State v. McGranahan
Decision Date | 20 June 1980 |
Docket Number | No. 79-273-C,79-273-C |
Citation | 415 A.2d 1298 |
Parties | STATE v. Michael J. McGRANAHAN. A. |
Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
This is an appeal from a Superior Court judgment of conviction in which a jury found Michael J. McGranahan (defendant) guilty of the second-degree murder of a four-and-one-half-week-old infant. The defendant claims that the trial justice erred in denying his motions for a judgment of acquittal and for a new trial because the evidence did not support a finding of premeditation and malice. The defendant further claims that the sentence imposed, thirty-five years, was excessive. 1 We reject these arguments and affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.
On May 14, 1978, the rescue division of the Warwick Fire Department received an emergency call to attend to an infant having difficulty breathing. Upon arriving at the residence, rescue officer Robert Pollitt observed defendant giving an infant, Tina M. Suttles, mouth-to-mouth resuscitation. Officer Pollitt continued this procedure and administered chest massage but was unable to detect any vital life signs. When attempts to revive Tina proved unsuccessful she was transported to the emergency room of Kent County Memorial Hospital where she was pronounced dead.
While at the residence, defendant told Officer Pollitt that he had placed Tina in a bassinet and later discovered that she had stopped breathing. The defendant told the attending physician and nurse at the hospital that Tina had been fussy that afternoon and that he had placed her in the bassinet, on her abdomen, and had turned her head to the side. When a Warwick patrolman routinely questioned defendant, however, defendant told him that he had laid Tina in the bassinet on her back and that she apparently had rolled over, turned white, and stopped breathing.
Because it appeared that Tina had died a crib death, the state medical examiner's office ordered an autopsy performed. Doctor John Grauerholz, a specialist in forensic pathology, found a small scratch on Tina's right nostril and a small bruise on the underside of her chin. An internal examination revealed hemotoma on the tissue of the scalp in the area between the scalp and the skull. Inside the skull the doctor found bilateral bleeding over the surface of the brain and another bruise on the brain itself, directly under the bruise on the skull. As a result of the autopsy Dr. Grauerholz contended that the death had been caused by a contusion of the brain, subdural hemorrhage, and brain swelling following an injury inflicted by a blunt object. In his opinion the manner of death was homicide.
Relying on this medical evidence, police called defendant in for questioning on May 15. The police gave defendant his Miranda rights and informed him that he was a suspect in a murder investigation. The defendant then related the same story he had given to Officer Pollitt the previous day. After being told that Tina had died from a head injury, defendant stated that he had briefly left Tina unattended on an ottoman while changing her diaper and that when he returned, he found her lying on the floor, apparently having fallen and struck her head. The defendant claimed that his initial hesitancy to tell the truth was due to the fact that he feared he would be found negligent in the care of the infant.
During questioning police telephoned Dr. Grauerholz who advised them that Tina sustained her head injuries as a result of having been struck by a moving object. The doctor told police that the typical reaction to this sort of injury would be for a child to fuss initially, then quiet down, and appear to go to sleep. The swelling of the brain within the skull would exert pressure that would lead to a progressive loss of consciousness and finally death.
When the police informed defendant that his second story differed from the findings of the medical examiner, defendant recanted. He told the police that he had been left in charge of Tina and her eighteen-month-old sister, Melanie, while their mother went to visit relatives. He became upset when Tina wet her diaper and began to cry. To quiet Tina, defendant placed her face down in the bassinet that was located in another room. 2 The defendant became more upset when Melanie wet her pants. He spanked her once, and she too started crying. Tina continued to cry. The defendant said he became enraged, returned to the room where Tina was lying, picked up a plastic bottle of disposable baby wipes, and struck her in the back of the head. She fussed a bit, quieted down and appeared to go to sleep. When defendant checked on her later, she had stopped breathing.
After giving the police his written statement, defendant requested and was granted permission to telephone his mother and his attorney. A police officer later testified that defendant said to his mother: At trial defendant denied having said this.
