State v. McGinnis
| Decision Date | 08 October 2019 |
| Docket Number | Appeal No. 2018AP1388-CR |
| Citation | 389 Wis.2d 377,936 N.W.2d 415 (Table),2019 WI App 65 |
| Parties | STATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Michael R. MCGINNIS, Defendant-Respondent. |
| Court | Wisconsin Court of Appeals |
¶1 The State of Wisconsin appeals an order granting Michael McGinnis’s motion to suppress evidence obtained during his arrest. The State acknowledges that there was an unlawful entry into McGinnis’s residence, and that, as a result, the circuit court properly suppressed evidence and statements the police obtained while inside the residence. The State contends, however, that because the police officer possessed probable cause to arrest McGinnis at the time of the unlawful entry, evidence and statements police subsequently gathered while outside the residence need not be suppressed.
¶2 We agree with the State and conclude that at the time of the unlawful entry into McGinnis’s residence, law enforcement possessed probable cause to arrest McGinnis for operating a vehicle with a prohibited alcohol concentration (PAC). As a result, pursuant to New York v. Harris , 495 U.S. 14 (1990), and State v. Felix , 2012 WI 36, 339 Wis. 2d 670, 811 N.W.2d 775, the evidence police obtained outside of McGinnis’s residence following the unlawful entry is admissible against McGinnis in his criminal prosecution. We therefore reverse, in part, the order granting McGinnis’s suppression motion and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
¶3 The relevant facts in this case are undisputed. McGinnis was charged in a four-count criminal complaint with seventh-offense operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (OWI), hit and run of an attended vehicle, obstructing an officer, and disorderly conduct. The State subsequently filed a second amended Information that added a single count of seventh-offense PAC. These charges arose from events that transpired on the afternoon of January 6, 2018.
¶4 According to the police report, at 3:55 p.m. officer Edward Bell of the Altoona Police Department was dispatched to a report of a hit-and-run crash that had occurred at the Happy Hollow Tavern in the City of Altoona. The crash victim had called police to report that a yellow Jeep Wrangler had just struck the victim’s vehicle in the tavern’s parking lot. The victim provided the license plate number of the Jeep and stated the vehicle had fled when he attempted to make contact with its driver.
¶5 Bell ran a records check on the vehicle and discovered that McGinnis was the registered owner of the Jeep and that his residence was a few blocks west of the Happy Hollow Tavern. Bell noted McGinnis had six previous OWI convictions, which meant McGinnis was subject to a .02 blood alcohol content restriction. Cf. WIS. STAT. § 340.01(46m)(c) (2017-18). From his training, Bell believed that consuming even one alcoholic beverage could raise a person’s blood alcohol content beyond the .02 limit.
¶6 Bell directed another officer to collect information at the Happy Hollow Tavern while he responded directly to McGinnis’s residence. Bell arrived at the residence within one minute of the dispatch. The residence was located in an apartment complex and was a downstairs unit with immediate access to the parking lot. Bell spotted a yellow Jeep with a license plate matching the victim’s report parked in front of the apartment, about five to six steps from the apartment’s front door.
¶7 Bell approached the apartment and could hear music and someone moving inside the residence. He knocked on the door, but he did not receive a response. After approximately thirty seconds, he knocked a second time, and an unknown individual (later identified as McGinnis) opened the door. Bell could see into the residence, and there did not appear to be any other person inside.
¶8 Bell asked McGinnis if he was the registered owner of the Jeep. McGinnis denied owning the Jeep, and, upon being asked, he also denied having been at the Happy Hollow Tavern that day. During their conversation, Bell noted McGinnis’s eyes were glassy and bloodshot, and his speech was slurred and very slow, consistent with what Bell viewed as heavy intoxication. Bell told McGinnis that witnesses had seen him at the Happy Hollow Tavern, and McGinnis responded that he did not believe anyone would have evidence he was at that location. Bell then requested identification, to which McGinnis responded that Bell did not need his driver’s license.
¶9 Upon McGinnis’s refusal to provide identification, Bell told McGinnis he would need to identify himself because he was being detained related to the crash investigation. Bell asked McGinnis to step out of the residence and told him he was not free to leave. McGinnis declined to step outside and then began shutting the door. Bell moved his foot and body into the door frame to prevent the door from closing all the way. McGinnis’s hand was on the door frame, and Bell attempted to grab his wrist but McGinnis pulled his hand away and raised it above his head with a closed fist as if he was about to strike Bell. Bell unholstered his TASER and told McGinnis to put his hands behind his back. McGinnis then immediately turned around, walked down a hallway into a nearby bedroom, and shut the bedroom door.
