State v. McRae, 27
| Citation | 172 S.E.2d 37,276 N.C. 308 |
| Decision Date | 11 February 1970 |
| Docket Number | No. 27,27 |
| Parties | STATE of North Carolina v. Billie Clem McRAE. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of North Carolina |
Atty. Gen. Robert Morgan and Dale Shepherd, Staff Atty., for the State.
Benny S. Sharpe, Rockingham, for defendant.
Defendant contends that the trial judge erred by admitting into evidence inculpatory statements alleged to have been made by him to police officers while in police custody.
When defendant interposed his objection to evidence concerning custodial statements made by him to police officers, the trial judge, in accordance with procedure approved by this Court and the United States Supreme Court, excused the jury and in its absence conducted a voir dire hearing to determine the voluntariness of the alleged statements. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908; State v. Gray, 268 N.C. 69, 150 S.E.2d 1; State v. Catrett, N.C., 171 S.E.2d 398 (No. 52, Fall Term, 1969, filed January 6, 1970). This procedure is vital because of the unquestioned rule in North Carolina that an extra-judicial confession of guilt by a defendant is admissible against him only when it is made voluntarily and understandingly. State v. Vickers, 274 N.C. 311, 163 S.E.2d 481; State v. Gray, supra; State v. Roberts, 12 N.C. 259.
On voir dire, Everette L. Norton, an agent of the State Bureau of Investigation, and defendant Billie Clem McRae testified. Agent Norton, in substance, testified that he talked with defendant while he was in custody on a charge of first degree murder; that at the times he talked with defendant he appeared to be in a normal, rational condition; that defendant was in no way coerced or offered any reward to make a statement; he was warned verbally and in writing of his 'constitutional rights,' and, prior to making the statement, he stated orally and in writing that he understood his rights. The written document signed by defendant consisted of two parts, entitled 'Your Rights' and 'Waiver of Rights,' respectively. Under the section entitled 'Your Rights' appears the following:
The section entitled 'Waiver of Rights' states:
According to Agent Norton, defendant signed said waiver before any questioning took place and it was witnessed by the Deputy Clerk of the Superior Court.
On cross-examination, Agent Norton indicated that he had not discussed with defendant the charges against him before the incriminating statement was made, but that Chief Deputy Earl Dunn (of the Richmond County Sheriff's Office) had explained the charges to defendant sometime prior to defendant's signing the waiver and making the statement in question.
Defendant testified, in substance, that he was arrested on the morning of 14 November 1968. He stated that the warrant (charging him with murder) was read to him, but that he did not understand the charge of murder against him and that no one explained the doctrine of 'felony-murder' to him. He further testified that, though he read the statement of his rights, he did not really know what he was signing when he signed the statement. Asked if he read the statement, he said,
On cross-examination, defendant again stated that he did not understand what his rights were. He said, however, 'I told them I was willing to make a statement and answer questions.' When asked whether he understood the part of the waiver which indicated that he did not want a lawyer before he made the statement, defendant responded, 'Well, I didn't think I needed one at the time.' Defendant stated:
Upon completion of the evidence for the State and defendant on voir dire, the trial judge made full findings of fact. He found that defendant was fully apprised of his constitutional rights and read the paper writing quoted above entitled 'Your Rights' and 'Waiver of Rights,' and thereupon stated to the officers that he was willing to make a statement and answer questions; that he did not want a lawyer at that time and understood and knew what he was doing. The court further found:
'That the defendant understood that he had a right to remain silent; that anything that he said could be used against him; that he had a right to talk to a lawyer before answering any questions and to have one with him during questioning; that he understood that if he could not afford one, one would be appointed for him, and further understood that if he decided to answer questions he could stop at any time and request the presence of an attorney; that no one offered any reward to the defendant to cause him to make the statement; that he was not threatened or coerced in any way; that there is no indication, either by the defendant, who chose to take the stand in his own behalf in this inquiry, nor by cross examination of the Officer Norton to indicate that the defendant was mistreated in any way;
'* * * That the defendant prior to the time the questioning was begun had been read the charges against him and knew and understood that he was charged with murder of one Braxton Crawford Quick; * * *'
Based upon his findings of fact, the trial judge concluded that the challenged statement was 'freely, knowingly and understandingly given by the defendant, after having been fully forewarned of his constitutional rights, and after having freely, knowingly, understandingly and voluntarily waived same.' Thereupon the court ordered that the statement be admitted into evidence before the jury.
Defendant argued that he did not voluntarily, understandingly and intelligently make incriminatory statements or knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel, because he was unaware of the rule of law which could make him guilty of murder in the first degree although he did not actually commit the act which ended Quick's life. He relies upon the familiar cases of Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977, and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 86 S.Ct. 1602. In Escobedo a young Mexican boy was taken to police headquarters for interrogation on a murder charge and, after prolonged questioning, made inculpatory statements. He was not advised of his right to remain silent and, although he made several requests to see his lawyer, and although his lawyer, who was in the building, made persistent efforts to see his client, he was denied the right to have his counsel present. His custodial statement was used at his trial and Escobedo was convicted of murder. The United States Supreme Court, reversing the trial court, stated:
'We...
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