State v. McCord
| Decision Date | 25 June 1980 |
| Docket Number | No. 78-2525,78-2525 |
| Citation | 385 So.2d 1112 |
| Parties | STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Carla Sue McCORD, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and John D. Cecilian, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellant.
Richard L. Jorandby, Public Defender, and Tatjana Ostapoff, Asst. Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
The State appeals from an order suppressing physical evidence. Appellant argues the court erred in applying the doctrine of collateral estoppel. We affirm.
At 4:00 a. m. on January 6, 1978, Carla Sue McCord was detained by police officers while she and a male passenger were seated in a parked automobile in the vicinity of a Fort Lauderdale night club. McCord was arrested and charged with felony possession of a concealed firearm and narcotics. McCord was additionally charged with misdemeanor possession of narcotics and narcotic paraphernalia arising from the same incident and arrest. On July 10, 1978, the county judge entered an order suppressing the narcotics and narcotic paraphernalia covered by the misdemeanor charges, finding that the initial detention by the police officers was unlawful.
On the basis of those findings the circuit judge granted the defense's motion to suppress physical evidence as to the felony charges. The circuit court held that it was bound by the findings of the county court based upon the doctrine of collateral estoppel.
Appellant does not dispute the fact that the felony and misdemeanor charges arose from the same detention and arrest nor that the county court's order of suppression was premised upon a finding that the initial detention by the police was unlawful. Appellant argues that collateral estoppel does not apply to the felony charges for two reasons: (1) the order of suppression involved only a question of law and, (2) collateral estoppel can be raised in a criminal case only if the defendant has been previously placed in jeopardy.
In deciding appellant's first point, we start with the definition of "collateral estoppel" in Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 1194, 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970):
"Collateral estoppel" is an awkward phrase, but it stands for an extremely important principle in our adversary system of justice. It means simply that when a issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit. Although first developed in civil litigation, collateral estoppel has been an established rule of federal criminal law at least since this Court's decision more than 50 years ago in United States v. Oppenheimer, 242 U.S. 85, 37 S.Ct. 68, 61 L.Ed. 161. (Emphasis added).
Notwithstanding appellant's contention that only a question of law was involved here, 1 it is our conclusion that a determination as to the validity of a detention which resulted in a subsequent search is a mixed question of law and fact. Diaz v. State, 181 So.2d 351, 353 (Fla.2d DCA 1965). A fact, question or right distinctly adjudged in the original action cannot be disputed in a subsequent action, even though the determination was reached upon an erroneous view or by an erroneous application of the law. United States v. Moser, 266 U.S. 236, 45 S.Ct. 66, 67, 69 L.Ed. 262 (1924). Accordingly, appellant's first point is without merit.
The second point raised by appellant questions whether jeopardy must have attached in the initial determination as a condition precedent to the application of the doctrine. We conclude that jeopardy is not a prerequisite to application of the rule.
Although Ashe held that collateral estoppel is a part of the fifth amendment's guarantee against double jeopardy. Ashe does not preclude collateral estoppel from being applied as a matter of due process required by the fourteenth amendment when double jeopardy is not involved.
We conclude that "jeopardy" is not the key to the application of the rule but that "final judgment" is. In other words, there must have been a previous final determination of the issue which the accused seeks to use as the basis for application of the rule.
For purposes of issue preclusion, "final judgment" includes any prior adjudication of an issue in another action between the parties that is determined to be sufficiently firm to be accorded conclusive effect. Factors supporting a conclusion that a decision is final for this purpose are that the parties were fully heard, that the court supported its decision with a reasoned opinion, and that the decision was subject to appeal or was in fact reviewed on appeal. United States ex rel. DiGiangiemo v. Regan, 528 F.2d 1262, 1265 (2d Cir. 1975).
In this instance the defendant moved to suppress the evidence, whereupon the county judge determined that appellee's detention was invalid. Although the adverse decision was appealable the State chose not to appeal. When appellee's motion to dismiss the information for lack of evidence was also granted, the State had the opportunity to appeal and did not do so. Therefore, we conclude that the action taken in the county court constituted a "final judgment" within the definition of DiGiangiemo.
The rationale for permitting the accused in a criminal case to rely upon collateral estoppel 2 is recited in DiGiangiemo :
While it was unnecessary to determine in United States v. Oppenheimer, supra, whether application or collateral estoppel on behalf of a criminal defendant was constitutionally required, overly sensitive ears are not needed to detect due process overtones in Mr. Justice Holmes' statement, 242 U.S. at 87, 37 S.Ct. at 69:
It cannot be that the safeguards of the person, so often and so rightly mentioned with solemn reverence, are less than those that protect from a liability in debt.
We do not suggest that collateral estoppel is similarly mandated by due process in civil cases. But, as has been said, "(t)he weight of the harassment factor is considerably increased in the criminal law," . . . because of the disparity usually prevailing in resources between the state and the defendant and the strain of a second prosecution even if not for the identical offense. . . . Id. at 1265-66.
Other jurisdictions have applied the rule in non-jeopardy cases. Laughlin v. United States, 344 F.2d 187 (D.C.Cir.1965), held that the government was collaterally estopped from relitigating the issue of consent where that issue had been previously determined on a motion to dismiss in a prior criminal proceeding against the same defendant. The Supreme Court of Illinois in People v. Williams, 59 Ill.2d 557, 322 N.E.2d 461 (1975), applied collateral estoppel where there had been an adjudication prior to trial on defendant's motion to suppress. The trial court had previously held that the defendant's statements were inadmissible and the State subsequently sought to relitigate the issue in a pre-trial suppression hearing under a second indictment. The court specifically noted that the State had the right to appeal the first order and chose not to do so. 3 See also State v. Gonzalez, 75 N.J. 181, 380 A.2d 1128 (1977).
There are two Florida cases which require discussion. Suiero v. State, 248 So.2d 219 (Fla.4th DCA 1971), held that failure to...
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State v. McCord
...Defender, West Palm Beach, for respondent. ALDERMAN, Justice. We accepted jurisdiction to resolve the conflict between State v. McCord, 385 So.2d 1112 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980), and State v. Kling, 335 So.2d 614 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976). At issue is the applicability against the State of the collateral......
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