State v. Meadows, 15601

CourtSupreme Court of West Virginia
Citation172 W.Va. 247,304 S.E.2d 831
Docket NumberNo. 15601,15601
PartiesSTATE of West Virginia v. David MEADOWS.
Decision Date22 June 1983

Syllabus by the Court

1. "In a criminal case, a verdict of guilt will not be set aside on the ground that it is contrary to the evidence, where the state's evidence is sufficient to convince impartial minds of the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. The evidence is to be viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution. To warrant interference with a verdict of guilt on the ground of insufficiency of evidence, the court must be convinced that the evidence was manifestly inadequate and that consequent injustice has been done." Syllabus point 1, State v. Starkey, 161 W.Va. 517, 244 S.E.2d 219 (1978).

2. "Circumstantial evidence will not support a guilty verdict, unless the fact of guilt is proved to the exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis of innocence; and circumstances which create only a suspicion of guilt but do not prove the actual commission of the crime charged, are not sufficient to sustain a conviction." Syllabus point 2, State v. Dobbs, 163 W.Va. 630, 259 S.E.2d 829 (1979).

3. "If, on a trial for murder, the evidence is wholly circumstantial, but as to time, place, motive, means and conduct, it concurs in pointing to the accused as the perpetrator of the crime, he may properly be convicted." Syllabus point 1, State v. Bailey, 151 W.Va. 796, 155 S.E.2d 850 (1967).

4. "The weight of circumstantial evidence, as in the case of direct evidence, is a question for jury determination, and whether such evidence excludes, to a moral certainty, every reasonable hypothesis, other than that of guilt, is a question for the jury." Syllabus point 4, State v. Bailey, 151 W.Va. 796, 155 S.E.2d 850 (1967).

5. The ruling of a trial court concerning the sufficiency of a bill of particulars will not be reversed on appeal unless the trial court abused its discretion.

6. "Instructions that are repetitious or are not supported by the evidence should not be given to the jury by the trial court." Syllabus point 7, State v. Cokeley, 159 W.Va. 664, 226 S.E.2d 40 (1976) .

7. "A judgment of conviction will not be reversed because of improper remarks made by a prosecuting attorney to a jury which do not clearly prejudice the accused or result in manifest injustice." Syllabus point 5, State v. Ocheltree, 170 W.Va. 68, 289 S.E.2d 742 (1982).

8. Where a prospective juror, upon individual questioning, indicated that he was a former penitentiary guard but had retired ten years before trial, it was not reversible error to permit him to be a juror where no prejudice was shown.

Norris Kantor, J. Franklin Long, Bluefield, for appellant.

S. Clark Woodroe, Asst. Atty. Gen., Charleston, for appellee.

McHUGH, Justice:

This case is before this Court upon the appeal of David Meadows, the appellant, from a judgment of the Circuit Court of Mercer County, West Virginia, which found him guilty of first degree murder. The appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment, without recommendation of mercy. This Court has before it the petition for appeal, all matters of record and the briefs and oral argument of counsel.

In his appeal the appellant asserts five errors. Those assertions are: (1) the trial court erred in failing to issue a directed verdict in favor of the appellant because the evidence was insufficient to sustain a guilty verdict; (2) the trial court erred in failing to issue a directed verdict in favor of the appellant due to the State's variance in its evidence from the bill of particulars filed in the present case; (3) the trial court erred in refusing to give appellant's Instruction No. 21 to the jury, regarding the necessity of the State to prove the appellant's presence at the scene of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt; (4) the trial court erred in permitting the prosecution to misquote the evidence during final arguments, and (5) the trial court erred in failing to strike a juror for cause when it became known during voir dire that the juror had been employed as a prison guard ten years prior to his jury duty.

Testimony was heard at trial that the appellant and the murder victim, Gloria Darlene Hairston, were romantically involved. However, on the afternoon of November 28, 1979, the appellant appeared at Ms. Hairston's place of employment and accused her of having an affair with a co-employee, Jerry McConnell. After the appellant struck both Ms. Hairston and Mr. McConnell with his fist, the appellant drew a knife on Mr. McConnell. While the altercation stopped at that point, the appellant, before leaving, was overheard as saying, "I'm not through with you all yet." Ms. Hairston, along with other co-workers, accompanied Mr. McConnell to a hospital for treatment of an eye injury which required several stitches. After the visit to the hospital, one of Ms. Hairston's co-workers took her to her car at "about twenty minutes till 7, a quarter till, somewhere around there."

The record indicates that on November 28, 1979, at 6:00 p.m., the appellant borrowed a 1975 royal blue Chevrolet Caprice Classic automobile, with a C.B. antenna mounted on its trunk, from a Veronica Finney. Ms. Finney testified that upon returning her automobile later that evening at either 7:20 p.m. or 8:20 p.m., the appellant watched television at her home in Bluefield, West Virginia, until 10:30 p.m. Ms. Finney also testified that the appellant borrowed her automobile again one day during the week following November 28, 1979.

Another witness, who knew Ms. Hairston, testified that she saw Ms. Hairston and an unidentified person sitting in Ms. Hairston's automobile, a Chevrolet Monza, which was parked alongside Route 52 in Freeman, West Virginia, at 7:30 p.m. on November 28, 1979. The witness also testified that she saw a larger automobile, in which yet another person appeared to be sitting, parked in front of Ms. Hairston's automobile.

