State v. Medrano, 18895.

• Decision Date: 21 May 2013
• Docket Number: No. 18895.,18895.
• Citation: 65 A.3d 503,308 Conn. 604
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Rafael MEDRANO.

308 Conn. 604

65 A.3d 503

STATE of Connecticut

v.Rafael MEDRANO.

No. 18895.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Feb. 6, 2013.

Decided May 21, 2013.

James B. Streeto, assistant public defender, for the appellant (defendant).

Timothy J. Sugrue, assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Gail P. Hardy, state's attorney, and Anne Mahoney, senior assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

ROGERS, C.J., and NORCOTT, PALMER, ZARELLA, EVELEIGH, McDONALD and VERTEFEUILLE, Js.

EVELEIGH, J.

In this certified appeal, the defendant, Rafael Medrano, appeals from the judgment of the Appellate Court, which affirmed the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of manslaughter in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a–55 (a)(1) and 53a–8 and carrying a dangerous weapon in violation of General Statutes § 53–206.¹State v. Medrano, 131 Conn.App. 528, 530, 27 A.3d 52 (2011). On appeal, the defendant claims that: (1) the prosecutor committed prosecutorial improprieties that deprived him of a fair trial; and (2) the trial court's instruction regarding the defendant's interest in the outcome of the trial in relation to the jury's credibility assessment of his testimony deprived him of his right to a fair trial. Upon a consideration of the entire record, we conclude that neither the instances of prosecutorial impropriety identified by the defendant, nor the trial court's instruction to the jury, affected the fairness of the trial or prejudiced the defendant. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court. Nevertheless, in the exercise of our supervisory authority over the administration of justice, we direct our trial courts in the future to refrain from instructing jurors, when a defendant testifies, that they may specifically consider his interest in the outcome of the case and the importance to him of the outcome of the trial.

The opinion of the Appellate Court appropriately sets forth the relevant facts and procedural history, which the jury reasonably could have found. “On June 22, 2007, the defendant attended a high school graduation party at a multifamily house on New Britain Avenue in Hartford hosted by Catherine Perez. Accompanying the defendant to the party were several friends or acquaintances, including his roommate, Angelley Torres, his friend, Omar Sosa, and Edwin Candelario. The celebration devolved into turmoil when a dispute erupted amongst the partygoers. This occurred when Torres began arguing with another guest at the party after that guest pushed him. That verbal altercation escalated when Joel Quinones began yelling at and aggressively confronting Torres. In response to this display of aggression, Torres pushed Quinones. The defendant, who was standing nearby, tried in vain to stop the disagreement from escalating further. Quinones however, drew a knife, cut the defendant on the right arm, then chased Torres out of the house and into the front yard where he stabbed Torres in the back.

“After witnessing Quinones stab Torres, the defendant pushed Quinones away from Torres. At this point a female partygoer hit the defendant in the shoulder with a stick. Quinones then threw his knife at the defendant, who was successfully able to dodge the oncoming weapon. Agitated by the blow to his shoulder with a stick and the knife thrown at him, the defendant chased the fleeing Quinones into the street. Quinones tripped on the corner of the sidewalk and fell to the ground as the defendant gave chase. The defendant came upon Quinones, and they struggled with each other briefly. The melee ended when the defendant stabbed Quinones twice in the side with a pocketknife he had been carrying. The blade of the pocketknife was less than four inches long and was carried habitually by the defendant in order to perform his duties at the automotive garage at which he was employed. An associate medical examiner testified at trial that these stab wounds were the cause of Quinones' death.

“After he stabbed Quinones, the defendant proceeded back up the street toward the house party where his car was parked. The defendant then fled the scene with Sosa and Torres and convened in the basement at Sosa's home. There, the defendant used alcohol to clean blood off his knife. He cleaned Torres' knife, which also was bloodstained. The defendant and Torres then placed the knives in the trunk of the defendant's car under a spare tire. During that time, the defendant telephoned his girlfriend, Mary DeJesus. He told her: ‘I stabbed a boy. Don't say nothing. I'll talk to you later....’

