State v. Meron

• Decision Date: 25 February 2004
• Docket Number: No. 02-1588.,02-1588.
• Citation: 675 N.W.2d 537
• Parties: STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Kathy Anne MERON, Appellant.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

675 N.W.2d 537

STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Kathy Anne MERON, Appellant.

No. 02-1588.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

February 25, 2004.

Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Robert P. Ranschau, Assistant State Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Bridget A. Chambers, Assistant Attorney General, Thomas J. Ferguson, County Attorney, and Sue Swan, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.

CADY, Justice.

This appeal requires us to decide whether a plea of guilty was properly entered in a criminal case and whether the challenge to the plea was properly preserved for appellate review. Upon our review, we vacate the decision of the court of appeals, reverse the judgment and sentence of the district court, and remand the case for further proceedings.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

Kathy Meron was arrested for shoplifting at a Younkers store in Black Hawk County. She was charged by trial information with theft in the third degree, an aggravated misdemeanor. Iowa Code § 714.1, .2(3) (2001). During the pendency of the action, Meron was again arrested for shoplifting. This arrest occurred at a Wal-Mart store in Cedar Falls. The police also discovered a controlled substance in her purse, apparently during a search incident to the arrest. She was charged by a second trial information with theft in the third degree and possession of a controlled substance, second offense, an aggravated misdemeanor. Id. §§ 714.1,.2(3), 124.401(5).

A few months later, Meron appeared in district court with her attorney for a dispositional hearing on two probation revocation proceedings arising from prior criminal convictions. She also requested to enter pleas of guilty to the pending theft and possession of controlled substance charges. After the district court was informed that Meron had not prepared written pleas of guilty, the following exchange occurred:

THE COURT: Ms. Meron, before I proceed with your guilty plea, there are several things that I must first determine on the record. However, because this is an aggravated misdemeanor and because you are represented by an attorney, I may somewhat abbreviate these proceedings and the questioning that I must go through in order to make my determinations, if I have your permission to do so. May I have your permission to do so?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: Ms. Meron, have you been over with your attorney the nature of the charge which has been made against you as well as the maximum and minimum penalties to which you subject yourself by entering this plea of guilty?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: And do you understand what you're charged with and what the maximum possible penalties are?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Have you also been over with your attorney the constitutional rights that you waive by entering a plea of guilty?

THE DEFENDANT: Pretty much so, yes.

THE COURT: Well, pretty much isn't good enough.

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: And do you understand those rights?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: And do you have any questions about them at this time?

THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.

THE COURT: Mr. Dubbert, do you believe that you've gone over with your client all of her constitutional rights that she waives by entering a plea of guilty?

MR. DUBBERT: I do, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And do you believe she understands those rights and is making a voluntary and intelligent waiver of those rights?

MR. DUBBERT: Yes, Your Honor.

The district court was then informed of a plea agreement concerning concurrent sentencing and recommendations for treatment. These matters were thoroughly discussed with Meron. The district court next inquired into the voluntary nature of the pleas. The district court made this inquiry by asking Meron if she understood that there would be no trial, and by explaining the maximum sentences she faced, as well as the details of the plea agreement. Meron acknowledged she understood that there would be no trial and understood the sentences she faced. Meron also admitted the facts underlying the charges. She again acknowledged that her attorney had explained to her the rights she was forfeiting by pleading guilty. Meron then asked to waive time for sentencing and acknowledged she understood she was waiving her right to file a motion in arrest of judgment. She was not, however, informed by the district court of the purpose of the motion or the consequences of failing to file the motion.

The district court accepted the pleas of guilty and sentenced Meron. She filed a timely notice of appeal. On appeal, she claims her pleas were not voluntarily or intelligently made because the district court failed to cover all the requirements of Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.8(2)(b) before accepting her pleas of guilty.

We transferred the case to the court of appeals. It found the district court failed to substantially comply with rule 2.8(2)(b) in accepting the plea, but concluded Meron waived the plea requirements of the rule by agreeing to the abbreviated procedure used by the district court. The court of appeals affirmed the judgment and sentence. We granted further review.

II. Scope of Review.

Our review of a claim of error in a guilty plea proceeding is at law. See Iowa R.App. P. 6.4.

III. Error Preservation.

The State first claims Meron did not preserve error because she failed to file a motion in arrest of judgment as required by rule 2.24(3)(a). Generally, a defendant must file a motion in arrest of judgment to preserve a challenge to a guilty plea on appeal. Iowa R.Crim. P. 2.24(3)(a) ("A defendant's failure to challenge the adequacy of a guilty plea proceeding by motion in arrest of judgment shall preclude the defendant's right to assert such challenge on appeal."); State v. Worley, 297 N.W.2d 368, 370 (Iowa 1980). Yet, this requirement does not apply where a defendant was never advised during the plea proceedings, as required by rule 2.8(2)(d), that challenges to the plea must be made in a motion in arrest of judgment and that the failure to challenge the plea by filing the motion within the time provided prior to sentencing precludes a right to assert the challenge on appeal. Worley, 297 N.W.2d at 370.

In this case, Meron never filed a motion in arrest of judgment. Nevertheless, she claims her present challenge to her guilty pleas was not waived because the district court failed to inform her of the procedure to file the motion and the consequences of failing to follow the procedure. The State argues the district court substantially complied with the notification requirements of rule 2.8(2)(d) when Meron acknowledged in open court that her attorney had informed her of the right to file the motion and when she expressed her willingness to waive the right. We recently clarified the procedure trial courts must follow to inform defendants about making challenges to a plea of guilty under rule 2.8(2)(d) in cases involving serious or aggravated misdemeanors. In State v. Barnes, 652 N.W.2d 466, 468 (Iowa 2002), we determined that it was unnecessary in misdemeanor cases for the trial court to actually engage in an in-court colloquy with a defendant so as to personally inform the defendant of the motion in arrest of judgment requirements. Instead, we found a written waiver filed by a defendant that properly reflected knowledge of the requirements of rule 2.8(2)(d) was sufficient. Id.

The State asserts the written waiver exception to an in-court colloquy recognized in Barnes should be extended to the situation where the defendant acknowledges in open court, as Meron did in this case, that her right to file a motion in arrest of judgment was explained to her by her attorney. The State argues that Barnes can be broadly read to mean that the required information under rule 2.8(2)(d) can be imparted to the defendant by means other than a personal colloquy with the defendant, including assurances to the court that counsel for the defendant provided the information to the defendant. In other words, the State wants us to treat an in-court assurance of defense counsel the same as a properly drawn written waiver executed by the defendant. The State suggests this is compatible with the underlying purpose of the rule that the defendant be informed.¹

We need not decide if Barnes can be extended as urged by the State. Rule 2.8(2)(d) clearly imposes two requirements. See Worley, 297 N.W.2d at 370. First, the court must "inform the defendant that any challenges to a plea of guilty based on alleged defects in the plea proceedings must be raised in a motion in arrest of judgment." Iowa R.Crim. P. 2.8(2)(d). Second, the court must inform the defendant "that failure to so raise such challenges shall preclude the right to assert them on appeal." Id. Even considering the assurances that counsel for Meron explained the right to file a motion in arrest of judgment, this guarantee would be insufficient to satisfy the second requirement of rule 2.8(2)(d). See Worley, 297 N.W.2d at 370. The court never asked Meron if her attorney also discussed the consequences of failing to file a motion. Accordingly, we conclude Meron is not precluded from challenging her plea on appeal.

IV. Plea Colloquy.

We next address a claim by Meron that the in-court colloquy in support of her guilty plea did not comply with the requirements of rule 2.8(2)(b). The State argues the district court substantially complied with the rule, and the failure by the district court to specifically address each specific requirement of the rule was overcome when it confirmed with Meron that her attorney had fully discussed with her the trial rights that were lost by pleading guilty.

A defendant waives a variety of constitutional rights by pleading guilty to a criminal offense, and it is fundamental that a plea of guilty is valid only if it is given voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. See State v. Hook, 623 N.W.2d 865, 869 (Iowa 2001), abrogated in part on other grounds...