The record also indicates that on the evening of November 28, 1979, the same two automobiles were parked close to a trailer occupied by Shirley and Jack Dillon. That evening Ms. Dillon was talking on the telephone when she heard her dogs barking. Upon looking outside she saw two automobiles, a small one and a larger, dark one with a C.B. antenna mounted on its trunk, parked off the side of Route 52. After seeing a person walking from the smaller automobile to the larger one she returned to her telephone conversation. However, a short time later the dogs again started barking. This time Ms. Dillon opened her front door and after noticing that the two automobiles had moved some 200 to 300 feet down the road she thought she heard a woman scream. Ms. Dillon also saw a man, whom she could not identify, standing beside the larger automobile.

Soon after returning to her telephone conversation, Ms. Dillon heard two gun shots. While she could not be exact about when the shots occurred, she indicated, however, that she heard the shots between 7:00 p.m. and 8:00 p.m. that same evening.

Other witnesses, who knew Ms. Hairston and could recognize her automobile, testified that they had seen her automobile parked on the same section of Route 52 near the Dillon residence later that evening. One such witness testified that Ms. Hairston's automobile was still parked there when she drove by it about midnight. The larger automobile, however, was not there at that time.

Shirley Dillon's husband, Jack, arrived home around midnight that night and he too saw the smaller automobile which was parked 200 to 300 feet down the road from his home. Soon thereafter the dogs once again began to bark. At that time Mr. Dillon looked out the window and heard the automobile's engine start. The automobile then backed up and stopped in front of the Dillon home, which sat on a small knoll overlooking the road. Mr. Dillon testified that as he watched, an unidentified person put "something" on the floor of the backseat of the automobile. He also heard "a thud noise, like it was something heavy" when the object was placed in the automobile. The unidentified person got back into the automobile, made a U-turn and drove in the direction of Bluefield. While the automobile made its U-turn on Route 52, Mr. Dillon also saw a second unidentified person walking on the opposite side of the road. At no time did Mr. Dillon see the larger automobile.

On December 4, 1979, during the week following Ms. Hairston's death, Ms. Dillon saw an automobile parked in front of her home. She identified it as the same large automobile with a C.B. antenna mounted on its trunk which had been parked near her home on the evening of November 28, 1979. The record indicates that Mr. Dillon looked at the license number of the automobile and as he read it aloud Ms. Dillon wrote the number on a "piece of a small envelope." The license number was that which belonged to the 1975 royal blue Chevrolet Caprice Classic automobile owned by Ms. Finney.

Wanda Talton, appellant's neighbor, who was also familiar with Ms. Hairston's automobile, testified that at about 1:00 a.m. or 1:30 a.m. on November 29, 1979, she saw what appeared to be Ms. Hairston's automobile parked next to a church annex in Bluefield. The church annex was located between Ms. Talton's home and the home of the appellant. She also saw the automobile later that morning parked in a different position, but still next to the church annex. She did not see the automobile anytime thereafter.

On November 29, 1979, Ms. Hairston was reported as missing. Her body, her purse and coat, with one button missing, were later found in a shallow grave next to a warehouse in Bluefield on January 17, 1980. The cause of her death was due to multiple shotgun wounds.

Also on November 29, 1979, the appellant called Ms. Hairston's place of employment to see if she was there. A co-worker told him that she was not. During that conversation the appellant told the co-worker that he had...

To continue reading

Request your trial
30 cases
  • State v. Kopa
    • United States
    • West Virginia Supreme Court
    • December 15, 1983
    ... ... pts. 1-4, State v. Meadows, W.Va., 304 S.E.2d 831 (1983) (evidence must be "manifestly inadequate" with "consequent injustice" being done to warrant reversal upon insufficiency ... ...
  • State v. Bennett
    • United States
    • West Virginia Supreme Court
    • September 12, 1985
    ... ... Grimm set forth above. See State v. Simmons, 172 W.Va. 590, 309 S.E.2d 89 (1983), 172 W.Va. at 595 n.5, 309 S.E. at 94, n. 5; State v. Meadows, 172 W.Va. 247, 304 S.E.2d 831 (1983), 172 W.Va. at 254, 304 S.E.2d at 838-39; syl. pt. 5, State v. Hatfield, 169 W.Va. 191, 286 S.E.2d 402 (1982) ... ...
  • State v. Duell, 16496
    • United States
    • West Virginia Supreme Court
    • June 27, 1985
    ... ... pt. 2, State v. Samples, 174 W.Va. 584, 328 S.E.2d 191 (1985); State v. Simmons, 171 W.Va. 590, 309 S.E.2d 89, 94 (1983); State v. Meadows, 172 W.Va. 247, 304 S.E.2d 831, 838-39 (1983); State v. Hall, 172 W.Va. 138, 304 S.E.2d 43, 47 (1983); State v. Hatfield, 169 W.Va. 191, 286 ... ...
  • State v. Gum, 15673
    • United States
    • West Virginia Supreme Court
    • November 10, 1983
    ... ... Dobbs, 163 W.Va.630, 259 S.E.2d 829 (1979)." Syl. pt. 2, State v. Meadows, 172 W.Va. 247, 304 S.E.2d 831 (1983) ...         3. " 'If, on a trial for murder, the evidence is wholly circumstantial, but as to time, ... ...
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT