State v. McQuaid

Decision Date19 February 1997
Citation147 N.J. 464,688 A.2d 584
PartiesSTATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Robert McQUAID, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtNew Jersey Supreme Court

Steven M. Gilson, Designated Counsel, Union, for appellant (Susan L. Reisner, Public Defender, attorney).

Bennett A. Barlyn, Deputy Attorney General, for respondent (Peter G. Verniero, Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney).

The opinion of the Court was delivered by

STEIN, J.

This appeal addresses the denial of defendant's second petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) filed approximately seven years after his guilty plea to felony murder and theft. Defendant, Robert McQuaid, based his second PCR petition largely on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, alleging that he had pled guilty because of the erroneous advice that if tried and convicted of the pending charges he could be subject to the death penalty. The Appellate Division upheld the trial court's denial of PCR based on the procedural bar of Rule 3:22-5, which deems conclusive a prior adjudication on the merits of any grounds for relief asserted.

I

We base our recitation of the pertinent facts primarily on defendant's admissions at his plea hearing and during a confession made several days following the murder. On December 8, 1982, defendant and a friend, Lawrence Woodward, sought to burglarize the Barrington, New Jersey home of Beatrice Watson. Defendant knew Watson from previous odd-jobs he had performed for her. For several weeks, the two men had watched the house in order to determine an appropriate time for the burglary. On the day of the crime defendant and co-defendant Woodward believed that the home would be unoccupied. Defendant approached the back door of the house and knocked. Unexpectedly, Watson answered the door. Defendant showed her a knife and told her to let him in, informing her that she should say nothing and would not be hurt. He backed her into the living room where he told her to lie face down on the couch. Woodward entered the house and defendant told him to find some tape and tie up the victim. After Woodward tied the victim with surgical tape, the two men ransacked the house.

While looking through bedroom drawers, defendant found a .38 caliber revolver. Defendant gave the gun to Woodward. The two men discussed whether to kill the victim in order to prevent her from identifying them. A pillow was placed over the victim's head. Woodward shot the victim twice after defendant said he could not shoot her. Following the shooting, the two men fled the scene with a pillowcase containing the few valuable items they had found. They drove to Philadelphia and stayed for two days. Defendant sold the items taken from the Watson home at a Coin Exchange store for approximately $200, and sold the gun for drugs. Defendant gave Woodward $80 to $100 as his share of the burglary proceeds. While in Philadelphia they also visited defendant's uncle.

On December 10, 1982, defendant and Woodward drove to New Jersey to return the car used during the burglary, which they had borrowed from a friend. At the friend's home, they spoke with Gary Cumens. Cumens had just read an article in a newspaper about the killing of Beatrice Watson, and knew that defendant had previously worked for her. Cumens asked defendant about the killing and defendant admitted that they had committed the burglary and had killed the victim.

Later that day, defendant and Woodward broke into a Haddonfield home. Defendant cut through a screen and broke the glass in the back door. Defendant searched the house and found an unloaded single barrel shotgun in a closet. When Woodward shouted that the police were outside, the two men separated and fled. Defendant escaped from the home through a basement window, carrying a pillowcase containing stolen goods. While running, he dropped the pillowcase. Defendant was apprehended by the police several blocks from the burglarized home.

On December 17, 1982, both defendant and Woodward made sworn statements to the police regarding the burglaries and the murder of Beatrice Watson. The two statements were consistent in detailing how they had planned the Watson burglary for several weeks before committing the crime. Both men stated that they went to a supermarket to procure gloves and a knife just before driving to the Watson house. Their statements differed somewhat regarding the decision to kill the victim. Woodward claimed defendant told him to kill the victim because she could identify defendant. He stated that defendant emphasized that he did not want to return to jail because he knew he would receive a long sentence. Woodward also claimed that defendant gave him the pillow and told him to shoot the victim through the pillow in order to muffle the sound. Defendant stated that they had previously discussed killing the victim, if necessary. Defendant claimed that, while defendant was in a different room, Woodward threatened and then killed the victim after defendant gave him the gun.

Other evidence acquired by the police included a sworn statement by Gary Cumens, which indicated that two days before the killing he had driven past the victim's home with the two defendants and heard them discuss their plan to burglarize the home. Cumens reported that defendant later admitted to him that he and Woodward had killed the victim. Cumens also stated that defendant informed him that defendant had told Woodward to go ahead and kill her while he went into another room.

The police went to the Philadelphia store where defendant had sold the items stolen from the victim's home. With the signed receipt retained by defendant, police detectives recovered the stolen items, including a silverware set engraved with the initial "W". Additionally, the police recovered the gun registered to the victim. The police spoke with defendant's uncle who confirmed the presence of the two men in Philadelphia during the two days following the murder. The uncle stated that defendant and his friend stayed overnight in a small silver car, which matched the description of the car defendant admitted to borrowing on the day of the murder. The police also located a witness who, on the day of the killing, saw the car used by defendant parked around the corner from the victim's home.

In December 1982, a grand jury indicted defendant on a total of fifteen charges. Those charges were: murder by his own conduct, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(1), -3a(2), -3c (count one); murder as an accomplice by procuring the commission of the homicide by payment or promise of payment of anything of pecuniary value, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c (count two); aiding and abetting the murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1, 11-3c (counts three and four); felony murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(3), -3c (count five); conspiracy to commit murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2 (count six); first-degree robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1b (count seven); second-degree burglary, N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2b (count eight); conspiracy to commit robbery and/or burglary, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2 (count nine); hindering apprehension or prosecution, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3a(3) (counts ten, eleven, and twelve); possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4a, -4d (counts thirteen and fourteen); and possession of a handgun, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5b (count fifteen).

The Camden County Prosecutor filed a Notice of Aggravating Factors, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(2)(e) and Rule 3:13-4(a), thereby designating defendant's prosecution as a death penalty case. The enumerated factors were: (1) the murder was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(4)(c); (2) the murder was committed for the purpose of escaping detection, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(4)(f); (3) the murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in the commission of a robbery and/or burglary, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(4)(g); and (4) the defendant procured the commission of the murder by payment or promise of payment, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(4)(e).

In February 1983, a second grand jury indicted defendant on six charges related to the Haddonfield burglary. Those charges were: fourth degree aggravated assault--by pointing a firearm, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1b(4) (count one); second-degree burglary, N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2 (count two); third-degree theft by unlawful taking or disposition, N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3 (count three); second degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4 (count four); third-degree unlawful possession of a weapon (shotgun), N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(c)(1) (count five); and conspiracy to commit burglary, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2 (count six).

Defense counsel represented defendant for close to a year and a half. At the plea hearing, counsel noted that he had had numerous conferences with defendant discussing the potential consequences of both a guilty plea and a conviction after trial. He acknowledged that defendant was charged with a capital crime and faced the possibility of a death sentence. In the course of a colloquy with the court, he expressed the view that defendant, if convicted on all charges, faced a potential sentence of life with sixty years parole ineligibility.

After substantial negotiations between defense counsel and the prosecutor, the State offered defendant a plea bargain. Defendant accepted. Based on the plea agreement, defendant entered a retraxit guilty plea to one count of felony murder. In exchange, the State agreed to seek dismissal of the remaining fourteen counts related to the murder indictment and recommend a sentence of forty years imprisonment with thirty years of parole ineligibility. Additionally, defendant pled guilty to one count of theft under the second indictment. The State also agreed to seek dismissal of the remaining five counts and to recommend a concurrent ten-year term of imprisonment with a five-year period of parole ineligibility.

During the plea hearing, defendant, defense counsel and the trial court made reference to defendant's death eligibility. On four separate...

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