¶10 Bell remained in the doorway and requested a backup officer. As that officer arrived, McGinnis exited the bedroom and approached the officers. He calmly apologized for lying to Bell and admitted that he was in fact at the Happy Hollow Tavern. After McGinnis provided identification, he was taken into custody and placed in the back of a squad car. McGinnis later consented to perform field sobriety testing but ultimately refused to complete the testing. Bell then told McGinnis he was under arrest, and McGinnis began walking away from the officers, resisted their efforts to subdue him, and had to be tased. He was then placed in handcuffs and transported to a local hospital for a blood draw.
¶11 McGinnis filed a motion alleging Bell’s warrantless entry into McGinnis’s apartment violated the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, McGinnis sought suppression of all evidence gathered after that entry, including "the results of the field sobriety exercises, the blood draw, and any statements made by Mr. McGinnis post[-]seizure." The State defended the warrantless entry on a variety of grounds, including that there were exigent circumstances and that Bell had probable cause to arrest McGinnis before his entry based upon an apparent seventh-offense felony PAC.
¶12 The circuit court held an evidentiary hearing on the suppression motion, at which Bell testified. At a decision hearing the following day, the court granted McGinnis’s suppression motion but remarked it was an "exceedingly close case." The court made findings consistent with the foregoing facts, and it concluded that when Bell placed his foot and body into the door frame, he had entered McGinnis’s residence for Fourth Amendment purposes. The court acknowledged that, under current Fourth Amendment case law, a warrantless in-home entry does not necessarily require the exclusion of evidence subsequently obtained outside the home. However, it concluded that principle did not apply here because Bell did not have probable cause to arrest McGinnis at the time of his entry.
¶13 Specifically, the circuit court emphasized the sanctity of the home for Fourth Amendment purposes and reasoned that Bell merely had reasonable suspicion—not probable cause—that McGinnis had committed a PAC violation. The court acknowledged that Bell knew five things at the time he entered McGinnis’s residence: (1) that it was probable that McGinnis had been at the Happy Hollow Tavern "within an hour or so before ... Bell ... had received the dispatch call"; (2) that it was "very likely that Mr. McGinnis’s vehicle had struck another parked vehicle in the Happy Hollow parking lot"; (3) that McGinnis had six prior OWI offenses and was subject to a .02 blood alcohol content limit; (4) that McGinnis had bloodshot eyes and slurred speech during their conversation at the front door; and (5) that McGinnis was "probably lying about not being at the Happy Hollow Tavern" recently.
¶14 The circuit court remarked, however, that "with a little bit more inquiry," Bell could have learned more details about the hit and run and the amount of alcohol McGinnis had to drink at the Happy Hollow Tavern, which would have "shed more light on whether ... the defendant was intoxicated." The court concluded that, "[a]rmed with this information, the officer could have, and should have, obtained a warrant at [four or five] o’clock in the afternoon ... so as to permit an arrest for Mr. McGinnis and not have to worry about the hazards of the Fourth Amendment." The State now appeals the order granting McGinnis’s suppression motion.
¶15 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides the right of citizens to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures. State v. Scull , 2015 WI 22, ¶18, 361 Wis. 2d 288, 862 N.W.2d 562 ; see also U.S. CONST. amend. IV. "Courts have long extolled the importance of the home, noting that the amendment was drafted in part to codify ‘the overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic.’ " Scull , 361 Wis. 2d 288, ¶19 (quoting Payton v. New York , 445 U.S. 573, 601 (1980) ).
¶16 Under Payton , absent exigent circumstances, law enforcement officers may not effect a warrantless and nonconsensual entry into a person’s home, even if they possess probable cause to arrest the person. Payton , 455 U.S. at 590; see also Harris , 495 U.S. at 16. The exclusionary rule protects against violations of Fourth Amendment rights and holds that "evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment is generally inadmissible in court proceedings." Scull , 361 Wis. 2d 288, ¶20. However, the Supreme Court in Harris declined to apply the exclusionary rule...
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