State v. Meloon, 82-453
| Decision Date | 12 December 1983 |
| Docket Number | No. 82-453,82-453 |
| Citation | 124 N.H. 257,469 A.2d 1316 |
| Parties | The STATE of New Hampshire v. Thomas E. MELOON. |
| Court | New Hampshire Supreme Court |
Gregory H. Smith, Atty. Gen. (Peter W. Mosseau, Asst. Atty. Gen., on brief), for the State.
James E. Duggan, Appellate Defender, Concord, on brief for defendant.
The defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence used to convict him of burglary after a jury trial in Superior Court (Souter, J.). Contending that the State failed to prove he intended to commit any crime upon his entering a building, the defendant asserts that the burglary conviction must be vacated and a conviction for criminal trespass entered instead. We affirm.
The evidence at trial revealed the following facts. At approximately 3:00 a.m., on May 2, 1982, Officer Miguel Cebollero, of the Concord Police Department, spotted a figure crouched inside the Trailways bus terminal. The headlights of Officer Cebollero's vehicle were aimed at the front windows of the terminal. After parking and radioing for assistance the officer saw a figure fleeing the rear area of the building. He instructed the person to stop, but the person continued to flee, scaled a chain link fence, and crossed Interstate 93.
Officer Cebollero gave chase, again radioed for assistance, and was subsequently joined by several other officers. The defendant was spotted in the Merrimack River by officers searching the area and was arrested. The defendant had no stolen property in his possession at the time of capture. Later that month, six zipper bank bags were found approximately 2.5 miles downriver, caught in the gate house of the Garvin Falls dam canal. The bags were later identified as the property of Trailways Bus Company.
The evidence introduced at trial indicated that the rear door of the bus terminal had been kicked open, a coin drawer inside had been opened and left on the floor, and sixteen zipper bank bags (similar to those later found in the river) were missing. There was testimony that the bus terminal was regularly closed to the public after 7:30 p.m. A statement of Ray Malonis, also arrested in connection with the break-in, was introduced which placed the defendant and Malonis inside the bus terminal that morning.
The defendant was indicted for burglary in violation of RSA 635:1. At the close of the State's case, the defendant's motion to dismiss was denied. The jury was instructed on the element of mens rea required for a burglary conviction and on the lesser-included offense of criminal trespass. The jury returned a guilty verdict on the charge of burglary.
The defendant challenges the sufficiency of the State's evidence used to show his presence in the bus terminal was "with purpose to commit a crime therein," as required by RSA 635:1, I. The question presented is whether any rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
In evaluating this claim, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. State v. Cobb, 123 N.H. 536, ----, 465 A.2d 1203, 1205 (1983); State v. Cyr, 122 N.H. 1155, 1159, 453 A.2d 1315, 1318 (1982). "We will uphold the jury's verdict unless 'no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.' " State v. Cobb, supra at ----, 465 A.2d at 1206 (quoting State v. Cyr, supra at 1159, 453 A.2d at 1318); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2791, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). "When the State's case rests upon circumstantial evidence, as it does here, such evidence must exclude all rational conclusions except that the defendant was guilty." State v. Hopps, 123 N.H. 541, ----, 465 A.2d 1206, 1209 (1983); State v. Cyr, supra at 1160, 453 A.2d at 1319.
"An intent to steal may be inferred from the defendant's conduct under all the circumstances, and 'an unexplained...
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