State v. Merchants' Exch.

Citation190 S.W. 903,269 Mo. 346
Decision Date21 December 1916
Docket NumberNo. 18956.,18956.
PartiesSTATE ex rel. BARKER, Atty. Gen., v. MERCHANTS' EXCH. OF ST. LOUIS.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Missouri

John T. Barker, Atty. Gen., and Lee B. Ewing, Asst. Atty. Gen., for relator. Frank Hagerman, of Kansas City, for Kansas City Board of Trade. Percy Werner, of St. Louis, for respondent.

GRAVES, J.

This is an original proceeding in quo warranto, at the instance of the Attorney General. The information, after formal allegations as to the incorporation of respondent, and as to certain laws of this state with reference to public inspectors and weighers of grain at all public elevators in cities having 75,000 inhabitants, charges:

"Relator further informs the court that said respondent, the Merchants' Exchange of St. Louis, has been for a great many years and is now guilty of improper uses and has unlawfully, illegally, and willfully misused and abused its corporate franchise, rights, and privileges under its charter in this, to wit: In that it is now unlawfully, wrongfully, and willfully maintaining a department, known as its weighing bureau, by and through which it is now unlawfully and wrongfully in violation of the statutes of this state weighing grain received into or discharged from public warehouses and elevators in the city of St. Louis, and making charges for said weighing, and issuing weight certificates or tickets and making charges therefor. That said acts of said respondent, Merchants' Exchange, are usurpations of powers, rights, and privileges not conferred upon it by its corporate charter and in excess thereof, and are in violation of the criminal statutes of this state, all to the great and permanent injury of the citizens of Missouri.

"Wherefore relator, prosecuting in this behalf for the state of Missouri, asks that this respondent be adjudged guilty of usurping privileges and authorities not granted by the state of Missouri in weighing the grain of the citizens of Missouri and charging therefor, and issuing weight certificates thereon, as aforesaid, and that such acts on the part of respondents be declared illegal and void, and said respondent be forbidden to weigh such grain as aforesaid and charge therefor, and from issuing weight certificates thereon, and that said respondent be fined in such sum as the court thinks will punish it and cause others to refrain from doing similar acts, and for all other and further orders and relief which to the court seem meet, just and proper."

The return is exceedingly verbose and such portions thereof as may be required can best be noted in the opinion, in connection with points raised. This return runs the gamut from a general demurrer to the invocation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the federal Constitution. Relator challenges the sufficiency of the return and moves for judgment on the pleadings. The facts, in the return, where facts may be in dispute as between the petition and return, must be taken as the facts in the case. This sufficiently outlines the case.

I. This case requires (1) a construction of our statutes, and (2) a determination of their validity. There are two vital questions met at the very threshold of the case. Section 63 of the act of 1913 reads:

"It shall be unlawful for any person, corporation or association other than a duly authorized and bonded state weigher to issue any weight certificate or to issue or sign any paper or ticket purporting to be the weight of any car, wagon, sack or other package of grain weighed at any warehouse or elevator in this state where duly appointed and qualified state weighers are stationed and in control of the scales under the provisions of this article, or to make any charge for such weighing, or purported weighing, or weight certificates, or tickets or purported weight certificates or tickets. And any person, corporation or officer, agent or servant of such corporation who shall do any of the acts declared by this section to be unlawful, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall be punished by a fine of not less than five hundred dollars, nor more than one thousand dollars, or shall be imprisoned in the county jail, or if in the city of St. Louis, the jail of said city, not less than six months nor more than twelve months, or by both such fine and imprisonment." Laws 1913, p. 372.

By the return it is admitted that the respondent has a weighing department, and that such department weighs the grain coming into public elevators and warehouses in the city of St. Louis, and further that it issues certificates of weight to the parties entitled thereto, and makes charges therefor.

With the plain letter of the law before us, and the admissions of respondent before us, it would be idle work to go into a detailed discussion of the question as to whether or not respondent is or is not violating this state statute. Its admissions of record show that it is not only violating the spirit, but also the letter, of the statute. Its reasons for such violation are immaterial, if the statute is a valid enactment. Much of the very lengthy return is taken up with statements of reasons for the admitted violation of the law, but if the law is a valid one, the imagined necessity of its violation in the alleged interest of the grain trade at St. Louis is wholly immaterial, and beyond the real issues.

Many laws seemingly work hardships upon persons and their business, but this is no excuse for the violation of the law. Nor is this seeming hardship an excuse for a corporation to do things, under a charter granted by the state, which things the state has forbidden by law.

The crux of this case lies in the validity or invalidity of our inspection laws. It does not lie in extraneous facts which might tend to show that the business of buying and selling grain in St. Louis would be benefited by a weighing and inspection thereof by respondent, rather than one by the state. To this vital question we proceed next.

II. We shall not discuss the fundamentals in statutory construction, when validity of a statute is at stake. It goes without the saying that there is a legal presumption of validity; that if there is doubt as to the constitutionality of the law the doubt shall be resolved in favor of the validity of the legislative act; that the expediency or inexpediency of the act is not for the courts; that in Missouri the power of the Legislature to enact laws has no limitation, except the express limitations in the state and federal Constitutions; that the legislative power under the police powers of the state are very broad.

Of all the members of this court the writer has been most loth to extend the police powers of the state. Vide concurring opinion in State v. Railroad, 242 Mo. loc. cit. 376, 147 S. W. 118, and dissenting opinion in State ex rel. v. Vandiver, 222 Mo. loc. cit. 255, 121 S. W. 45. Yet in all that I may have written, the doctrine that private rights may be made subservient to the public welfare is thoroughly recognized. The respondent urges that its private rights are invaded by these statutes, and, if so, then the laws are invalid, unless they fall within the practically undefined field of police powers of the state. I say undefined because the field of the public peace, health, safety, and welfare is a very broad one, and there are many angles from which to view the field. Laws of the character of the ones here involved where sustained, have been sustained upon the theory of police regulations. In other words, because they were a proper exercise of the police power of the state. We shall not attempt to defend these laws otherwise.

To determine whether or not these grain inspection laws, including the weight and certificate provisions thereof, are a proper exercise of the police powers, we should have the provisions thereof clearly in mind, and then say whether or not such provisions tend toward the general welfare.

The act defines a public warehouseman and elevatorman, and public warehouses and elevators, and establishes the office of warehouse commissioner. It further provides for the grading and weighing of all grain into the public warehouses or elevators, and for the keeping of such grain in the grades so established. Expert grain inspectors are to be employed to grade the grain, and weighmen employed to weigh the grain into the warehouses and elevators. If controversy arises either as to weights or grades a disinterested committee settles the same.

These officers are bonded for the faithful performance of duty. Warehouse receipts can only be given for grain actually weighed into the warehouse according to the grading and weighing of these public officers, and such receipts must be registered in the department of the warehouse commissioners. These receipts must be numbered consecutively, and no two receipts from one warehouse shall be of the same number during the space of any one year. When grain is delivered upon a receipt, the receipt must be given over to the proper officer of the state for cancellation. The issuance of receipts without the grain is made a crime. In fact the act undertakes to so hedge in the handling of grain in these public warehouses and elevators, as to prevent all kinds of frauds. It so hedges the warehouse receipts that frauds upon banks and other persons loaning money are protected. The whole purport of the act is for such official supervision in the principal grain markets as will protect not only the buyers, but the sellers, of grain. In other words it establishes a disinterested agency between the buyer and seller both as to weights and grades of the grain. If a wheat grower of Missouri ships a car of wheat to St. Louis, he is not forced to take the grading and weighing of the defendant (an association of grain dealers and...

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