “Do you know why Officer Huckabee left the department? .... Can you disclose to the court why?” The State objected on the ground of relevance, and the trial court sustained the objection. McBride made no further attempt to cross-examine McCrea regarding the lost shirt. Furthermore, McBride did not raise the due process argument arising from the limitation of cross-examination that he now raises on appeal. Thus, the issue is not preserved for appellate review. See Dunbar , 356 S.C. at 142, 587 S.E.2d at 693–94

(stating an issue must be both raised to and ruled upon by the trial court in order to be preserved for appellate review).

McBride argues his due process rights were violated because the shirt was lost. We disagree.

Relying on State v. Breeze , 379 S.C. 538, 665 S.E.2d 247 (Ct. App. 2008)

, the trial court found no due process violation because there was no bad faith by the State and no evidence the lost clothing possessed any exculpatory value. In Breeze, the defendant was convicted of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute. Id. at 542, 665 S.E.2d at 249. Prior to trial, the State informed the defendant the marijuana had been destroyed. Id. Breeze argued the trial court erred in finding the lost marijuana was not a due process violation and did not entitle...

To continue reading

Request your trial
16 cases
  • State v. Postell
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of South Carolina
    • 30 Junio 2021
    ...... Lawrence Orlando Postell, Appellant. No. 2021-UP-246Appellate Case No. 2018-001658Court of Appeals of South CarolinaJune 30, 2021 . ... . . . Appellate Defender Taylor Davis Gilliam, of Columbia, for. Appellant. . ... State v. McBride, 416 S.C. 379, 389, 786 S.E.2d 435,. 440 (Ct. App. 2016) ("Adverse ......
  • State v. Postell
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of South Carolina
    • 30 Junio 2021
    ...refusal to give a requested jury charge must be both erroneous and prejudicial to the defendant."); State v. McBride, 416 S.C. 379, 389, 786 S.E.2d 435, 440 (Ct. App. 2016) ("Adverse inference charges are rarely permitted in criminal cases."). To the contrary, an Abbeville County Sherriff's......
  • State v. Harris, Appellate Case No. 2016-000621
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of South Carolina
    • 13 Febrero 2019
    ...as discussed below, we conclude the error was harmless under the facts of this case. II. Harmless ErrorIn State v. McBride, 416 S.C. 379, 393-94, 786 S.E.2d 435, 442 (Ct. App. 2016), cert. denied, S.C. Sup. Ct. Order dated June 16, 2017, this court had the opportunity to address Stukes's ap......
  • State v. Harris, 2019-UP-081
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of South Carolina
    • 13 Febrero 2019
    ...this court had the opportunity to address Stukes's application in a case in which other evidence corroborated the victim's testimony. The McBride court observed that in Stukes, "The court found the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the case 'hinged on credibility. [Th......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT