State v. McLaughlin, 2004 Ohio 1780 (OH 4/8/2004)
| Citation | 2004 Ohio 1780 |
| Decision Date | 08 April 2004 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 03AP-393. |
| Parties | State of Ohio, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Annette Y. McLaughlin, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Ohio |
APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, C.P.C. No. 00CR-02-1013.
Ron O'Brien, Prosecuting Attorney, and Steven L. Taylor, for appellee.
Dennis C. Belli, for appellant.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Annette Y. McLaughlin, appeals from a judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas sentencing her to a six-month prison term after she failed to complete the terms of her treatment in lieu of conviction program. Because the trial court applied the wrong version of R.C. 2951.041 in this matter, we reverse the trial court's judgment and remand this matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
{¶2} In 1998, appellant worked as a licensed nurse at The Ohio State University Hospital. During the course of her employment, appellant stole Percocet tablets by filling out drug forms falsely indicating that the tablets were for her patients. On February 22, 2000, appellant was charged with six counts of theft in violation of R.C. 2913.02 and six counts of illegal processing of drug documents in violation of R.C. 2925.23. Appellant entered not guilty pleas to all the charges. On July 7, 2000, the trial court ordered an evaluation of appellant to determine whether she was eligible for treatment in lieu of conviction pursuant to R.C. 2951.041.
{¶3} On April 11, 2001, after appellant entered guilty pleas to all the charges against her, the trial court determined that appellant's drug dependence was a factor leading to her criminal offenses and that treatment would reduce the likelihood of future criminal activity. The trial court also determined that appellant was accepted into an outpatient drug treatment program at the Morrow County Council on Alcohol and Drugs ("MCCAD") and that appellant met the other eligibility requirements in R.C. 2951.041(B). Accordingly, the trial court found appellant eligible for treatment in lieu of conviction, accepted appellant's guilty pleas and placed her in the MCCAD program. Appellant was placed under the control of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas Probation Department for an indefinite period of time not to exceed three years. Her treatment in lieu of conviction was conditioned upon appellant (1) completing the drug program at MCCAD; (2) obtaining gainful employment or going to school; and (3) avoiding contact with known drug users.
{¶4} On October 1, 2002, appellant's probation officer filed a statement indicating that appellant had violated the terms of her treatment in lieu of conviction. The statement of violations reflected that appellant twice tested positive for cocaine, was unsuccessfully terminated three times from the treatment program at MCCAD, and failed to make payments for court costs. After a hearing on January 9, 2003, the trial court orally continued appellant's treatment in lieu of conviction but with additional conditions. On January 10, 2003, the trial court filed a criminal case processing sheet indicating its oral pronouncement of the day before. No judgment entry was filed.
{¶5} On January 15, 2003, the state filed a motion for reconsideration of the trial court's decision to allow appellant to remain in treatment in lieu of conviction. The state contended that once appellant failed to complete her treatment program, the trial court was obligated to impose a term of incarceration pursuant to R.C. 2951.041(F). The trial court agreed and revoked appellant's treatment in lieu of conviction due to her failure to complete the treatment program at MCCAD. The trial court then imposed concurrent six-month prison terms for each of appellant's convictions.
{¶6} Appellant appeals, assigning the following errors:
1. The court of common pleas erred and deprived Defendant-Appellant of her rights under the rules of criminal procedure as well as her constitutional right to due process and equal protection under U.S. Const. amend. XIV when it agreed to hear the State's motion for reconsideration of the court's January 9, 2003 ruling to maintain her under the supervision of the county probation department pursuant to R.C. 2951.041.
2. The court of common pleas abused its discretion when it granted the State's motion for reconsideration based upon its mistaken belief that a prior version of R.C. 2951.041(F), which was repealed by 1999 Am. Sub. S.B. No. 107 effective March 23, 2000, applied to Defendant-Appellant's case; and required it to terminate her supervision by the county probation department and to enter an adjudication of guilt due to her failure to complete a drug treatment program.
