State v. Mendez
| Decision Date | 12 July 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. 34,778,34,778 |
| Parties | STATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JOSE L. MENDEZ, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of New Mexico |
This decision was not selected for publication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of non-precedential dispositions. Please also note that this electronic decision may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Supreme Court.
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF DOÑA ANA COUNTY
Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General
Santa Fe, NM
Steven H. Johnston, Assistant Attorney General
for Appellant
Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender
Becca Salwin, Assistant Appellate Defender
Santa Fe, NM
for Appellee
{1} This appeal is before us on the district court's order granting Defendant Jose Mendez's motion to suppress evidence. Defendant was charged with possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia following a traffic stop on his bicycle where Defendant failed to stop at a stop sign. The officer conducting the traffic stop patted down Defendant for weapons and found the drugs and paraphernalia at issue. The district court granted Defendant's motion to suppress the evidence, finding that it was the fruit of an illegal search and seizure. We conclude that the district court properly applied the law and there was substantial evidence to support the district court's ruling. Furthermore, the district court did not err in rejecting the State's argument that the inevitable discovery doctrine should apply. We, therefore, affirm the district court's ruling.
{2} On the night of June 20, 2014, City of Las Cruces Police Department Patrol Sergeant Bobby Jaramillo was on patrol in an area where several businesses had "been burglarized in the past." He saw Defendant, whom he described as "a Hispanic male . . . wearing a striped shirt . . . and backpack" traveling on a black bicycle. He observed Defendant fail to stop at a stop sign. Sergeant Jaramillo engaged his emergency lights and conducted a traffic stop.
{3} Sergeant Jaramillo advised Defendant that he had "blown past" the stop sign. Sergeant Jaramillo requested Defendant's permission to conduct a search for weapons, and Defendant consented to a pat-down search. Sergeant Jaramillo felt a bulge in Defendant's pocket, that Sergeant Jaramillo believed to be a pipe used to smoke illegal narcotics. He asked Defendant if he could search his pocket, and Defendant consented. Sergeant Jaramillo pulled out a glass pipe from Defendant's front pocket, and a small plastic container of what Defendant admitted to be methamphetamine from a second pocket. Sergeant Jaramillo called for assistance from a Metro Narcotics Agent and ran a check for warrants, learning that Defendant had two outstanding warrants. Defendant was arrested and charged with possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine, pursuant to NMSA 1978, Section 30-31-23 (2011), and possession of drug paraphernalia, pursuant to NMSA 1978, Section 30-31-25.1(A) (2001).
{4} Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained on the basis that the search violated Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution and the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, including "[a]ny and all controlled substances and/or drug paraphernalia seized from the person or property of Defendant" and "[a]ll other fruits of the illegal seizure or search." During the hearing on the motion, Sergeant Jaramillo, the sole witness for the State, testified that healways runs a check for warrants upon effectuating a traffic stop. Regarding the traffic stop of Defendant, Sergeant Jaramillo testified that he stopped Defendant because he ran a stop sign. When Sergeant Jaramillo turned on his emergency lights, Defendant stopped and got off his bicycle. Sergeant Jaramillo also testified that Defendant then started moving toward Sergeant Jaramillo. Sergeant Jaramillo identified himself and told Defendant the reason for the stop. Because it was dark, Defendant was wearing baggy clothes, and Sergeant Jaramillo could not see what was in Defendant's waist band, Sergeant Jaramillo asked Defendant if he would turn around so he could conduct a pat-down search. Defendant complied with Sergeant Jaramillo's verbal directions and was cooperative. Defendant never made any threatening gestures. Sergeant Jaramillo admitted that he intended to give Defendant a verbal warning for running the stop sign but never did give such a warning. Instead, Sergeant Jaramillo considered that the verbal warning was implied because Defendant was already arrested on outstanding warrants, and Sergeant Jaramillo did not write him a citation for failing to stop at the stop sign. The district court granted Defendant's motion to suppress the evidence seized as a result of the pat-down search by Sergeant Jaramillo. The State timely appealed the suppression ruling to this Court.
