State v. McIntyre-Caulfield

• Court: New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division
• Writing for the Court: FASCIALE, J.A.D.
• Citation: State v. McIntyre-Caulfield, 455 N.J.Super. 1, 187 A.3d 171 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2018)
• Decision Date: 18 May 2018
• Docket Number: DOCKET NO. A–1277–17T1
• Parties: STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff–Respondent, v. Marianne MCINTYRE–CAULFIELD, Defendant–Appellant.

455 N.J.Super. 1

187 A.3d 171

STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff–Respondent,

v.Marianne MCINTYRE–CAULFIELD, Defendant–Appellant.

DOCKET NO. A–1277–17T1

Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division.

Submitted May 8, 2018

Decided May 18, 2018

Wilentz, Goldman & Spitzer, PA, attorneys for appellant (Darren M. Gelber, of counsel and on the brief).

Andrew C. Carey, Middlesex County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent State of New Jersey (Brian D. Gillet, Deputy First Assistant Prosecutor, on the brief).

Lowenthal & Abrams, PC, attorneys for respondents Parents of W.V. (Michael W. Landis, on the brief).¹

Before Judges Fisher, Fasciale and Moynihan.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

FASCIALE, J.A.D.

This is a tragic case involving the death of an infant that occurred after defendant placed him on his stomach for a nap in her daycare-home business. Two lawsuits resulted from the incident. The State charged defendant with second-degree endangering the welfare of a child, N.J.S.A. 2C:24–4(a)(2) ; and the infants' parents filed a civil lawsuit against defendant seeking money damages.

The State consented to defendant's admission into pre-trial intervention (PTI), and agreed to drop the charges if she successfully completed the program. Enrollment into PTI, however, required that defendant plead guilty because of the second-degree charge. Before pleading guilty, defendant's insurance company disclaimed coverage in the civil matter. Without insurance—and a civil reservation—defendant faced disastrous financial consequences if she pled guilty because the parents could use her plea as an admission of liability. These consequences created a genuine obstacle to resolving the criminal charge.

Defendant overcame that impediment by relying on Rule 3:9–2 and requesting, without opposition from the State, that her guilty plea not be evidential in the civil dispute. Defendant argued that the consequences of her guilty plea in the civil case—likely devastating financial ruin because she was uninsured—constituted good cause under the rule. The judge denied her request and entered the order under review.

The legal question—when enrollment into the PTI program is contingent on a defendant pleading guilty to a second-degree charge—is whether the civil consequences of wreaking devastating personal financial havoc on a defendant constitutes good cause under Rule 3:9–2. We hold that such a financial circumstance establishes good cause permitting a civil reservation. We emphasize that the civil reservation here eliminated the obstacle to avoiding an unnecessary criminal trial against defendant, who feared that the civil claimants would later use her plea of guilty as a devastating admission of civil liability.

Applying a de novo review to this legal question, State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518, 540–41, 58 A.3d 705 (2013), we conclude that the judge erred by denying defendant's request to plead guilty with a civil reservation. We therefore reverse.

I.

The facts are undisputed. On December 1, 2015, the five-month-old infant died. Before the State filed the charge, the parents' first civil attorney notified defendant that he represented the parents, and directed defendant to forward his representation letter to her "insurance company or legal representative." Defendant complied.

About a week after receiving the letter from the civil attorney, the State charged defendant with the offense. According to defendant's merits brief, the State's theory "centered on the admitted fact that defendant had placed the infant on his stomach for a nap." Along these lines, defense counsel remarked in the brief that the American Academy of Pediatrics, since the 1990s, has recommended that infants sleep on their backs in an attempt to reduce infant deaths classified as Sudden Infant Death Syndrome. The cause of the tragic death, however, is not before us.

In July 2016, a senior claims representative for defendant's insurance company—relying on various exclusions in the policy—issued a letter denying insurance coverage and refusing to defend defendant in any civil suit arising from the incident. Without waiving the insurance company's rights to rely on additional exclusions in the policy, she explained that no insurance coverage existed because the incident occurred "out of business pursuits in [defendant's] home." She also referenced other sections in the policy that would purportedly justify the insurance company's position. The claims representative "strongly urged [defendant] to retain personal counsel, solely and completely at [her] own expense, to protect [her] rights and interests."

