State v. McReynolds

Decision Date11 April 1925
Docket Number25,934
Citation118 Kan. 356,234 P. 975
PartiesTHE STATE OF KANSAS, Appellee, v. LLOYD MCREYNOLDS, Appellant
CourtKansas Supreme Court

Decided January, 1925.

Appeal from Leavenworth district court; JAMES H. WENDORFF, judge.

Judgment affirmed.

SYLLABUS

SYLLABUS BY THE COURT.

HOMICIDE--Evidence Admissible in Rebuttal. In a prosecution for murder, evidence proper in chief as tending to prove motive and intent was offered in rebuttal. The court limited the offered evidence to rebuttal and instructed the jury that it was admitted only for that purpose. Held, that the offer of the evidence in rebuttal and the ruling of the court thereon do not constitute error.

Lee Judy, of Kansas City, for the appellant.

Charles B. Griffith, attorney-general, Malcolm McNaughton, county attorney, and William D. Reilly, assistant county attorney for the appellee.

OPINION

HARVEY, J.:

Three colored men, Lloyd McReynolds, Vernon Clay and David Parker, were charged jointly with the murder of Charles Lambert, who was shot and killed June 7, 1924, on the main highway leading from Kansas City to Leavenworth. Lloyd McReynolds was tried separately and found guilty of murder in the first degree, and he has appealed. The state's theory was that the defendants were equally guilty, and the evidence on behalf of the state tended to show the following facts:

Lambert was engaged in the produce business at Leavenworth, where he bought produce, which he took to Kansas City and sold at the market. On June 6 he took four truckloads of strawberries to Kansas City. Each truck had a driver. After the boxes were unloaded, the other drivers returned to Leavenworth, but Lambert and one young man, George Kerston, stayed in Kansas City. The next morning Lambert disposed of his berries and started home soon after noon. Lambert frequently carried large sums of money on his person. McReynolds, Clay and Parker, all of whom reside in Kansas City, Kan., were over at the Kansas City, Mo., market on the morning of June 7, and in some way were informed that Lambert had about $ 1,600 with him and that he had no gun. The three of them plotted to hold Lambert up on his road home and take the money away from him. When Lambert and Kersten started home they drove across the viaduct to Kansas City, Kan., and to the DeCoursey Creamery, where they loaded the truck with crates covered with tarpaulin, and started out the paved highway toward Leavenworth. The three defendants followed in McReynolds' car. At one point on the road Lambert had some trouble with a tire and stopped to fix it. The defendants, who were some little distance back of him, stopped their car and waited until Lambert went on. At the halfway house Lambert and Kersten stopped for lunch. It was then about 2:30. The three defendants drove by the place some little distance and stopped and waited until Lambert passed them. Lambert left the halfway house about three o'clock and drove on toward Leavenworth, the three defendants following him. At a place on the highway before Lansing was reached the three colored men drove their car up to the side of Lambert's truck, their plan being for one of them to climb onto the truck and to attack Lambert who was sitting on the front seat, but because the truck was so full of crates, that could not be accomplished. They drove their car to the side of Lambert's truck and told him to get over to the side of the road, and one of the colored men shot at the tire on Lambert's truck. Lambert drew a gun and fired. Several shots were exchanged, and Lambert was shot through the intestines and died the next day as a result thereof. By the time the shooting was over the car in which the colored men were riding had dropped back of the truck. Defendants then turned around and started back toward Kansas City. Instead of going directly to Kansas City, they drove off on a side road, where Clay and Parker got out of the car and went over to a little station to catch the interurban. McReynolds drove on in to Kansas City. Because of the peculiar markings of the car which was owned by McReynolds, he was located and taken into custody and made a written statement from which the other two were arrested. Upon the trial of McReynolds, Parker was a witness for the state. Clay, who had been separately tried the previous day and found guilty in the first degree, was a witness for McReynolds.

The evidence on behalf of the defendant tended to show that he had a taxi stand in Kansas City, Kan., and two taxi cars of his own, which he operated; that he was acquainted with Clay, who on the morning of June 7 came to his stand and hired McReynolds to drive him to Leavenworth, and paid him $ 8 for the trip. That Clay stated he wanted to go to Leavenworth to take part in a crap game which he understood was to be played there that afternoon; that when they started to Leavenworth they met Parker, whom Clay invited to go with them. There was evidence that McReynolds had a good reputation as a law-abiding citizen; that he had never been connected or charged with being connected with any crimes or offenses, and he testified that he had no knowledge of Lambert and that he did not know Parker; had never met him until that day. McReynolds took the witness stand in his own behalf, and on cross-examination he was asked specifically about his acquaintance with Parker, and said he did not know him. He was then asked, if on the Saturday evening before the killing of Lambert he had not driven Parker and Clay in his taxi, and if the three of them had held up a street-car conductor, robbed him, and divided the money, all of which he denied.

