State v. McGuire
| Decision Date | 05 May 2022 |
| Docket Number | 2019-324-C.A.(P1/18-3099AG), No. 2019-326-C.A.(P1/18-3099AAG), No. 2019-328-C.A.(P1/18-3099BBG), No. 2019-329-C.A.(P1/18-3099BG), No. 2019-330-C.A.(P1/18-3099CG), No. 2019-333-C.A.(P1/18-3099DDG), No. 2019-334-C.A.(P1/18-3099EEG), No. 2019-335-C.A.(P1/18-3099EG), No. 2019-336-C.A.(P1/18-3099FG), No. 2019-344-C.A.(P1/18-3099GG), No. 2019-345-C.A.(P1/18-3099HG), No. 2019-346-C.A.(P1/18-3099JG), No. 2019-349-C.A.(P1/18-3099PG), No. 2019-352-C.A.(P1/18-3099QG), No. 2019-354-C.A.(P1/18-3099SG), No. 2019-355-C.A.(P1/18-3099VG), No. 2019-358-C.A.(P1/18-3099WG), No. 2019-361-C.A.(P1/18-3099YG), No. 2019-363-C.A.(P1/18-3099OOG) |
| Citation | 273 A.3d 146 |
| Parties | STATE v. Deric S. MCGUIRE et al. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
Christopher R. Bush, Department of Attorney General, for State.
Megan F. Jackson, Office of the Public Defender, John F. Cicilline, Esq., for Defendants.
Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and Long, JJ.
These consolidated cases came before the Supreme Court on February 23, 2022, on appeal by the State of Rhode Island, seeking review of a Superior Court order granting the defendants’1 motion to suppress all wire, electronic, or oral communications obtained through the use of wiretaps and any subsequently obtained evidence.2 The state argues that the trial justice erred in finding that an associate justice of the Superior Court had no authority to issue the wiretap orders and that, even if the associate justice was without statutory authority, the trial justice erred in concluding that suppression of the evidence derived from those wiretap orders was warranted. For the reasons stated in this opinion, we affirm the order of the Superior Court.
These consolidated cases arose from a Rhode Island State Police investigation into alleged outlaw motorcycle gangs, which led to an indictment in November 2018 against forty-one defendants charging 424 criminal counts, including possession of and possession with intent to deliver controlled substances, conspiracy, and unlawful possession of firearms. As part of the investigation, from May 2017 through May 2018, an Assistant Attorney General presented applications for several orders authorizing the interception of wire, electronic, and oral communications and orders extending, amending, or terminating the wiretaps (the wiretap orders). The parties filed a Joint Statement of Undisputed Facts in the Superior Court comprising the following facts.3
The first seven wiretap orders, entered between May 18, 2017, and July 12, 2017, were issued by Superior Court Presiding Justice Alice B. Gibney (the Presiding Justice). On July 6, 2017, anticipating that she would be absent for an extended period of time for medical reasons, the Presiding Justice entered an administrative order "[i]n accordance with Section 8-3-4, G.L. 1956 (1997 Reenactment)," which provided that, in her "absence[,] * * * Honorable Robert D. Krause is hereby designated to act and perform all the duties inherent in the Office of the Presiding Justice beginning July 13th, 2017." Justice Krause was the senior associate justice of the Superior Court.
At some point in July 2017, but prior to July 13, 2017, the Presiding Justice orally communicated to Associate Justice Melanie Wilk Thunberg that, during the Presiding Justice's absence, Justice Thunberg was the designated justice to act and perform the duties of the Presiding Justice with respect to the wiretap orders in the present cases. The Presiding Justice delegated this task to Justice Thunberg because, from the Presiding Justice's previous involvement in the investigation, she knew that the cases involved firearms and that Justice Krause was in charge of the Superior Court's Gun Calendar. The Presiding Justice also orally notified the Assistant Attorney General to direct any further applications to Justice Thunberg. No orders, in camera or otherwise, entered respecting this assignment.
