State v. Mellon

Decision Date30 October 2003
Docket NumberNo. E1999-01505-SC-DDT-DD.,E1999-01505-SC-DDT-DD.
PartiesSTATE of Tennessee v. James A. MELLON.
CourtTennessee Supreme Court

Gerald L. Gulley, Jr., Knoxville, Tennessee, and Tim S. Moore, Newport, Tennessee, for the appellant, James A. Mellon.

Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter; Michael E. Moore, Solicitor General; Marvin S. Blair, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

WILLIAM M. BARKER, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which FRANK F. DROWOTA, III, C.J., E. RILEY ANDERSON, ADOLPHO A. BIRCH, JR., and JANICE M. HOLDER, JJ. joined.

Although the defendant, James A. Mellon, raises numerous issues on appeal, the dispositive issue is whether his guilty plea was unknowing and involuntary, and the subsequently imposed death sentence in violation of due process, when he was not adequately informed of the consequences should he breach the plea agreement. Prior to trial, the defendant pleaded guilty to felony murder and especially aggravated robbery as part of a plea agreement with the prosecution. The agreement provided that, in exchange for his pleas of guilty, the State would recommend a sentence of life in prison with the possibility of parole on the felony murder conviction and a concurrent sentence of fifteen to twenty-five years for the especially aggravated robbery conviction, with the trial court to decide the actual length of the sentence. Pursuant to the agreement, sentencing would be reserved until after testimony by the defendant in any related proceeding or at the conclusion of such proceedings. The defendant reneged on the agreement and instead moved to withdraw his guilty pleas. The trial court denied the defendant's motion and empaneled a jury. A sentencing hearing was conducted, resulting in a sentence of death. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction and death sentence for the felony murder. On automatic appeal to this Court, we conclude that the defendant was not adequately informed of the consequences if he should breach the plea agreement. We are constrained to hold that the defendant's pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered, and thus the subsequent sentence denied him due process of law. Therefore, we reverse the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In the early morning hours of August 24, 1997, Robert Scott Loveday was robbed and murdered while stopped at a pay phone outside a service station in Farragut, Tennessee. Loveday was found shot twice in the chest, and the robbers had taken his watch and a one-dollar bill. Following the police investigation, the defendant and three others, Anthony Jones, David Jones, and Ernest Rogers, were arrested and charged in connection with the robbery/murder. The police investigation also revealed that approximately one hour before the fatal shooting of Loveday, the defendant Mellon had used a handgun to rob Matthew James Miller in a Lowe's parking lot.

On August 26, 1997, Anthony Jones told police that he was the one who shot Loveday after seeing something "gleaming" in his hand. Anthony Jones pleaded guilty to felony murder in exchange for a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole and to especially aggravated robbery for a consecutive sentence of twenty-five years.

The defendant Mellon was indicted on four counts: (1) first degree premeditated murder of Loveday; (2) felony murder during the perpetration of the aggravated robbery of Loveday; (3) felony murder during the perpetration of the robbery of Loveday; and (4) especially aggravated robbery of Loveday. Although the defendant had been reluctant to plead guilty, following counseling with a defense investigator, he appeared before the Criminal Court of Knox County and entered pleas of guilty to first degree felony murder during the perpetration of aggravated robbery, and to especially aggravated robbery. In exchange for his guilty pleas, the State agreed to recommend a sentence of life with the possibility of parole for the felony murder conviction and a concurrent sentence of twenty-five years for the especially aggravated robbery conviction, provided that the defendant testify truthfully against his co-defendants.

Specifically, the plea agreement provided: "Defendant agrees that he will, if called upon, testify truthfully in any other proceeding in connection with this incident. Said testimony will be consistent with the statements defendant made to Knox County Sheriff's Department officers. Sentencing in this case is reserved."