In rebuttal the state called Parker and asked him about his acquaintance with McReynolds. He testified he had known McReynolds about three years; that McReynolds knew his name, called him both by his first name and his last name. He further testified that he and Clay rode with McReynolds on the night of June 5. He was then asked whether or not on that occasion he and Clay held up a conductor of a street car. This was objected to as not being proper rebuttal and as having been asked purely for the purpose of prejudicing defendant before the jury. The court overruled the objection, but instructed the jury that "this testimony is for the purpose of showing the acquaintance, if there was any, between this man [Parker] and McReynolds."

"MR. MCNAUGHTON (county attorney): Not altogether that, if your honor please. I asked McReynolds the question whether or not a street-car robbery had been pulled off on the night of the 5th and he had transported the proceeds of that.

"THE COURT: We are not trying that case. I think it should only be considered by the jury for the purpose of determining whether or not Parker and McReynolds were acquainted, and for the purpose of showing their relation with each other, and for the purpose of showing association with each other, and for no other purpose."

The defendant objected to the testimony being considered for any purpose, for the reason that it is not proper rebuttal, and was asked only for the purpose of prejudicing the jury against the defendant. The county attorney then asked the following:

"Q. After this ride you and Clay had with McReynolds, state whether you, Clay and McReynolds had any property dealings?

"THE COURT: What night?

"Q. The night of the 5th of June?

"THE COURT: He may answer.

"MR. JUDY (attorney for defendant): I object to the question as incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial; not proving or tending to prove any issue in the case; not rebuttal; prejudicing the jury against this defendant.

"Q. Answer that question, yes or no. A. Yes, sir."

The errors complained of in the appeal relate to this rebuttal testimony, both to the questions asked by the county attorney and the rulings of the court upon the admission of the evidence, and the failure of the court to grant a new trial which...

To continue reading

Request your trial
7 cases
  • State v. Willis, 59120
    • United States
    • Kansas Supreme Court
    • January 16, 1987
    ...v. Gibbs, 105 Kan. 52, 181 Pac. 569 [ (1919) ]; The State v. Abrams, 115 Kan. 520, 223 Pac. 301 [ (1924) ]; The State v. McReynolds, 118 Kan. 356, 360, 234 Pac. 975 [ (1925) ]; State v. Haines, 128 Kan. 475, 477, 278 Pac. 767 [ (1929) ], the admission of such evidence, even though it be ass......
  • State v. Beam
    • United States
    • Kansas Supreme Court
    • March 6, 1954
    ...is, that under our decisions, see State v. Gibbs, 105 Kan. 52, 181 P. 569; State v. Abrams, 115 Kan. 520, 223 P. 301; State v. McReynolds, 118 Kan. 356, 360, 234 P. 975; State v. Haines, 128 Kan. 475, 477, 278 P. 767, the admission of such evidence, even though it be assumed it pertained to......
  • State v. Reuter
    • United States
    • Kansas Supreme Court
    • July 7, 1928
    ... ... various stages of the trial. This question has been before ... the court on a number of occasions. (State v ... Robinson, 125 Kan. 365, 263 P. 1081; State v ... Baker, 122 Kan. 552, 253 P. 221; State v ... Pittsenberger, 119 Kan. 649, 240 P. 568; State v ... McReynolds, 118 Kan. 356, 234 P. 975; State v ... King, 111 Kan. 140, 206 P. 883; State v ... Ridgway, 108 Kan. 734, 197 P. 199; State v ... Bowers, 108 Kan. 161, 194 P. 650; State v ... Kirby, 62 Kan. 436, 63 P. 752.) ... Such ... evidence may, in the discretion of the court, be received ... ...
  • State v. Bean
    • United States
    • Kansas Supreme Court
    • November 9, 1957
    ...is, that under our decisions, (see State v. Gibbs, 105 Kan. 52, 181 P. 569; State v. Abrams, 115 Kan. 520, 223 P. 301; State v. McReynolds, 118 Kan. 356, 360, 234 P. 975; State v. Haines, 128 Kan. 475, 477, 278 P. 767, the admission of such evidence, even though it be assumed it pertained t......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT