State v. McCaa

Decision Date30 January 2012
Docket NumberNo. 56A04–1107–CR–341.,56A04–1107–CR–341.
Citation963 N.E.2d 24
PartiesSTATE of Indiana, Appellant–Plaintiff, v. Johnnie S. McCAA, Appellee–Defendant.
CourtIndiana Appellate Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Joseph E. Morrison, Roselawn, IN, Attorney for Appellee.

Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Cynthia L. Ploughe, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Appellant.

OPINION

BRADFORD, Judge.

In this prosecution of AppelleeDefendant Johnnie McCaa for one count of Class A misdemeanor Operating a Vehicle While Intoxicated (“OWI”) in a Manner that Endangers Another Person,1 AppellantPlaintiff the State of Indiana appeals from the trial court's grant of McCaa's motion to suppress evidence. After an initial stop of McCaa for erratic driving, police directed McCaa to move his semi-trailer truck to another location for further investigation. The State contends that the trial court erred in granting McCaa's motion to suppress evidence generated following the initial stop. We reverse and remand with instructions.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The underlying facts of this appeal do not appear to be in dispute. Shortly before 11:43 a.m. on February 21, 2011, Newton County Sherriff's Sergeant Shannon Cothran, who was near the scene of a fatal accident on U.S. Highway 41, received a dispatch concerning “various” reports of a semi-trailer truck being driven erratically southbound toward the accident site. Tr. p. 6. One report was of a “trash hauler that was all over the roadway.” Tr. p. 7. The accident, which had occurred approximately forty-five minutes before, resulted in the driving lane being closed, leaving only the passing lane open to traffic. Sergeant Cothran parked in the median facing west and soon observed a southbound trash hauler “go off the road” to the right twice over the course of approximately one-half of a mile before he was able to pull in behind it as it approached the accident site. Tr. p. 9. Sergeant Cothran also observed that the truck was traveling slowly in relation to the posted speed limit.

As Sergeant Cothran followed the truck in the driving lane, he radioed ahead to a Deputy Shufflebarger, who was parked in the driving lane near the accident, to stop the truck. Sergeant Cothran suggested to Deputy Shufflebarger that he use caution, because Sergeant Cothran was concerned that the truck would not be able to change to the passing lane in time. Deputy Shufflebarger stopped the truck in the passing lane a few feet from or adjacent to the accident site, such that all southbound traffic on U.S. 41 was now stopped. According to Sergeant Cothran, it was “typical in Newton County to have alot [sic] of traffic on 41 at 11:43 on ... a weekday.” Tr. p. 28.

Deputy Shufflebarger had the driver, McCaa, exit the truck. Sergeant Cothran, who had parked behind the truck on the right side of the driving lane, approached and spoke with McCaa. Sergeant Cothran asked McCaa about his erratic driving, and McCaa said that he had been eating his lunch and had “spilled [his] pop,” which had caused him to drive off of the roadway. Tr. p. 16. Sergeant Cothran observed a sandwich wrapper and a spilled soft drink can on the floor in the cabin of the truck. During the initial encounter with McCaa, which lasted no more than one minute, Sergeant Cothran did not notice any slurred speech, glassy or bloodshot eyes, or manual dexterity problems. According to Sergeant Cothran, a typical stop of a truck due to the sort of erratic driving involved here would require approximately ten to fifteen minutes.

Sergeant Cothran decided to continue the investigation because he was not certain that McCaa's explanation for his erratic driving was true and was concerned that McCaa might be suffering from a medical condition such as low blood sugar. Sergeant Cothran decided to move the investigation to a gas station approximately two miles farther down U.S. 41 because of “a downpour of rain[,] the truck was blocking the only open lane of traffic, the gas station had adequate room to park the truck, and a medical crew was waiting there, having been called in to assist with the accident if necessary. Tr. p. 27. According to Sergeant Cothran, the truck would have been (1) in the way if it had been moved just ahead of the crash scene, (2) on the north side of a hill if it had been moved approximately one-eighth of a mile, and (3) on the south side of a hill if it had moved moved approximately one-half of a mile. During the drive to the gas station, Sergeant Cothran observed McCaa drive his truck off the roadway three more times.