“The defendant was subsequently arrested and charged with the crime of murder, in count one, and carrying a dangerous weapon, in count two. After a full hearing, the case was committed to the jury, which returned a verdict of not guilty on count one but guilty of the lesser included offense of intentional manslaughter in the first degree and guilty on count two. The court rendered judgment in accordance with this finding, sentencing the defendantto incarceration for twenty years for intentional manslaughter in the first degree and for three consecutive years thereafter on the count of carrying a dangerous weapon.” Id., at 531–32, 27 A.3d 52. The defendant appealed to the Appellate Court.

On appeal to the Appellate Court, the defendant claimed that: his conviction of both manslaughter in the first degree and carrying a dangerous weapon violated the fifth amendment prohibition against double jeopardy, and that the prosecutor committed prosecutorial impropriety that deprived him of his right to a fair trial. Id., at 530, 27 A.3d 52. The Appellate Court concluded that the defendant's conviction of manslaughter in the first degree and carrying a dangerous weapon does not violate the constitutional protection against double jeopardy and that the defendant was not deprived of a fair trial as a result of prosecutorial impropriety. Id., at 530–31, 27 A.3d 52. The Appellate Court did not reach two additional claims made by the defendant in his appellate brief regarding the trial court's jury instruction, namely, that “the [trial] court erred in its instructions on the credibility of witnesses by unduly emphasizing his interest in the outcome of the trial” and “that the [trial] court erred in its instructions to the jury on the state's burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id., at 530 n. 1, 27 A.3d 52. Particularly with respect to his objection to the “defendant's interest” charge, the defendant acknowledged that these additional claims were governed by precedent from this court, including State v. Williams, 220 Conn. 385, 396–97, 599 A.2d 1053 (1991), in which this court previously had deemed such an instruction not to be per se improper. This appeal followed.² Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.

I

The defendant first claims that the Appellate Court improperly concluded that the defendant was not deprived of a fair trial as the result of prosecutorial impropriety and, therefore, improperly affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Specifically, the defendant asserts that the prosecutor engaged in vitriolic and improper questioning of the defendant and that, during closing argument, she engaged in a vicious attack on the defendant, argued facts not in evidence, appealed to the jury's emotions and denigrated the defendant's credibility. The defendant claims that, despite finding that the prosecutor engaged in improprieties, the Appellate Court improperly concluded that these actions by the prosecutor did not deprive him of a fair trial. In response, the state asserts that only one of the challenged acts rises to the level of prosecutorial impropriety, and that, even if all of the remarks raised by the defendant were improper, the Appellate Court properly concluded that the defendant failed to meet his burden of establishing that they were so egregiousas to deprive him of a fair trial. We agree with the state that the Appellate Court properly concluded that the defendant failed to meet his burden of establishing that the remarks were so egregious as to deprive him of a fair trial.

Before we address the merits of the defendant's claims, we set forth the standard of review and the law governing claims of prosecutorial impropriety. “In determining whether the defendant was denied a fair trial we must view the prosecutor's comments in the context of the entire trial.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Williams, 204 Conn. 523, 538, 529 A.2d 653 (1987).

“ ‘[I]n analyzing claims of prosecutorial [impropriety], we engage in a two step analytical process. The two steps are separate and distinct: (1) whether [impropriety] occurred in the first instance; and (2) whether that [impropriety] deprived a defendant of his due process right to a fair trial.’ ... State v. Angel T., 292 Conn. 262, 275, 973 A.2d 1207 (2009). ‘[W]hen a defendantraises on appeal a claim that improper remarks by the prosecutor deprived the defendant of his constitutional right to a fair trial, the burden is on the defendant to show ... that the remarks were improper....’ ” State v. Taft, 306 Conn. 749, 761–62, 51 A.3d 988 (2012).

In the present case, the defendant claims the prosecutorial impropriety occurred during cross-examination of the defendant and closing argument. “Prosecutorial [impropriety] ... may occur in the course of cross-examination of witnesses ... and may be so clearly inflammatory as to be incapable of correction by action of the court.... In such instances there is a reasonable possibility that the improprieties in the cross-examination either contributed to the jury's verdict of guilty or, negatively, foreclosed the jury from ever considering the possibility of acquittal.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Reynolds, 264 Conn. 1, 164, 836 A.2d 224 (2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 908, 124 S.Ct. 1614, 158 L.Ed.2d 254 (2004).

“As we previously have recognized,...