Approximately three weeks later, a new civil attorney wrote defendant. He explained that the parents retained his law firm to represent them and the estate of the infant. The new attorney instructed defendant not to destroy any video, surveillance, or other evidence from the accident scene, and that if she did, defendant may receive sanctions for spoliation of evidence. As to the extent of the civil damages proximately caused by the incident, he added they were "yet unknown."

At some point, defendant applied for admission into the PTI program. In January 2017, the criminal division manager recommended rejection of the PTI application, and an assistant prosecutor issued a rejection letter in February 2017. But the parties in the criminal case engaged in further negotiations and eventually, in September 2017, the prosecutor consented to defendant's enrollment in the PTI program for a period of thirty-six months. Although the parents initially objected to PTI, the record reflects they were ultimately unopposed to defendant's enrollment into the program.

The prosecutor notified defendant that—in addition to the standard PTI conditions—she had to plead guilty to the second-degree charge. For second-degree offenses, such a requirement is also mandated by N.J.S.A. 2C:43–12(g)(3)(a). A few days later, on September 14, 2017, the parties appeared before the judge at the plea hearing. The parents were there and participated in the hearing by giving a statement.

Defendant filled out her plea forms and specifically raised the subject of pleading guilty with a civil reservation under Rule 3:9–2. The filled-out forms reflect that the parties acknowledged that the State would dismiss the criminal charges if defendant successfully completed PTI—which is also consistent with N.J.S.A. 2C:43–12(g)(3) —and that "counsel [is] to request [a] civil reservation." At the end of plea hearing, the judge addressed defendant's Rule 3:9–2 request. He "signed off" on the request, but then reserved decision. The following colloquy occurred:

[Judge:] I understand there is a request for a civil reservation.... I don't know if the State is going to take any further argument or application with respect to that.

[Assistant Prosecutor:] Judge, we'll submit to the [c]ourt on that issue.

[Judge:] ... If the family has counsel, they may wish to be heard on that ... and I'll give them the opportunity to do so. So, I'll ... carry that for ten days before I make a ruling in case any additional documentation is submitted.

I've signed off on the order.

[Emphasis added.]

In the State's merits brief, an assistant prosecutor (without obtaining an order permitting the supplementation of the record) supplied us with a copy of an August 11, 2017 email she wrote to defense counsel—before the plea hearing and preparation of the plea forms—stating that the State could not agree to the civil reservation. But at the plea hearing, as the quoted colloquy reflects, the State submitted on the issue. Although the infant's parents later objected to the reservation, the State never filed opposition.

In October 2017, the judge issued the order under review denying her request. One month later, the parents filed their civil wrongful-death complaint against defendant, as well as a declaratory judgment suit against the insurance company. They alleged that the insurance company wrongfully denied coverage, a defense, and indemnification for the incident.

In December 2017, a senior claims representative wrote defendant reiterating that there existed no insurance coverage for the parents' claim for damages related to the incident. She explained that the "claim falls squarely in the purview of the ‘business exclusion’ in the [p]olicy." It is undisputed that defendant operated the daycare business out of her home on the day of the incident.

II.

On appeal, defendant maintains that the judge erred as a matter of law. Defendant contends that she established good cause to accept her guilty plea with a civil reservation that it not be evidential in the civil lawsuit. Defendant adds that she showed good cause especially because her plea deal, and the statute, reflect the State would drop the charges if she successfully completed PTI. Defendant urges us to reverse the order.

It is well known that guilty pleas in criminal proceedings are evidential in a related civil case as a statement by a party under N.J.R.E. 803(b)(1). Maida v. Kuskin, 221 N.J. 112, 125, 110 A.3d 867 (2015). However, "[f]or good cause shown[,] the court may, in accepting a plea of guilty, order that such plea not be evidential in any civil proceeding." R. 3:9–2. "The purpose of [Rule 3:9–2] is to avoid an unnecessary criminal trial of a defendant who fears that a civil claimant will later use [her] plea of guilty as a devastating admission of civil liability." Stone v. Police Dep't of Keyport, 191 N.J. Super. 554, 558, 468 A.2d 442 (App. Div. 1983). Defendant realized this purpose by...