State v. Messer

Decision Date09 January 1940
Docket Number35589.
Citation194 La. 238,193 So. 633
CourtLouisiana Supreme Court
PartiesSTATE v. MESSER.
Concurring Opinion Jan. 23, 1940.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 5, 1940.

Appeal from Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Evangeline; J. Cleveland Fruge, Judge.

Theophilus Messer was convicted of murder, and he appeals.

Affirmed.

In trial for murder of one cutting wood on defendant's land testimony as to missing link in chain of title to such land was properly excluded as immaterial, where sole defense urged was that defendant was insane at time of homicide and no issue of self-defense in protecting his property against trespassers was raised.

Roland B. Reed and George L. Fontenot, both of Ville Platte, and A. H. Garland, of Opelousas, for defendant and appellant.

Lessley P. Gardiner, Atty. Gen., Edward M. Heath and James O'Connor, Asst. Attys. Gen., and E. Herman Guillory Dist. Atty., and Atlee P. Steckler, both of Ville Platte, for the State.

LAND Justice.

Defendant is indicted for the murder of LeRoy Barmore in the Parish of Evangeline on or about the 20th day of July, 1939.

The first trial of the case resulted in a mistrial. On the second trial, defendant was found by the jury ‘ guilty as charged,’ and thereafter sentenced by the court to be hanged.

On appeal to this court, the errors complained of by defendant during the course of his trial are embodied in eight (8) bills of exceptions.

Bill of Exception No. 1.

The State and defense having announced their readiness on the second trial, defendant, for the first time, moved to withdraw his plea of not guilty made on the first trial, for the purpose of filing a plea of insanity, both at the present time and at the time of the commission of the act.

The district attorney opposed the motion, on the ground that during the first trial, no plea of insanity was filed by defendant and that, after the first trial, defendant had three weeks within which to file such plea but elected to wait until the date fixed for the second trial to interpose such plea, and on the further ground that this plea is frivolous and was filed solely for the purpose of delay.

The objections of the State were sustained by the trial judge for the following reasons stated in the per curiam to this bill: ‘ The Court denied the motion of the defendant to withdraw the plea of not guilty, to file the plea of present insanity, but the Court permitted the plea of insanity at the time of the commission of the crime to be filed, but refused to appoint a commission of experts to inquire into the present mental condition of the accused or to the mental condition of the accused at the time of the commission of the crime, and the Court announced to the defendant that it would permit evidence of expert or lay witnesses to be introduced on the trial of the case, by the defendant, to prove insanity at the time of the crime.

Article 265 of the Code provides that the defendant, may, with the consent of the Court, withdraw the plea of not guilty and then set up some other plea. In the case of State v. Harville, 175 La. 458, 143 So. 373, the Supreme Court, in interpreting Article 265 of the Code of Criminal Procedure held that once a plea of not guilty is entered, it cannot be withdrawn for the purpose of filing some other plea, without the consent of the Court.

‘ The reason why the Court refused the defendant's motion to withdraw the plea of not guilty, and enter the plea of present insanity was because the Court did not believe that the defendant was presently insane, or that a trial should be held on the question of present insanity, for the reason that the Court had ample opportunity to examine and observe the defendant during the trial of the first case, some three weeks, before the trial of the present case, which resulted in a mistrial, and the Court observed that the defendant made a good witness for himself on his first trial, and stayed on the witness stand for approximately six (6) hours, and assisted his attorneys throughout the trial, and apparently understood very well everything that took place, and the Court further observed and talked to the defendant since the first trial, and particularly on the morning that the plea of present insanity was filed, and the Court found that the defendant at the time the plea was filed, apparently understood the case against him very well, and was able to assist in his defense the same as he had done during his first trial. The Court further understands that under the provisions of Article 267 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the request made by an accused for the appointment of a commission of experts to inquire into the mental condition of the accused rests within the sound discretion of the Trial Court, and may be refused if the Court is not convinced that the accused may be presently insane.

‘ In the instant case, not only was the Court not convinced that the accused was presently insane, but the Court was convinced beyond a doubt that the accused was presently sane, and appeared to understand the proceedings against him, and to be able to assist his attorneys in his defense, and the Court further felt that the plea of present insanity was filed solely for the purpose of delay, and that it was unnecessary to appoint medical experts to inquire into the present insanity of the defendant. State v. Ridgway, 178 La. 606, 152 So. 306.State v. McManus, 187 La. 9, 174 So. 91.

