State v. McNeal

Decision Date23 June 2017
Docket NumberNo. 15-1606,15-1606
Citation897 N.W.2d 697
Parties STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Christopher Clay MCNEAL, Appellant.
CourtIowa Supreme Court

Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, Shellie L. Knipfer, Assistant Appellate Defender, and Corey Stone, Law Student, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Louis S. Sloven, Assistant Attorney General, and Matthew Wilber, County Attorney, Amy Zacharias, Jon Jacobmeier, and Christine M. Shockey, Assistant County Attorneys, for appellee.

MANSFIELD, Justice.

In this case, we are asked to review a district court's decision to commence a criminal trial on June 26 but to postpone the presentation of evidence to July 7, eight days after the June 29 expiration of the speedy trial deadline. The court granted this postponement at the State's request based on the unavailability of medical experts.

On our review, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion. We assume without deciding that the district court's use of a start-and-stop procedure to avoid the speedy trial deadline should be analyzed under the same standards as a straightforward extension of the speedy trial deadline. Nevertheless, under that law, we find that the court acted within its discretion. In addition, we conclude the defendant's other appeal issues are without merit. Accordingly, we vacate the decision of the court of appeals and affirm the defendant's convictions and sentence.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

On February 22, 2015, Matthew Browning was working alone in a tool shop. The defendant, Christopher McNeal, entered the shop and began repairing a wheelchair that he had dropped off earlier. Browning asked McNeal to leave because the shop's owner did not want McNeal there. McNeal ignored him, kept working on the wheelchair, and asked Browning if he had any drugs to share. Browning replied that he did not. Browning again asked him to leave, this time using a raised voice and gesturing to McNeal with a sledgehammer in hand. The next thing Browning remembered was McNeal leaving the shop. Browning awoke hours later with blood frozen to his face and feeling "[t]errible." One of the sledgehammers from the shop went missing that night and was never located.

Browning was eventually diagnosed with an epidural hematoma and a lineal fracture in his skull based on an examination by Dr. John Treves. Several days after the assault, Browning told the owner of the shop, "Oh God. [McNeal] hit me in the head with a hammer." Later, Browning saw McNeal and confronted him, asking McNeal why he would "do something like that." McNeal replied, "Well, you were shaking a hammer at me. I just beat you to it."

When McNeal was interviewed by police, he claimed he was not at the shop at all that day. Asked where he was instead, McNeal responded that he "get[s] around" and was at the "other end of town."

On March 30, the State charged McNeal with attempted murder, see Iowa Code § 707.11(1) (2015), first-degree burglary, see id. § 713.3(1)(c ), willful injury resulting in serious injury, see id. § 708.4(1), assault while participating in a felony, see id. § 708.3(1), and assault with a dangerous weapon, see id. § 708.1(2)(c ). The State also gave notice that it would seek the mandatory five-year minimum sentence of confinement if the jury found that McNeal was in possession of a "dangerous weapon," i.e., a sledgehammer, while committing a forcible felony. See id. § 902.7. McNeal pled not guilty and demanded a speedy trial pursuant to Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.33(2)(b ). The speedy trial deadline in this case was June 29.1

Trial was set for June 9. However, on that date, the following exchange took place regarding plea negotiations:

THE COURT: This case is set for trial this morning. What are we doing?
MR. TENNY: Well, Your Honor, there has been a plea agreement offered by the State. And as I—initially Mr. McNeal was considering it, but as of last night, I understand he no longer wishes to accept that plea agreement. He's asked the State if they would consider a total of five years, concurrent on everything; and from what I understand, the State is not agreeable to that.
....
THE COURT: So you're wanting to just make a record on the plea offer?
MR. TENNY: Right. And I've explained all of this. I was at the jail last night until 6:00 p.m. talking with Mr. McNeal about this offer and—and I also explained that there's a potential at risk that it could turn out way worse for him if he's convicted of any of the larger charges, you know, total.

