State v. McCleese

• Decision Date: 23 August 2019
• Docket Number: SC 20081
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. William MCCLEESE

333 Conn. 378

215 A.3d 1154

STATE of Connecticut

v.William MCCLEESE

SC 20081

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued October 15, 2018

Officially released August 23, 2019^*

Adele V. Patterson, senior assistant public defender, with whom was Beth A. Merkin, public defender, for the appellant (defendant).

Melissa Patterson, deputy assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Patrick J. Griffin, state's attorney, and Matthew A. Weiner and Lisa M. D'Angelo, assistant state's attorneys, for the appellee (state).

Kim E. Rinehart, New Haven, filed a brief for the Connecticut Psychiatric Society as amicus curiae.

Robinson, C.J., and Palmer, McDonald, D'Auria, Mullins, Kahn and Ecker, Js.

D'AURIA, J.

Under the federal constitution's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments, a juvenile offender cannot serve a sentence of imprisonment for life, or its functional equivalent, without the possibility of parole, unless his age and the hallmarks of adolescence have been considered as mitigating factors. Miller v. Alabama , 567 U.S. 460, 476–77, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 183 L. Ed. 2d 407 (2012) ; Casiano v. Commissioner of Correction , 317 Conn. 52, 60–61, 115 A.3d 1031 (2015), cert. denied sub nom. Semple v. Casiano , ––– U.S. ––––, 136 S. Ct. 1364, 194 L. Ed. 2d 376 (2016) ; State v. Riley , 315 Conn. 637, 641, 110 A.3d 1205 (2015), cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 136 S. Ct. 1361, 194 L. Ed. 2d 376 (2016). The defendant, William McCleese, a juvenile offender, was originally serving a sentence of imprisonment for the functional equivalent of his life without the possibility of parole, in violation of this constitutional mandate. Because of subsequent legislation, however, he will be eligible for parole in or about 2033. This appeal requires us to decide whether the legislature may remedy the constitutional violation with parole eligibility. We conclude that it may and has done so.

The following undisputed facts and procedural history, as contained in the record and the Appellate Court's decision in the defendant's direct appeal, are relevant to this appeal. The defendant was seventeen years old when he and a partner shot and killed one victim and injured another. State v. McCleese , 94 Conn. App. 510, 512, 892 A.2d 343, cert. denied, 278 Conn. 908, 899 A.2d 36 (2006). In 2003, a jury found the defendant guilty of murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a (a), conspiracy to commit murder in violation of § 53a-54a (a) and General Statutes § 53a-48 (a), and assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-59 (a) (5). Id., at 511, 892 A.2d 343.

The defendant received a total effective sentence of eighty-five years of imprisonment without eligibility for parole, including sixty years on the conviction of murder. Although the sentencing court, Harper, J ., considered other mitigating evidence and mentioned the defendant's youth several times, there is no express reference in the record that it specifically considered youth as a mitigating factor, which, at the time, was not a constitutional requirement. See Miller v. Alabama , supra, 567 U.S. at 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455. The Appellate Court affirmed his conviction on direct appeal; State v. McCleese , supra, 94 Conn. App. at 521, 892 A.2d 343 ; and this court denied his petition for certification to appeal from the Appellate Court's judgment. State v. McCleese , 278 Conn. 908, 899 A.2d 36 (2006).

Subsequently, decisions by the United States Supreme Court, decisions by this court, and enactments by our legislature resulted in changes to the sentencing scheme for juvenile offenders. Those changes will be set forth more fully in this opinion, but a brief summary helps to understand the procedural posture of this case. Specifically, the United States Supreme Court in Miller held that the eighth amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments is violated when a juvenile offender serves a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole because it renders "youth (and all that accompanies it) irrelevant to imposition of that harshest prison sentence" and "poses too great a risk of disproportionate punishment." Miller v. Alabama , supra, 567 U.S. at 479, 132 S.Ct. 2455. Thus, an offender's age and the hallmarks of adolescence must be considered as mitigating factors before a juvenile can serve this particular sentence.¹ This court has interpreted Miller to apply not only to mandatory sentences for the literal life of the offender, but also to discretionary sentences and sentences that result in imprisonment for the "functional equivalent" of an offender's life. State v. Riley , supra, 315 Conn. at 642, 654, 110 A.3d 1205 ; see also Casiano v. Commissioner of Correction , supra, 317 Conn. at 72, 115 A.3d 1031. We also have ruled that Miller applies not only prospectively, but retroactively, and also to challenges to sentences on collateral review. Casiano v. Commissioner of Correction , supra, at 71, 115 A.3d 1031.