The Court refused to appoint medical experts to examine into the mental condition of the defendant at the time of the commission of the crime for the reason that the Court, after observing the defendant and hearing his testimony about his actions on the day of the killing, during the trial of the first case, and prior thereto, personally feels and knows that the defendant could not have been insane at the time of the commission of the crime. The Court has personally known the defendant for a number of years, and had occasion to observe him in court at different times prior to the commission of the crime, and particularly, had the opportunity to observe the defendant in the trial of a civil case wherein the defendant was interested, and subsequently, had to sentence the defendant to the Parish Jail for contempt of Court, and the Court feels that the appointment of a lunacy commission to examine into the mental condition of the defendant as of the date of the commission of the crime, would simply cause unnecessary delay and expense, so the Court, in the exercise of its discretion refused to appoint medical experts to examine into the mental condition of the accused at the time of the commission of the crime. State v. Ridgway, 178 La. 606, 152 So. 306,State v. McManus, 187 La. 9, 174 So. 91.

‘ During the trial of the case, the defendant offered the testimony of numerous witnesses in an effort to prove that the defendant was insane or mentally unbalanced at the time of the commission of the crime, and the State rebutted this evidence by the introduction of testimony of witnesses who had talked to the defendant and had been in his company on the morning of the killing, and just prior thereto, and after the homicide took place, and all of these witnesses testified that the defendant appeared to be perfectly sane and normal at the time of the commission of the crime.

The State further introduced the testimony of Dr. T. H. Littell, Coroner of the Parish, who testified that he had occasion to examine the defendant in jail after the commission of the crime, on different occasions up to the date of the trial, and that in his opinion, the defendant was perfectly sane and normal.’ Tr., pp. 19-21, inclusive.

In State v. Dawson, 186 La. 900, at pages 902 and 903,173 So. 524, it is said by this court: ‘ Article 265 of the Code of Criminal Procedure reads as follows:

" The defendant may at any time, with the consent of the court, withdraw his plea of not guilty and then set up some other plea or demur or move to quash the indictment.'

This article of the Code leaves it to the sound discretion of the trial judge to permit the withdrawal of a defendant's plea of not guilty, which discretion should not be interfered with unless unreasonably or arbitrarily exercised.’

Act No. 136 of 1932 repeals Articles 268, 269, 270, 271, 272 and 273 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and amends and reenacts Article 267 of the Code. The pertinent parts of this article, as amended, are as follows: ‘ Art. 267. If before or during the trial the court has reasonable ground to believe that the defendant, against whom an indictment has been found or information filed, is insane, or mentally defective, to the extent that he is unable to understand the proceedings against him or to assist in his defense, the court shall immediately fix a time for a hearing to determine the defendant's mental condition. The court may appoint two disinterested qualified experts in mental diseases to examine the defendant with regard to his present mental condition and to testify at the hearing. * * *

‘ Whenever, on a prosecution by indictment or information, the existence of insanity or mental defect on the part of the defendant at the time of the alleged commission of the offense charged becomes an issue in the cause, the court may appoint one or more disinterested qualified experts in mental diseases, not exceeding three, to examine the defendant. * * *

‘ The appointment of experts by the court shall not preclude the State or defendant from calling expert witnesses to testify at the trial, and in case the defendant is committed to custody by the court they shall be permitted to have free access to the defendant for purposes of examination or observation.’

Whether a defendant pleads present insanity or...

To continue reading

Request your trial
21 cases
  • State v. Breedlove
    • United States
    • Louisiana Supreme Court
    • December 1, 1941
    ...on the defendant's challenge for cause, quoting the last part of the above excerpt from the opinion. In the case of State v. Messer, 194 La. 238, 253, 193 So. 633, 638, trial judge, in his per curiam, followed the same course adopted by the district judge in the instant case, by first stati......
  • State v. Palmer
    • United States
    • Louisiana Supreme Court
    • March 21, 1955
    ...Chap. 19, Sec. 692C, and authorities therein cited.4 Wharton's Criminal Evidence, 11th Ed., Vol. 2, sec. 773, p. 1321; State v. Messer, 194 La. 238, 193 So. 633; State v. McMullan, 223 La. 629, 66 So. 574; Pollack v. State, 215 Wis. 200, 253 N.W. 560, 254 N.W. 471.5 State v. Bessa, 115 La. ......
  • State v. Eubanks
    • United States
    • Louisiana Supreme Court
    • November 7, 1960
    ...in their testimony and as an aid to the jury in obtaining a better understanding of the character of the wounds. See State v. Messer, 194 La. 238, 193 So. 633; State v. Henry, 197 La. 999, 3 So.2d 104 and State v. Johnson, 198 La. 195, 3 So.2d 556. And the fact that the photographs portray ......
  • State v. Bentley
    • United States
    • Louisiana Supreme Court
    • June 29, 1951
    ...has been manifestly abused. See, State v. Ridgway, 178 La. 609, 152 So. 307; State v. Eisenhardt, 185 La. 308, 169 So. 417; State v. Messer, 194 La. 238, 193 So. 633; State v. Washington, 207 La. 849, 22 So.2d 193; State v. Ledet, 211 La. 769, 30 So.2d 830; State v. Gunter, 208 La. 694, 23 ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT