State v. McDonald
Decision Date | 31 October 1966 |
Docket Number | No. A--550,A--550 |
Citation | 92 N.J.Super. 448,224 A.2d 18 |
Parties | STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Charles J. McDONALD, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division |
Jacob H. Chertcoff, Paterson, for appellant (George S. Grabow, Paterson, assigned counsel, attorney).
Archibald Kreiger, Asst. Pros., for respondent (John G. Thevos, Passaic County Pros., attorney, William Pollack, Asst. Pros., on the brief).
Before Judges GAULKIN, LEWIS and LABRECQUE.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
LEWIS, J.A.D.
Defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction entered in the Passaic County Court following a jury verdict that he was guilty of possession and sale of narcotics in violation of R.S. 24:18--4, N.J.S.A.
The facts, as culled from the testimony presented by the prosecution, are that Joseph Ritucci, an undercover agent for the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, was introduced, either on June 30 or July 1, 1965, through an informer, to one Alexander Dakak and by him to defendant. He met them again on July 8, 1965 and on that occasion, after he had given Dakak $12 for heroin, Dakak told defendant to tell Ritucci 'where the stuff is.' Ritucci testified that he
A chemical analysis demonstrated the presence of hereoin in the powder, and both Dakak and defendant were indicted. The former entered a plea of guilty and testified at the trial that defendant was his unwitting dupe and had no knowledge of the nature of his (Dakak's) dealings with Ritucci.
Defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal at the close of the State's case and now urges that its denial was error. We hold the motion was properly denied. The evidence at that time was such that the jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of possession and sale of narcotics. See State v. Reed, 34 N.J. 554, 564, 170 A.2d 419, 91 A.L.R.2d 797, 804 (1961); State v. Weissman, 73 N.J.Super. 274, 283, 179 A.2d 748, 93 A.L.R.2d 1001, 1007 (App.Div.1962), certification denied 37 N.J. 521, 181 A.2d 782 (1962).
Defendant advances the argument that the State failed to sustain its burden of proving that the substance in the glassine envelopes was illegal, viz., that the powder contained a quantity of heroin sufficient to be of harm. We do not agree with that contention.
The proofs disclose that the glassine envelopes and their contents were delivered by the New Jersey State Police to one John Anderson, 'a principal chemist' employed by that organization. He made chemical and physical tests of the white powder and found that the substance was 'a combination of diacetel morphine heroin and quinine.'
R.S. 24:18--4, N.J.S.A., makes it unlawful for any person 'to manufacture, possess, have under his control, sell, prescribe, administer, dispense or compound any narcotic drug,' except as otherwise authorized by the statute. The act specifically exempts the possession or sale of medical preparations containing limited parts of six contraband drugs. N.J.S.A. 24:18--7. Prior to 1952, heroin was one of the enumerated exceptions, but in that year the Legislature omitted heroin from the list. L.1952, c. 285, p. 971. Under these circumstances, we find particularly applicable the general rule of construction that 'enumerated exceptions in a statute indicate a legislative intent that the statute be applied to all cases not specifically excepted.' State v. Reed, supra, 34 N.J., at p. 558, 170 A.2d at p. 422, 91 A.L.R.2d, at p. 801. Moreover, defendant did not claim that the white powder in question was for medicinal purposes. Even if an exception had been asserted, R.S. 24:18--46, N.J.S.A., would be applicable. It provides that
'* * * it shall not be necessary to negative any exception, excuse, proviso, or exemption, contained in this chapter, and the burden of proof of any such exception, excuse, proviso, or exemption, shall be upon the defendant.'
In People v. Hines, 30 Ill.2d 152, 195 N.E.2d 712 (Sup.Ct.1964), defendant Hines was convicted on charges of selling and dispensing narcotics. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Illinois held that the state had not failed to prove that the substance seized was in fact a narcotic because the chemist had performed only a qualitative and not a...
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