State v. Melanson, No. 93-726

• Court: Supreme Court of New Hampshire
• Writing for the Court: THAYER
• Citation: 665 A.2d 338,140 N.H. 199
• Docket Number: No. 93-726
• Decision Date: 19 September 1995
• Parties: The STATE of New Hampshire v. Doris C. MELANSON.

Page 338

665 A.2d 338 140 N.H. 199 The STATE of New Hampshire
v.
Doris C. MELANSON. No. 93-726. Supreme Court of New Hampshire. Sept. 19, 1995.

[140 N.H. 200] Jeffrey R. Howard, Attorney General (John C. Kissinger, Jr., Assistant Attorney

Page 339

General, on the brief and orally), for the State.

Stephen T. Jeffco, P.A., Portsmouth (Stephen T. Jeffco, on the brief and orally), for the defendant.

THAYER, Justice.

The defendant, Doris C. Melanson, appeals her conviction for driving under the influence of drugs or liquor, RSA 265:82 (1993), following a bench trial in the Exeter District Court (Cullen, J.). The sole question is whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant's motion to suppress. We affirm.

On the morning of July 22, 1993, Officer Michael Wallace of the Epping Police Department received a report from a Rockingham County dispatcher of a complaint regarding an individual who may have been driving while intoxicated. The officer was provided with the license plate number, a description of the vehicle, including make, model, and color, the vehicle's current location, and direction of travel. While responding to the report, the officer was further advised that the vehicle had driven off the road into a field. Shortly thereafter, the officer observed the vehicle. At that time, he activated the lights on his cruiser to stop the vehicle. The vehicle did not stop, however, and eventually made a wide right turn, veering into an oncoming lane. At that point, the officer activated his audible siren and the vehicle finally stopped. After performing a number of field sobriety tests, the defendant was arrested for driving while intoxicated.

At the hearing on the motion to suppress, the defendant argued that she was seized when the cruiser's lights were activated, and therefore, the court could only consider the information the officer had prior to activating the lights in determining whether reasonable suspicion existed to justify stopping the defendant. The trial court did not rule on when the stop occurred but instead found that sufficient evidence existed prior to the activation of the lights to justify the stop. As we agree with this ruling, we need not address the question of when the defendant was actually seized.

On appeal, the defendant raises both federal and State constitutional arguments. We address the defendant's State constitutional claim first, see State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226, 231, 471 A.2d 347, 350 (1983), and because federal law is not more favorable to the defendant in this area, see Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990); State v. Kennison, 134 N.H. 243, 590 A.2d 1099 (1991), we need not analyze her federal constitutional claim, State v. Drewry, 139 N.H. 678, ----, 661 A.2d 1181, 1184 (decided June 30, 1995).

Under part 1, article 19 of our State Constitution, a police officer may make an investigative stop of a vehicle provided that the [140 N.H. 201] stop is based on "a reasonable suspicion that the person detained had committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime ... [and the officer is] able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the intrusion." State v. Pellicci, 133 N.H. 523, 529, 580 A.2d 710, 713 (1990) (brackets, quotations and citations omitted).

Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that [it] can be established with information that is different in quantity of content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less...