State v. Meyer

• Decision Date: 19 November 1900
• Citation: 65 N.J.L. 237,47 A. 486
• Parties: STATE v. MEYER.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

47 A. 486

65 N.J.L. 237

STATE

v. MEYER.

Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey.

Nov. 19, 1900.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Error to supreme court.

Sophia Meyer was convicted of a high misdemeanor. Conviction reversed by the supreme court (45 Atl. 779), and the state brings error. Reversed.

N. C. J. English, for the State.

J. A. Kiernan, for defendant in error.

DIXON, J. The defendant was indicted for having, without lawful justification, thrust an instrument into the womb of A. K., a woman then pregnant with child, with intent to cause her miscarriage, in consequence whereof the woman died. On trial in the Union sessions, the dying declarations of A. K. were admitted in evidence on behalf of the state, against the defendant's objection, and the defendant was convicted. On error, the supreme court reversed the conviction because of the admission of that evidence. The reason assigned by the supreme court for such reversal is that as the legislature, in the crimes act of 1898 (P. L. p. 794, § 119), declared the act of the accused to be a high misdemeanor, whether the woman or child died in consequence thereof or not, the death of either is not now an essential element of the crime, but is really a fact to be considered in fixing the penalty. This reason we think is unsound. While it is true that the statute calls the prohibited conduct a high misdemeanor, whether the woman or child die in consequence thereof or not, yet, on due attention to all its provisions, it clearly appears to describe two high misdemeanors,— one where the woman or child dies in consequence of the operation, and the other where death does not ensue. A noticeable feature of the crimes act of 1898, not found in our earlier criminal laws, is that the section defining an offense merely designates it as a misdemeanor or a high misdemeanor, without fixing the punishment for guilt, and then a separate section declares what punishment may be imposed on persons convicted of a misdemeanor, and what on persons convicted of a high misdemeanor. When a penalty different from those thus generally prescribed is intended, that is indicated in immediate connection with the definition of the crime. In accordance with this design, the offense against pregnancy, when death does not result, is simply called a high misdemeanor, leaving the penalty to be ascertained from the section declaring the punishment appropriate to that degree of guilt; but for such offense when death results a severer penalty is provided by the section defining the crime, and, of course, the more aggravated offense is also called a high misdemeanor. Except for the modification which this purpose of the revisers dictated, the language of the statute is substantially the same as before, and does not manifest, we think, any intention to blend what before were distinct offenses into one. It still remains true, as was ruled in State...