3. The court of common pleas abused its discretion and/or acted in a manner contrary to law when it sentenced Defendant-Appellant to a term of imprisonment based on its mistaken belief that a prior version of R.C. 2951.041(F), which was repealed by 1999 Am. Sub. S.B. No. 107 effective March 23, 2000, applied to her case, precluded the consider-ation of a community control sanction, and required the imposition of actual incarceration due to her failure to complete a drug treatment program.
4. Defendant-Appellant was denied her right to the effective assistance of counsel under U.S. Const. amend. VI and XIV due to trial counsel's failure to argue for the application of the new intervention in lieu of conviction statute to his client's case.
{¶7} Appellant contends in her first assignment of error that the trial court improperly reconsidered its January 9, 2003, decision to continue appellant's treatment in lieu of conviction. We disagree. Although a court does not have authority to reconsider its own valid final judgment in a criminal case, State ex rel. Hansen v. Reed (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 597, 599, the trial court's January 9, 2003 oral pronouncement of sentence was not a final judgment. It is axiomatic that a court only speaks through its journal. State ex rel. Worcester v. Donnellon (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 117, 118. Therefore, a pronouncement of sentence does not become the official action of the court unless and until it is entered upon the court's journal. Id.; State v. Coyle (Oct. 13, 1997), Clermont App. No. CA97-02-014. Here, the trial court orally announced its decision at the January 9, 2003, hearing and filed a criminal case processing sheet the next day reflecting that oral ruling. However, the trial court did not file a judgment entry reflecting the trial court's decision. Because there was no judgment entry, the trial court's decision was not final. Hansen, supra. Because the trial court's pronouncement of sentence was not final, the trial court could properly reconsider its judgment. Therefore, appellant's first assignment of error is overruled.
{¶8} We will address appellant's second and third assignments of error together. Appellant argues in both these assignments of error that the trial court applied the wrong version of R.C. 2951.041 when it sentenced appellant to prison after she failed to successfully complete her drug treatment program.
{¶9} Prior to March 23, 2000, R.C. 2951.041 was titled Treatment in Lieu of Conviction ("Treatment") and provided an alternative to prison for offenders the trial court felt were drug dependent or in danger of becoming drug dependent. To be eligible for Treatment, an offender had to meet five criteria. R.C. 2951.041(B). First, an offender's drug dependence must have been a factor leading up to the charges the offender faced and rehabilitation through treatment would substantially reduce the likelihood of future criminal activity. Id. at (B)(1). Second, the offender must have been accepted into a qualified drug treatment program. Id. at (B)(2). Third, the offender must have been eligible for probation or community control sanctions. Id. at (B)(3). Finally, the offender could not be a repeat or dangerous offender and could not be charged with certain offenses found in R.C. Chapter 2925. Id. at (B)(4) and (5).
{¶10} If eligible and accepted into Treatment, the offender was placed under the control of the probation department for a period of rehabilitation not to exceed three years. The period of rehabilitation was conditioned upon, among other things, the offender's voluntary entrance into a drug treatment program. R.C. 2951.041(D). If the trial court later found that the offender failed Treatment in some manner, the trial court entered a finding of guilt and was obligated to impose a term of imprisonment. Id. at (F). See State v. Shoaf (2000), 140 Ohio App.3d 75, 78 ().
{¶11} However, on December 22, 1999, the Governor of Ohio signed Am.Sub.S.B. No. 107 ("Bill No. 107"). In that bill, the General Assembly repealed the existing version of R.C. 2951.041 and enacted an entirely new version of the statute, titled Intervention in lieu of Conviction ("Intervention"). This new version of the statute took effect March 23, 2000. The new statute imposed new criteria for an offender to qualify for Intervention. Id. at (B)(1) through (8). The offender's participation in Intervention was no longer conditioned upon the voluntary entrance into a drug treatment program. Rather, after the offender is assessed by an appropriately licensed facility or professional, the trial court was required to establish an intervention plan for the offender. Id. at (D). That plan must require the offender, for at least one year, to abstain from the illegal use of alcohol and drugs and to submit to regular random drug testing, although the trial court may impose additional terms and conditions. If the trial court finds that an offender failed to comply with any of the terms and conditions of the Intervention plan, the trial court...
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