{5} The State makes two arguments on appeal. First, the State argues that the district court erred in granting Defendant's motion to suppress based upon whether the pat-down of Defendant was unlawful because (1) Sergeant Jaramillo had reasonable suspicion to conduct the pat-down search, and (2) Defendant gave his consent to be searched. Alternatively, the State argues that even if the pat-down search was unconstitutional, suppression of the evidence was not justified because it was still admissible under the inevitable discovery doctrine.
{6} A motion to suppress concerns mixed questions of fact and law. State v. Urioste, 2002-NMSC-023, ¶ 6, 132 N.M. 592, 52 P.3d 964. We review the district court's ruling on a motion to suppress to determine "whether the law was correctly applied to the facts, viewing them in a manner most favorable to the prevailing party[.]" State v. Boeglin, 1983-NMCA-075, ¶ 22, 100 N.M. 127, 666 P.2d 1274. In this case, the district court entered only very limited factual findings and conclusions of law. "In circumstances such as this, [the] practice has been to employ presumptions and as a general rule, [the appellate courts] will indulge in all reasonable presumptions in support of the district court's ruling." State v. Jason L., 2000-NMSC-018, ¶ 11, 129 N.M. 119, 2 P.3d 856 (). We also recognize that the district court is "the sole judge of the credibilityof the witnesses and the weight to be given [to] the evidence[.]" State v. Notah-Hunter, 2005-NMCA-074, ¶ 7, 137 N.M. 597, 113 P.3d 867. When evidence conflicts, we "will draw all inferences and indulge all presumptions in favor of the district court's ruling." Jason L., 2000-NMSC-018, ¶ 11. "[T]he question is not whether substantial evidence would have supported [the] opposite result[,] but whether such evidence supports the result reached." State v. Maxwell, 2016-NMCA-082, ¶ 57, 384 P.3d 116 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
{7} The right of people to be free from unreasonable searches and seizure is protected by both the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution. Under our interstitial approach, we first consider "whether the right being asserted is protected under the [F]ederal [C]onstitution." State v. Ketelson, 2011-NMSC-023, ¶ 10, 150 N.M. 137, 257 P.3d 957 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). If such protection exists under the Federal Constitution, we need not reach the New Mexico Constitution claim. Id. If not, we then "consider whether the New Mexico Constitution provides broader protection[.]" Id. The district court's order granting the motion to suppress does not clearly state whether it relied upon the Federal Constitution or the New MexicoConstitution. We will assume that the district court addressed the constitutional issues appropriately because both arguments were presented by Defendant.
{8} "An automobile stop and the attendant detention of its occupants is a seizure." State v. Duran, 2005-NMSC-034, ¶ 22, 138 N.M. 414, 120 P.3d 836 (internal quotation marks omitted), overruled on other grounds by State v. Leyva, 2011-NMSC-009, ¶ 17, 149 N.M. 435, 250 P.3d 861. Under NMSA 1978, Section 66-3-702 (1978), "[e]very person riding a bicycle upon a roadway . . . [is] subject to all of the duties applicable to the driver of a vehicle[.]" Therefore, a person riding a bicycle and subject to a traffic stop is afforded the same protections from unreasonable search and seizure as those afforded to a person in an automobile subject to a traffic stop.
{9} When an officer conducts a traffic stop to investigate a possible crime, we analyze the reasonableness of the stop and ensuing investigatory detention in accordance with the two-part test in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968). See Duran, 2005-NMSC-034, ¶ 23. We ask first whether the stop was justified at its inception and second, whether the officer's actions during the stop were reasonably related to circumstances that justified the stop. Id. Although the State argues in its brief in chief that the traffic stop of Defendant was justified at its inception, this point was never contested by Defendant and required no ruling by the district court. Instead, thequestion before us is the second inquiry—whether Sergeant Jaramillo's pat-down of Defendant was reasonably related to the circumstances that justified the stop or was instead an unreasonable expansion of the scope of the initial traffic investigation.
{10} After an officer has made a traffic stop based on a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, "[t]he scope of the investigation may [only] be expanded where the officer has reasonable and articulable suspicion that other criminal activity . . . [is] afoot." Leyva, 2011-NMS...
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