State v. McGee

• Decision Date: 03 March 1909
• Citation: 81 Conn. 696,72 A. 141
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE v. McGEE.

72 A. 141

81 Conn. 696

STATE

v. McGEE.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

March 3, 1909.

Appeal from Court of Common Pleas, New Haven County; Isaac Wolfe, Judge.

Frank J. McGee was convicted of threatening an employe etc., and he appeals. Affirmed.

See, also, 80 Conn. 614, 69 Atl. 1059.

Information under section 1296 of the General Statutes of 1902, brought to the court of common pleas in New Haven county. Verdict of conviction. Motion in arrest of judgment overruled, and sentence pronounced by the court, Wolfe, J., and an appeal by the accused, with stay of execution. The information is in three counts. They are alike, save that the acts complained of are charged as having been done to different persons, of whom one Clark is the person named in the first count. They charge that the accused, on the 11th day of September, 1907, with force and arms did then and there unlawfully threaten and did, by following, mocking, and annoying, use means to intimidate a person named to compel him against his will to refrain from working in the employ of the McLagan Foundry Company and to leave the employ of said company, against the peace, of evil example, and contrary to the statute in such case made and provided.

William Kennedy and Walter J. Walsh, for appellant. Robert C. Stoddard and Robert J. Woodruff, Pros. Atty., for the State.

PRENTICE, J. (after stating the facts as above). The brief filed in support of this appeal pursues only two claims of error; one that the court erred in not directing a verdict of acquittal upon the first count for the reason that the evidence failed to connect the acts done to Clark with his employment by or service for the foundry company, and the other that it erred in overruling the motion in arrest of judgment. The court was right in declining to direct a verdict as requested, and in submitting to the jury the question of the guilt of the accused of the offense charged upon the evidence adduced in support of it. The more important question, and the one upon which counsel have chiefly dwelt, is that which relates to the court's denial of the motion in arrest. The reasons assigned in the motion in support of it are six, which resolve themselves in the brief of counsel into two. These present the general claim that the several counts in the information fail to charge a crime. One assigns as the reason that nowhere is it alleged that the accused did the several things charged against him with the intent to intimidate the person named therein; the other that the several counts do not set forth with particularity the treats upon which the charges in that regard are predicated.

The objection first stated does not present itself as a similar objection made upon demurrer would have. The defendant did not demur and thus afford the state an opportunity to amend in the event that such a course seemed prudent or proved necessary, but took his chances with the jury, and now asks that the result thus reached be nullified. In this state, whatever be the law elsewhere, we have adopted as applicable to criminal actions the principle of aider by verdict as applied to civil actions. State v. Keena, 63 Conn. 329, 331, 28 Atl. 522. This information is based upon the statute, and has no other foundation. State v. McGee, 80 Conn. 614, 617, 69 Atl. 1059. The statute enumerates a variety of acts, the doing of which under the specified conditions will constitute the crime defined. An intent to intimidate is made one of these conditions, and no one of the acts done without that intent is brought within the purview of the statute. Certain of these acts are charged against this accused. The intent to intimidate being an essential ingredient of the crime attempted to be charged, it must be set forth in the information with reasonable certainty, or the information will be bad even upon a motion in arrest. State v. Costello, 62 Conn. 128, 130, 25 Atl. 477; State v. Keena, 63 Conn. 329, 330, 28 Atl. 522. This does not, however, signify, as the defendant appears to assume, that any particular formula of words must of necessity be used. "That nicety and strictness in framing indictments which was formerly required has been in modern times considered excessive, and therefore has been much relaxed." Barth v. State, 18 Conn. 432, 438. Where the offense charged is a misdemeanor created by statute, still less conformity with ancient requirements is requisite. The essential elements of the crime must be charged, but they need not be charged in any precise formula of words or set phrase. It is enough if the offense is set forth with such clearness and certainty as to apprise the accused of the crime for which he is called upon to answer, and to enable the jury to deliver an intelligent verdict, the court to render a proper judgment, and the accused to plead his conviction or acquittal in bar of another prosecution for the same offense. State v. Bierce, 27 Conn. 319, 320; State v. Lockbaum, 38...