State v. Melanson

Citation665 A.2d 338,140 N.H. 199
Decision Date19 September 1995
Docket NumberNo. 93-726,93-726
PartiesThe STATE of New Hampshire v. Doris C. MELANSON.
CourtSupreme Court of New Hampshire

Jeffrey R. Howard, Attorney General (John C. Kissinger, Jr., Assistant Attorney

General, on the brief and orally), for the State.

Stephen T. Jeffco, P.A., Portsmouth (Stephen T. Jeffco, on the brief and orally), for the defendant.

THAYER, Justice.

The defendant, Doris C. Melanson, appeals her conviction for driving under the influence of drugs or liquor, RSA 265:82 (1993), following a bench trial in the Exeter District Court (Cullen, J.). The sole question is whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant's motion to suppress. We affirm.

On the morning of July 22, 1993, Officer Michael Wallace of the Epping Police Department received a report from a Rockingham County dispatcher of a complaint regarding an individual who may have been driving while intoxicated. The officer was provided with the license plate number, a description of the vehicle, including make, model, and color, the vehicle's current location, and direction of travel. While responding to the report, the officer was further advised that the vehicle had driven off the road into a field. Shortly thereafter, the officer observed the vehicle. At that time, he activated the lights on his cruiser to stop the vehicle. The vehicle did not stop, however, and eventually made a wide right turn, veering into an oncoming lane. At that point, the officer activated his audible siren and the vehicle finally stopped. After performing a number of field sobriety tests, the defendant was arrested for driving while intoxicated.

At the hearing on the motion to suppress, the defendant argued that she was seized when the cruiser's lights were activated, and therefore, the court could only consider the information the officer had prior to activating the lights in determining whether reasonable suspicion existed to justify stopping the defendant. The trial court did not rule on when the stop occurred but instead found that sufficient evidence existed prior to the activation of the lights to justify the stop. As we agree with this ruling, we need not address the question of when the defendant was actually seized.

On appeal, the defendant raises both federal and State constitutional arguments. We address the defendant's State constitutional claim first, see State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226, 231, 471 A.2d 347, 350 (1983), and because federal law is not more favorable to the defendant in this area, see Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990); State v. Kennison, 134 N.H. 243, 590 A.2d 1099 (1991), we need not analyze her federal constitutional claim, State v. Drewry, 139 N.H. 678, ----, 661 A.2d 1181, 1184 (decided June 30, 1995).

Under part 1, article 19 of our State Constitution, a police officer may make an investigative stop of a vehicle provided that the stop is based on "a reasonable suspicion that the person detained had committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime ... [and the officer is] able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the intrusion." State v. Pellicci, 133 N.H. 523, 529, 580 A.2d 710, 713 (1990) (brackets, quotations and citations omitted).

Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that [it] can be established with information that is different in quantity of content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause.

White, 496 U.S. at 330, 110 S.Ct. at 2416. "A trial court's findings on reasonable suspicion will be upheld unless clearly erroneous." State v. Conant, 139 N.H. ----, ----, 662 A.2d 283, 285 (decided July 11, 1995).

The defendant argues that because the information was received from an anonymous source and was conclusory in nature, it was not sufficient to justify a reasonable suspicion on the part of the officer. The defendant argues that our decision in State v. Kennison mandates suppression. We do not agree. In Kennison, we stated that when evaluating "an investigative stop ... based on information received from an [unknown] informant ... we examine the reliability and credibility of the informant, and his or her basis of knowledge, and then make a final judgment according to the totality of the circumstances." Kennison, 134 N.H. at 247, 590 A.2d at 1101 (quotation omitted).

We will first consider the complainant's basis of knowledge. While the officer had no direct evidence in this case, the information provided, including the specific description of the car, knowledge of its exact location at a moment in time, and the specific information regarding the car's movements, reasonably support a conclusion that the caller had personally observed the vehicle. State v. Tucker, 19 Kan.App.2d 920, 928, 878 P.2d 855, 862 (1994) (detail of anonymous caller's tip suggests firsthand knowledge; decided under Federal Constitution); cf. State v. Christy, 138 N.H. 352, 357, 639 A.2d 261, 264-65 (1994).

An informant who has personally observed incriminating behavior has a stronger basis of knowledge than does an informant who relates not what he knows personally, but what he has heard others say. Moreover, an explicit and detailed description of alleged wrongdoing is entitled to greater weight than a general assertion of criminal activity.

Conant, 139 N.H. at ----, 662 A.2d at 285 (citation omitted).

This fact alone distinguishes this case from Kennison. In Kennison, the...

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33 cases
  • Harris v. Com.
    • United States
    • Virginia Supreme Court
    • 31 Octubre 2008
    ...moment indicates that the informant personally observed the vehicle being operated by an intoxicated driver. See State v. Melanson, 140 N.H. 199, 665 A.2d 338, 340 (1995) (although anonymous informant provided only "innocent" details, they nevertheless were sufficient to support the conclus......
  • McChesney v. State
    • United States
    • Wyoming Supreme Court
    • 20 Octubre 1999
    ...is sufficient to establish reliability. See State v. Robles, 171 Ariz. 441, 831 P.2d 440, 441-43 (App.1992); State v. Melanson, 140 N.H. 199, 665 A.2d 338, 340-41 (1995); State v. Smith, 638 N.E.2d 1353, 1355-56 (Ind.App.1994); State v. Markus, 478 N.W.2d 405, 408-9 (Iowa App. 1991). We dec......
  • People v. Wells
    • United States
    • California Supreme Court
    • 26 Junio 2006
    ...627-630); State v. Slater (1999) 267 Kan. 694, 986 P.2d 1038, 1041-1046; State v. Sampson (Me.1996) 669 A.2d 1326; State v. Melanson (1995) 140 N.H. 199, 665 A.2d 338, 339-341; People v. Rance (1996) 227 A.D.2d 936, 644 N.Y.S.2d 447; Kaysville City v. Mulcahy (Utah Ct.App.1997) 943 P.2d 231......
  • State v. Boyea
    • United States
    • Vermont Supreme Court
    • 1 Diciembre 2000
    ...motor-vehicle stops based upon an anonymous tip of erratic or drunk driving. The first decision we discussed was State v. Melanson, 140 N.H. 199, 665 A.2d 338 (1995). There, as here, a police officer received a report from a dispatcher relaying information from an anonymous informant about ......
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