State v. McCray
| Decision Date | 20 July 2020 |
| Docket Number | 082744,A-75/76 September Term 2018 |
| Citation | 243 N.J. 196,233 A.3d 523 |
| Parties | STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Antoine MCCRAY, Defendant-Appellant. State of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Sahaile Gabourel, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | New Jersey Supreme Court |
Laura B. Lasota, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellants (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Laura B. Lasota, of counsel and on the briefs).
Claudia Joy Demitro, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney; Claudia J. Demitro, of counsel and on the briefs).
Alexander Shalom argued the cause for amicus curiae American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey (American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey Foundation, attorneys; Alexander Shalom and Jeanne LoCicero, on the brief).
John McNamara, Jr., Chief Assistant Morris County Prosecutor, argued the cause for amicus curiae County Prosecutors Association of New Jersey (Francis A. Koch, President, attorney, Franklin; John McNamara, Jr., of counsel and on the brief).
Michael R. Noveck argued the cause for amici curiae Partners for Women & Justice, New Jersey Coalition to End Domestic Violence, Essex County Family Justice Center, New Jersey Crime Victims’ Law Center, and Rachel Coalition (Gibbons, attorneys; Michael R. Noveck and Lawrence S. Lustberg, Newark, on the brief).
Oleg Nekritin submitted a brief on behalf of amicus curiae Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers of New Jersey (Law Offices of Robert J. De Groot, attorneys; Oleg Nekritin, East Hanover, on the brief).
In this appeal, we consider whether the State can prosecute contempt charges for a violation of a condition of pretrial release under the Criminal Justice Reform Act (CJRA or Act).
In the two consolidated cases on appeal, both defendants were arrested and released on non-monetary conditions, pursuant to the CJRA. After allegedly violating those conditions, each defendant was charged with contempt, a fourth-degree offense that is contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:29-9, for a violation of a court order.
Both trial court judges concluded the Act did not permit the State to pursue contempt charges. The Appellate Division reversed based on its review of the statute and its legislative history.
We largely agree with the trial court rulings. Although the plain language of the CJRA is silent on the issue, the Act's history reveals the Legislature did not intend to authorize criminal contempt charges for violations of release conditions. In fact, during the enactment process, the Legislature expressly removed the option of contempt proceedings from the original draft of the bill. In doing so, the Legislature parted company with other laws it looked to when it crafted the CJRA. Beyond that, allowing criminal contempt charges for all violations of conditions of release, no matter how minor, is at odds with the purpose and structure of the CJRA.
No-contact orders are treated differently, however, because the CJRA did not modify settled law relating to them. Judges regularly enter orders in domestic violence cases and other matters that bar defendants from contacting witnesses, victims, and others. In State v. Gandhi, 201 N.J. 161, 989 A.2d 256 (2010), the Court held that violations of no-contact orders -- even if issued as part of a pretrial release order -- can serve as a basis for contempt charges. That precedent remains firmly in place.
Because neither appeal here involved a violation of a no-contact order, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Division and dismiss the contempt charges against both defendants.
On April 16, 2017, defendant Antoine McCray was arrested and charged with second-degree robbery, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(a)(1). A week later, the trial court denied the State's motion for pretrial detention and released McCray subject to certain non-monetary conditions. One of the conditions was that he "not commit any offense during the period of release." On August 29, 2017, McCray was charged with various theft offenses for allegedly stealing a wallet out of a stroller and then making fraudulent purchases with the victim's credit cards.
A grand jury later indicted McCray for fourth-degree contempt, contrary to N.J.S.C. 2C:29-9(a), for violating the trial court's order of pretrial release. The grand jury also returned separate indictments that charged multiple theft offenses. Pursuant to a plea agreement, McCray pled guilty to the contempt charge and to four counts of conspiracy to use a credit card fraudulently. The trial judge advised counsel that he would wait until sentencing to decide whether to accept the plea on the contempt charge. The court invited both counsel to submit written argument about the validity of the charge.
At sentencing, the same judge, the Honorable Pedro J. Jimenez, Jr., J.S.C., dismissed the contempt indictment. In a written opinion, the judge traced the history and purpose of the CJRA. He noted that the federal and District of Columbia statutes after which the CJRA was modeled both provide for contempt prosecutions, but the CJRA does not. Judge Jimenez also observed that the New Jersey Legislature removed language from earlier drafts that permitted contempt charges. He concluded the Act provided other means to address violations of release conditions, and cited to other statutory settings.
After dismissing the contempt indictment, Judge Jimenez sentenced McCray to four years in prison on the remaining counts to which he had pled guilty.
Defendant Sahaile Gabourel was arrested and charged with seven counts of possession and distribution of heroin on July 10, 2018. The trial court denied the State's motion to detain Gabourel pretrial and released him subject to a number of conditions. In particular, the judge ordered Gabourel to comply with a curfew and remain at home from 6 p.m. to 6 a.m.
On July 23, 2018, police officers who knew of the curfew arrested Gabourel when they saw him on a street corner at 8:09 p.m. The officers found three Percocet
pills in Gabourel's pocket during a search incident to arrest. Gabourel was then charged in a two-count complaint with (1) fourth-degree contempt, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:29-9(a), for disobeying the trial court's release order and violating the curfew condition; and (2) possession of Percocet
, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10.5(a)(1).
After a hearing, the Honorable Paul M. DePascale, J.S.C., revoked the order of pretrial release and detained Gabourel, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:162-24. Judge DePascale also concluded "the State may not prosecute a non-criminal violation of a term or condition of a pretrial release order by way of contempt." He succinctly recounted the Act's legislative history: contempt "was in the bill," "was removed, and then the bill was approved." The judge also analogized the situation to a violation of a term of probation, which cannot be prosecuted by contempt "[b]ecause there's another mechanism provided by the [probation] statute to deal with that." Judge DePascale accordingly dismissed the contempt charge against Gabourel.
Relying in part on the reasoning in Gandhi, the court "conclude[d] that a pretrial release order is a ‘judicial order’ " within the meaning of the contempt statute and that "a defendant who ... violates the conditions in the order may be charged with contempt under N.J.S.A. 2C:29-9(a)." Id. at 490, 205 A.3d 1178. The court found that defendants’ reliance on State v. Williams, 234 N.J. Super. 84, 560 A.2d 100 (App. Div. 1989), and State in Interest of S.S., 367 N.J. Super. 400, 842 A.2d 904 (App. Div. 2004), was misplaced. McCray, 458 N.J. Super. at 492-93, 205 A.3d 1178.
The Appellate Division also concluded defendants had sufficient notice they could be charged with contempt, and that the Double Jeopardy Clause did not bar McCray's prosecution for criminal contempt. Id. at 500, 205 A.3d 1178.
We granted McCray's petition for certification, 238 N.J. 69, 207 A.3d 768 (2019), and Gabourel's motion for leave to appeal, 238 N.J. 51, 207 A.3d 758 (2019). We also granted leave to appear as amici curiae to the following organizations: the American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey (ACLU); the Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers of New Jersey (ACDL); the County Prosecutors Association of New Jersey; and Partners for Women and Justice, the New Jersey Coalition to End Domestic Violence, Essex County Family Justice Center, New Jersey Crime Victims’ Law Center, and Rachel Coalition, which filed a consolidated brief.
Defendants argue that the Appellate Division erred in concluding that violations of conditions of pretrial release are punishable by prosecutions for criminal...
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