State v. McCray

• Decision Date: 29 June 2005
• Docket Number: No. 39,883-KA.,39,883-KA.
• Citation: 908 So.2d 68
• Parties: STATE of Louisiana, Appellee v. Brandon Keith McCRAY, Appellant.
• Court: Louisiana Supreme Court

908 So.2d 68

STATE of Louisiana, Appellee v. Brandon Keith McCRAY, Appellant.

No. 39,883-KA.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.

June 29, 2005.

G. Paul Marx, Lafayette, Louisiana Appellate Project, Mary L. Harried, Clark Glen Garret, Indigent Defender's Office, for Appellant.

Paul J. Carmouche, District Attorney, Tommy J. Johnson, Edwin L. Blewer, III, Lea R. Hall, Assistant District Attorneys, for Appellee.

Before GASKINS, CARAWAY and LOLLEY, JJ.

CARAWAY, J.

After entry of a plea of not guilty, Brandon Keith McCray was tried and found guilty as charged of second degree murder. He was sentenced to mandatory life imprisonment without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence. McCray appeals his conviction, urging that he acted without the requisite intent due to his mental illness which prevented him from distinguishing between right and wrong. We affirm the conviction and sentence.

Facts

On July 13, 2002, McCray entered the home of his friend and cousin, Eugene "Woozy" Jones, and shot him five times, mortally wounding the victim. The victim's girlfriend, her three children and a female friend were in the house when the shots were fired. Both women heard the victim yell "no" followed by multiple gunshots. One of the women peeked out of the window in time to see McCray getting into his car. A neighbor who was in her driveway also heard the gunshots. She saw McCray first get into his car and then walk back to the house toward the window. She witnessed McCray smile before returning to his car and driving away and saw that he had something silver in his hand that looked like a gun. McCray left the scene and turned himself in to uniformed officers who were working as funeral escorts about five or six blocks away. McCray smiled as he told the officers how he had just killed someone and pointed to a gun in the right passenger seat. The gun was later determined to have been the murder weapon. In videotapes of McCray's transport to the police station, he calmly admitted to shooting the victim without any immediate provocation because the victim had been evil and involved in bombing the World Trade Center. McCray also described where the shots hit the victim. In a later taped statement, McCray told a detective that he had a dream about the victim being evil. McCray explained that the murder weapon did not belong to him but that the gun's owner knew nothing of the crime. McCray and a friend had purchased the gun at a pawn shop the morning of the crime and had tested it in the woods.

Prior to trial, McCray entered a plea of not guilty and moved for the appointment of a sanity commission. The court appointed George Seiden and Charles Armistead to examine the defendant. Both physicians and McCray's mother testified at the sanity hearing. Dr. Seiden concluded that McCray suffered from paranoid delusions at the time of his arrest and probable schizophrenoform, a beginning form of schizophrenia. Dr. Seiden opined that McCray was competent to stand trial and was able to distinguish between right and wrong at the time of the offense. Dr. Armistead diagnosed McCray with chronic active schizophrenia and agreed that McCray was competent to stand trial although he did not have enough information to determine whether McCray knew right or wrong at the time of the crime.

McCray's mother testified that her son began to have mental health problems approximately two and one-half years prior to her testimony. She stated that McCray exhibited violent behavior and began to believe that everybody was evil. She had called the police on several occasions and went to the coroner's office at lease twice to have him committed. McCray did not receive medication until after he killed the victim.

Based upon this testimony, the trial court found McCray competent to stand trial. At the subsequent trial of this matter, the state submitted as its evidence the eyewitness testimony of the occupants of the house, McCray's neighbor, the police officers, the coroner's testimony and McCray's taped statements. Against his counsel's advice, McCray testified in his own behalf. He acknowledged shooting the victim, but claimed that it had been in self-defense or an accident. However, McCray admitted that he intended to pull the trigger only the "last two times" while the victim was "running towards the window at an angle." He also testified that he "ran to the car smiling" after shooting the victim and that he "wasn't crazy." From this evidence, a unanimous jury returned a second degree murder guilty verdict. This appeal ensued.

Discussion

On appeal, McCray argues that the evidence precluded him from being competent to stand trial and conclusively established his insanity at trial so as to exempt him from criminal responsibility. He concedes that trial counsel did not enter a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, but argues that he should not be punished by such an omission.

Second degree murder is the killing of a human being when the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm. La. R.S. 14:30.1. Specific criminal intent is that state of mind which exists when the circumstances indicate that the offender actively desired the proscribed criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act. La. R.S. 14:10(1). Specific intent need not be proven as a fact, but may be inferred from the circumstances of the transaction and the actions of the defendant. State v. Kahey, 436 So.2d 475 (La.1983); State v. Murray, 36,137 (La.App. 2d Cir.8/29/02), 827 So.2d 488, writ denied, 02-2634 (La.9/05/03), 852 So.2d 1020. The discharge of a firearm at close range and aimed at a person is indicative of a specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm upon that person. State v. Thompson, 39,454 (La.App. 2d 3/2/05), 894 So.2d 1268; State v. Murray, supra. The determination of whether the requisite intent is present is a question for the trier of fact. State v. Huizar, 414 So.2d 741 (La.1982); State v. Thompson, supra.

The proper standard of appellate review for a sufficiency of the evidence claim is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); State v. Bosley, 29,253 (La.App. 2d Cir.4/2/97), 691 So.2d 347, writ denied, 97-1203 (La.10/17/97), 701 So.2d 1333. The Jackson standard is applicable in cases involving both direct and circumstantial evidence. An appellate court reviewing the sufficiency of evidence in such cases must resolve any conflict in the direct evidence by viewing that evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. When the direct evidence is thus viewed, the facts established by the direct evidence and inferred from the circumstances established by that evidence must be sufficient for a rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was guilty of every essential element of the crime. State v. Sutton, 436 So.2d 471 (La.1983); State v. Owens, 30,903 (La.App. 2d Cir.9/25/98), 719 So.2d 610, writ denied, 98-2723 (La.2/5/99), 737 So.2d 747.

Mental...