To comport with federal constitutional requirements, the legislature passed No. 15-84 of the 2015 Public Acts (P.A. 15-84).² In relevant part, the act retroactively provided parole eligibility to juvenile offenders sentenced to more than ten years in prison. See P.A. 15-84, § 1. As a result, the defendant is no longer serving a sentence without the possibility of parole—he will be parole eligible after serving thirty years, when he is about fifty years old.

Following these developments, the defendant filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence. He asserted a Miller claim under the federal constitution and a similar claim under the state constitution.³ Initially, the trial court, Clifford, J ., ruled in the defendant's favor on his federal constitutional claim but reserved ruling on a remedy for the federal violation and on the merits of the state constitutional claim.

Three days after the trial court's initial ruling on the motion to correct an illegal sentence, the United States Supreme Court held that Miller applied retroactively. Montgomery v. Louisiana , ––– U.S. ––––, 136 S. Ct. 718, 732, 193 L. Ed. 2d 599 (2016). In other words, a Miller violation existed if a juvenile offender was serving life without parole without the trial court's having considered the Miller factors, even if the sentencing took place before Miller had been decided. Although this court in Casiano had already established that Miller applied retroactively, critically, Montgomery also made clear that "[Miller 's] retroactive effect ... does not require [s]tates to relitigate sentences, let alone convictions, in every case [in which] a juvenile offender received mandatory life without parole. A [s]tate may remedy a Miller violation by permitting juvenile homicide offenders to be considered for parole, rather than by resentencing them." Id., at 736.

Relying on Montgomery , the state filed a motion to reconsider the trial court's ruling granting the defendant's motion to correct an illegal sentence. After briefing and argument, the court granted the motion to reconsider, concluded that the defendant's Miller claim was now moot under both the federal and state constitutions, and dismissed the motion to correct an illegal sentence. The defendant appealed from that decision to the Appellate Court. The defendant's appeal was then transferred to this court. See Practice Book § 65-2.

In this appeal, we must decide whether the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over the defendant's motion to correct an illegal sentence. Subject matter jurisdiction "involves the authority of the court to adjudicate the type of controversy presented by the action before it." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ajadi v. Commissioner of Correction , 280 Conn. 514, 533, 911 A.2d 712 (2006). The existence of jurisdiction is a question of law, and our review is plenary. Id., at 532, 911 A.2d 712. A trial court generally has no authority to modify a sentence but retains limited subject matter jurisdiction to correct an illegal sentence or a sentence imposed in an illegal manner. State v. Delgado , 323 Conn. 801, 809, 151 A.3d 345 (2016). Practice Book § 43-22⁴ codifies this common-law rule. Id. Therefore, we must decide "whether the defendant has raised a colorable claim within the scope of Practice Book § 43-22 .... In the absence of a colorable claim requiring correction, the trial court has no jurisdiction ...." (Citation omitted.) Id., at 810, 151 A.3d 345.

In the present case, whether the defendant has made out a colorable claim depends on (1) whether the parole eligibility afforded by P.A. 15-84 adequately remedies an unconstitutional sentence under the state constitution, (2) whether, consistent with separation of powers principles embodied in the Connecticut constitution,⁵ the legislature may remedy an unconstitutional sentence that was imposed by the judiciary, and (3) whether P.A. 15-84 violates the defendant's right to equal protection. We hold that the defendant has not made out a colorable claim and that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over his motion.

I

The defendant first claims that the parole eligibility afforded by P.A. 15-84, § 1, does not remedy a Miller violation under the Connecticut constitution. Specifically, he argues that a juvenile sentenced to fifty years or more without consideration of the Miller factors must be resentenced in accordance with Miller , regardless of whether he is eligible for parole. We disagree and conclude that parole eligibility under P.A. 15-84, § 1, is an adequate remedy for a Miller violation under our state constitution just as it is under the federal constitution.

This court has not yet addressed this issue. In State v. Geisler , 222 Conn. 672, 684–85, 610 A.2d 1225 (1992), "we identified six nonexclusive tools of analysis to be considered, to the extent applicable, whenever we are called on as a matter of first impression to define the scope and parameters of the state constitution: (1) persuasive relevant federal...