Once inside the gas station, Sergeant Cothran conducted the horizontal-gaze-nystagmus, one-leg-stand, and walk-and-turn field sobriety tests (“FSTs”) on McCaa, all of which he failed. McCaa took a portable breath test for blood alcohol concentration, which registered 0.00. Sergeant Cothran detained McCaa at the gas station for approximately twenty minutes. Sergeant Cothran took McCaa to a hospital where, pursuant to a search warrant, a urine sample was ultimately collected.2

On February 24, 2011, the State charged McCaa with Class A misdemeanor OWI in a manner that endangers another person. On May 13, 2011, McCaa moved to suppress all evidence generated following the initial stop of McCaa. Following a hearing conducted on May 25 and June 8, 2011, the trial court granted McCaa's motion to suppress. The trial court concluded that Sergeant Cothran's directing McCaa to reenter his truck and drive it to the gas station was impermissible, apparently on the grounds that Sergeant Cothran was able to “improve or enhance his probable cause” by witnessing McCaa drive off of the roadway three more times and because Sergeant Cothran had not observed any further indications of impairment during the initial stop. Tr. p. 65. The trial court's written order provided in relevant part as follows:

[T]he Court now finds the arresting officer was acting in good faith when he directed [McCaa] to drive his semi-trailer to a different location after the initial stop to pursue his investigation but that by instructing [McCaa] to drive his semi-trailer to a distance of approximately one (1) mile; the Court finds that the arresting officer erred.

Appellant's App. p. 14.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

We review a trial court's decision to grant a motion to suppress as a matter of sufficiency. State v. Moriarity, 832 N.E.2d 555, 557–58 (Ind.Ct.App.2005). When conducting such a review, we will not reweigh evidence or judge witness credibility. Moriarity, 832 N.E.2d at 558. In such cases, the State appeals from a negative judgment and must show that the trial court's ruling on the suppression motion was contrary to law. State v. Estep, 753 N.E.2d 22, 24–25 (Ind.Ct.App.2001). This court will reverse a negative judgment only when the evidence is without conflict and all reasonable inferences lead to a conclusion opposite that of the trial court. Id. at 25. As previously mentioned, there is no conflict regarding the underlying facts of this case, and in any event, the trial court's comments on the record make it clear that it found Sergeant Cothran, who was the only witness at the suppression hearing, to be credible. Consequently, the State's claims come to us essentially as pure questions of law.

A. Fourth Amendment

The State contends that the police had reasonable suspicion to stop McCaa and continue the investigation beyond the initial stop and that Sergeant Cothran's decision to have McCaa move his truck did not impermissibly lengthen the stop. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that [t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” “The overriding function of the Fourth Amendment is to protect personal privacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the State.” Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966). “In Wolf [ v. People of State of Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27, 69 S.Ct. 1359, 93 L.Ed. 1782 (1949) (overruled on other grounds by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961)) ] we recognized (t)he security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police’ as being ‘at the core of the Fourth Amendment and ‘basic to a free society.’ Id.

[In] Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), ... the Supreme Court recognized that investigative stops of limited duration and reasonably related in scope to the justification for their initiation are legal. Terry held that a police officer need not have probable cause to make an arrest when making an investigative stop, but must be able “to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts,” reasonably warrant ‘the intrusion upon the constitutionally protected interests' of private citizens. Id., 392 U.S. at 21–22, 88 S.Ct. at 1880 (quoting Camara v. San Francisco Mun. Ct., 387 U.S. 523, 534, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 1733–34, 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967)). Indiana courts follow the Terry guidelines. Platt v. State (1992), [–––] Ind. [––––], 589 N.E.2d 222, 225–26; Luckett v. State (1972), 259 Ind. 174, 179, 284 N.E.2d 738, 741. Whether a particular fact situation justifies an investigatory stop is determined on a case by case basis. Platt, 589 N.E.2d at 226. The requirements of the Fourth Amendment are satisfied if the facts known to the officer at the moment of the stop are such that a person “of reasonable caution” would believe that the “action taken was appropriate.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 22, 88 S.Ct. at 1880. Indiana has adopted this test. Gipson v. State (1984), [–––] Ind. [––––], 459 N.E.2d 366, 368.

Baran v. State, 639 N.E.2d 642, 644 (Ind.1994).

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