Under the proposed plea agreement, McNeal would have pled guilty to willful injury causing serious injury in this case and willful injury causing bodily injury in an unrelated case. See id. § 708.4(1), (2). All remaining charges would be dismissed. Neither of those charges would carry a mandatory minimum term of incarceration, and the State would recommend concurrent sentences, resulting overall in an indeterminate ten-year sentence. Conversely, if the offer was rejected, the State informed McNeal that it would proceed with all the charges in the trial information, request consecutive sentences, and seek the dangerous-weapon-forcible-felony enhancement. Notably, the attempted murder charge carried a mandatory minimum term of seventeen and one-half years in prison. See id. § 902.12(2).

On the record, McNeal rejected the plea agreement. At the same time, he declined to waive the speedy trial deadline. Accordingly, the trial was rescheduled to June 23.

Before then, on June 16, the parties returned to court. The lead prosecutor explained,

[I]t was our understanding as [McNeal] came to court last week that we had a plea deal. And then on the 9th of June, pretty much everything fell apart in terms of the defendant wishing to take the plea offer that was made.
And so the State then has been working since that time to schedule the expert witnesses in this case that we have. ... [W]e have been unable to nail down times that our—where our experts are available in this case. The State understands that—And when I say available, I mean next week, because we're supposed to start trial on Tuesday, June 23rd....
Now, there are, I think, five to seven doctors named on the trial information. The three that we need to prove the elements in this case of the serious injury are unavailable. One is in Europe, one is a neurosurgeon and is in surgery next week and can't inconvenience, obviously, the people that need brain surgery, and the other is a radiologist that is unavailable because of work commitments, as well.

The prosecutor went on,

[W]e're in a little bit of flux in terms of what our schedule is. This is certainly not a situation that the State would normally find itself in or want to find itself in, to be noticing witnesses this late. But because of the representation or understanding that the plea offer was going to be taken, we simply had not noticed or attempted to schedule these witnesses to come in for trial, you know, as of last week.

The State added that one of the three witnesses would not be back from Europe until June 30. That witness was Dr. Crystal Seluk, a physician who had been listed with the original minutes of testimony on March 30. The State proposed that a jury could be selected on June 23, and the case could then be continued "until such time as the State is able to then schedule [the] expert witnesses."

At this point, the parties made a record once more on the State's plea offer and the defendant's unwillingness to accept that offer.

The court then asked the defense to address the State's proposal to have the jury picked on June 23 followed by a recess until the experts were available. At first, defense counsel did not respond to this proposal, but instead asked the State to reconsider a single indeterminate five-year sentence to resolve all charges. The State again declined this counteroffer, citing "the facts in this case ... and the injuries to the victim."

Defense counsel then explained that the State's plea offer had not arrived until June 2. Initially, the defendant had intended to accept it, and preparations had been made on both sides for a plea hearing to occur on June 9. However, the defendant had "a change of heart" on June 9.

Defense counsel objected to the State's proposal to take a trial hiatus for the expert witnesses. Defense counsel claimed the State had known about these witnesses all along but had not listed them until after June 9. (This was partially incorrect because the original minutes of testimony included Dr. Seluk.) Defense counsel added that "everyone knows that medical personnel are difficult to get to court." Defense counsel urged,

Now, the State can present whatever witnesses they have on June 23rd, those who are available, and present their case in that way, or this—it would be a good reason to settle the case, as—as we've—you know, as we're requesting.

The prosecutor responded by correcting the record as to Dr. Seluk. She explained, "Dr. Seluk had been named all along and yet is still unavailable." The prosecutor added that it would have been "horribly inconvenient" to have medical professionals scheduled to show up on June 9 when both sides thought a plea was going to be entered.

After hearing these arguments, the court concluded, "I think it's clear, with one of the doctors out of the country from June 23rd until June 30th, that's a problem. And I think there is a good cause to adjust the scheduling of the trial." The court thus ordered that the jury could be impaneled on June 23, but that proof would not commence until July 7. Yet the court added,

[W]e need to get them going July 7, at the very latest. And if there's still a doctor in Europe or one doing surgery or whatever it is, you'll just have to subpoena them and get them here on that day or do without them.

On June 23, a prosecutor made allegedly improper comments during jury selection for a different case. Because the venire was also going to be used to select the jury for McNeal's case, McNeal...

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