The defendant was tried in the Superior Court for murder. At the close of the state's case, and later at the close of all the evidence, defendant made a timely motion for a judgment of acquittal with respect to the charge of murder. The trial justice denied defendant's motions, and the jury returned a verdict of second-degree murder. After the jury verdict, defendant made a timely motion for a new trial. The trial justice denied this motion and imposed a sentence of thirty-five years.
The defendant challenges the denial of his motion for a judgment of acquittal. He argues the evidence does not show premeditation, an essential element for a finding of first and second-degree murder. State v. Crough, 89 R.I. 338, 353, 152 A.2d 644, 652 (1959).
A motion for judgment of acquittal made pursuant to Rule 29 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure was formerly termed a motion for a directed verdict. State v. Moretti, 113 R.I. 213, 215, 319 A.2d 342, 343 (1974). In passing on a motion for judgment of acquittal, the trial justice must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, drawing therefrom every reasonable inference consistent with guilt. State v. Gianoulos, R.I., 404 A.2d 81, 82 (1979). Neither the weight nor the credibility of the evidence is to be considered at this stage of the proceeding. State v. Murphy, 113 R.I. 565, 569, 323 A.2d 561, 563 (1974); State v. Riffkin, 112 R.I. 308, 312, 309 A.2d 15, 17 (1973). If viewed in this light, the evidence introduced by the prosecution is insufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the court must grant defendant's motion. State v. Distante, 118 R.I. 532, 536, 375 A.2d 212, 215 (1977); State v. Rose, 112 R.I. 402, 406, 311 A.2d 281, 283 (1973).
We are guided by these same standards in assessing the correctness of the trial justice's decision to deny defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal. State v. Gianoulos, R.I., 404 A.2d at 82. We find that the trial justice quite properly considered the evidence in a light most favorable to the state and reached reasonable inferences consistent with guilt. Expert medical evidence, policy testimony, and defendant's own statements gave rise to the clear inference that defendant had adequate time, however momentary, to harbor a fixed and deliberate design to strike the infant. State v. Page, 104 R.I. 323, 334, 244 A.2d 258, 264 (1968). From the totality of the testimony and the exhibits presented, the trial justice could also reasonably infer that defendant committed the act with malice, that is, with wanton disregard for the life of another or with an unjustified disregard for the probability of death or great bodily harm. Commonwealth v. Paquette, 451 Pa. 250, 301 A.2d 837 (1973). Accordingly, the trial justice was correct in denying defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal on the count of either first or second-degree murder. See State v. Goff, 107 R.I. 331, 336-37, 267 A.2d 686, 689 (1970).
Next, defendant claims that the trial justice improperly denied his motion for a new trial under Super.R.Crim.P. 33 because the evidence did not show implied malice. In passing on this motion, the trial justice must have regard for the weight and credibility of testimony in light of his independent judgment. State v. Carsetti, 111 R.I. 642, 652, 306 A.2d 166, 172 (1973). If he determines that the evidence adduced at trial is sufficient for the jury, as factfinders, to conclude that it proves guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, he must deny the motion for a new trial. State v. Barnes, R.I., 409 A.2d 988, 992 (1979). "In ruling on the motion, the trial justice should articulate the facts on which he has based his ruling so that the reviewing court can ascertain whether he has overlooked or misconceived material evidence on a controlling issue or was otherwise clearly wrong in his decision." Id. at 409 A.2d at 992.
The burden of proving error by the trial justice rests with defendant. State v. Howard, 114 R.I. 731, 738, 339 A.2d 259, 263 (1975). In discharge of this obligation, defendant asserts that his actions do not support a finding of implied malice because they neither tended to inflict great bodily harm nor exhibited a depraved heart or reckless and wanton disregard of the consequences of his acts.
In this state it is well settled that malice, express or implied, is an element of first or second-degree murder. State v. Fenik, 45 R.I. 309, 314, 121 A. 218, 221 (1923). Legal malice can arise from either an express intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm or from a hardness of the heart, cruelty, wickedness of disposition, recklessness of consequence, and a mind dispassionate of social duty. See State v. Miller, 154 Conn. 622, 228 A.2d 136 (1967); Commonwealth v. Coleman, 455 Pa. 508, 318 A.2d 716 (1974)....
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