In October 2017, the Presiding Justice resumed her duties on a part-time basis and entered various administrative orders in her capacity as the Presiding Justice; in January 2018, she returned full-time and resumed all duties as the Presiding Justice. Upon returning full-time, the Presiding Justice informed Justice Krause that she had rescinded his designation as Acting Presiding Justice, but she advised Justice Thunberg to continue to handle the wiretap orders, given that Justice Thunberg had been actively involved in the investigation during the Presiding Justice's absence. Consequently, the Presiding Justice did not issue any of the wiretap orders after her return in January 2018. From August 2, 2017, through May 2018, Justice Thunberg issued several wiretap orders in connection with the investigation, and Justice Thunberg signed these orders as "Acting Presiding Justice" or "Designated Acting Presiding Justice."4
On December 5, 2018, McGuire filed a motion to suppress "any and all wire, electronic, or oral communications seized during the * * * investigation * * * in 2017 and 2018" because, he contended, the wiretap orders issued between August 2017 and May 2018 "were signed by a person not authorized to grant such orders" in accordance with G.L. 1956 § 12-5.1-3. As noted supra at footnote 1, twenty-four defendants joined in the motion to suppress.
The trial justice granted the motion to suppress with respect to all orders issued after July 13, 2017, as well as the evidence derived from those wiretaps. The trial justice found that, although the Presiding Justice had no conflict of interest, she nonetheless disqualified herself during her impending absence and also disqualified Justice Krause, the senior associate justice, from entering the wiretap orders; and that, sometime between July 6, 2017, and July 13, 2017, she orally designated Justice Thunberg to handle the wiretap applications and orders in connection with the investigation. Although, in accordance with the administrative order, Justice Krause became the Acting Presiding Justice on July 13, 2017, the trial justice found no evidence that the investigation was referred to Justice Krause or that Justice Krause disqualified himself from receiving applications or issuing the wiretap orders.
Based on a strict construction of chapter 5.1 of title 12, the "Interception of Wire and Oral Communications" act (the wiretap act), the trial justice determined that the wiretap act mandated that the applications be made to Justice Krause, as the senior associate justice and "Acting Presiding Justice" at the time. Specifically, she concluded that, because the Presiding Justice was without statutory authority under § 12-5.1-3 to disqualify the senior associate justice from receiving and acting upon the wiretap applications and orders in her absence, the designation of Justice Thunberg to fulfill this duty violated the wiretap act. In addition, she determined that, because Justice Krause was serving as the "Acting Presiding Justice" until the Presiding Justice resumed her duties in January 2018, Justice Thunberg lacked the statutory authority under the wiretap act to enter the wiretap orders as acting presiding justice or as designated acting presiding justice. Accordingly, the trial justice determined that these violations of the wiretap act rendered the wiretap orders null and void ab initio and that, therefore, suppression of the evidence was the appropriate remedy. The state filed timely appeals.
"Questions of statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo by this Court."5 State v. Oster , 922 A.2d 151, 160 (R.I. 2007). When interpreting a statute, "our ultimate goal is to give effect to the purpose of the act as intended by the Legislature." Id. (quoting Webster v. Perrotta , 774 A.2d 68, 75 (R.I. 2001) ). If "the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, this Court must interpret the statute literally and must give the words of the statute their plain and ordinary meanings." Id. (brackets omitted) (quoting Accent Store Design, Inc. v. Marathon House, Inc. , 674 A.2d 1223, 1226 (R.I. 1996) ). We previously have held that we "will not construe a statute to reach an absurd result." Id. (quoting Kaya v. Partington , 681 A.2d 256, 261 (R.I. 1996) ).
"[T]his Court will examine statutes in their entirety, and will ‘glean the intent and purpose of the Legislature from a consideration of the entire statute, keeping in mind the nature, object, language and arrangement of the provisions to be construed.’ " Oster , 922 A.2d at 160 (brackets omitted) (quoting In re Advisory to the Governor (Judicial Nominating Commission) , 668 A.2d 1246, 1248 (R.I. 1996) ). "When a specific statute conflicts with a general statute, our law dictates that precedence must be given to the specific statute." Warwick Housing Authority v. McLeod , 913 A.2d 1033, 1036-37 (R.I. 2007) ; see G.L. 1956 § 43-3-26 ().
On appeal, the state argues that, according to G.L. 1956 § 8-3-4, the Presiding Justice had authority to designate Justice Thunberg to act upon the wiretap applications and issue the orders because that statute allows the Presiding Justice, in her absence, to designate any associate justice to fulfill the duties of her office. The state also avers that the trial justice erred in finding that the Presiding Justice had disqualified herself from considering the wiretap applications and erroneously concluded that all such applications be submitted to Justice Krause pursuant to § 12-5.1-3. In the event the wiretap orders violated the wiretap act, however, the state asserts that such violation does not warrant the suppression of evidence. In the alternative, the state requests that this Court apply the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule.
In the context of governmental intrusion upon personal communications, this Court has determined that "the citizens of this state have a...
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