Before accepting his pleas of guilty, the trial court reviewed the guilty pleas with the defendant to confirm that he was entering them voluntarily and knowingly. The colloquy between the Court and Mellon was, in pertinent part, as follows:

THE COURT: ... First, do you understand, sir, that you are entering a plea of guilty in the second count of the indictment to felony murder.... [T]he State had requested the death penalty in this case, the recommended sentence, however, is life with the possibility of parole. It is not a promise of parole but you certainly would become eligible for parole and would go up for parole. And that would be served consecutively to the sentence you've received already in 64114.1

In the fourth count of the indictment you would be pleading guilty to especially aggravated robbery, wherein you are a Range I Standard Offender, and the range of punishment for that is fifteen to twenty-five years.

There is no agreement. It would be a sentence that I would impose, and make a decision as to what the sentence would be. But it would be agreed that that would be a sentence concurrent with the felony murder sentence.

Do you understand that so far, sir?

MR. MELLON: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And do you understand, sir, that until ... we've got to the point of testimony, or conclusion of the cases of the co-defendants ... sentencing will be reserved, and you will wait for sentence, and it is agreed further that you will testify truthfully and consistently with the statements that you previously made?

Do you understand all that, sir?

MR. MELLON: Yes, Your Honor.

The Court accepted the guilty pleas of Mellon on the two counts.

When the time came for the trial of co-defendant Ernest Rogers, the defendant refused to testify. In the meantime, the defendant filed two pro se motions to dismiss counsel. On January 19, 1999, those motions were denied. At the hearing on those motions, defense counsel filed a motion asking that the defendant be allowed to withdraw his pleas of guilty because of the defendant's fear that he would be harmed if he testified against any of his co-defendants. At the hearing, the defendant claimed that he had not understood that he was to testify against all his co-defendants but thought that he was required to testify only against Anthony Jones. He acknowledged, however, that he did not intend to testify against any of his co-defendants, including Anthony Jones. The defendant claimed that he had been pressured by the defense investigator to accept the plea agreement, even though he repeatedly had expressed a desire not to plead guilty. He also complained that he was not allowed to talk with his mother before accepting the plea bargain.

The motion to withdraw the pleas was accompanied by an affidavit by Brandt Davis, lead counsel for the defendant. Mr. Davis stated that prior to the entry of the pleas, the defendant expressed to both of his lawyers his reluctance to testify against any co-defendants in any of the pending cases because he was afraid of what might happen to him in prison if he were labeled a "snitch" as the result of such testimony. This reluctance continued until the morning of October 8, 1998, although he was willing to otherwise accept the offer made by the State. Upon being told the plea offer would be withdrawn by the State if not accepted that morning, the defendant met with the defense investigator and later with both defense counsel, and ultimately agreed to accept the plea agreement. Counsel further stated that following the entry of his guilty pleas, Mellon advised him that he felt threatened by Anthony Jones as a result of his agreement to testify.

When the motion to withdraw the pleas was argued before the trial court, the prosecutor questioned Mellon regarding his understanding of the plea agreement.

Q. Mr. Mellon, you understood that you were pleading guilty to the offense, and that the only thing that was being reserved was the right of sentence? Whether you would be sentenced to life with parole, life without parole, or death?

And on the especially aggravated robbery that you would be sentenced to fifteen to twenty-five years?

You understood that those two things were specifically reserved, didn't you?

A. No, I understood that the plea agreement was life with parole which was fifty-one years, with the especially aggravated robbery ran concurrent and twelve years run consecutive.

Q. And that that sentence recommendation was conditioned upon your testifying?

A. Correct.

Q. That the sentencing recommendation had nothing to do with your entering the plea of guilty?

A. I don't understand that. Could you clarify it?

Q. That your sentencing recommendation had nothing to do with your entering the plea of guilty to first degree murder or to especially aggravated robbery. It was strictly based on whether or not you would testify?

A. Yes.

The trial court denied the defendant's motion to withdraw his pleas, finding that they had been entered voluntarily and knowingly.

The case proceeded to a jury sentencing hearing with death, life without the possibility of parole, and life with the possibility of parole all possible sentences. The jury found one aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt—that "[t]he defendant was previously...

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