State v. Meyer

• Decision Date: 05 April 1886
• Citation: 3 A. 195,58 Vt. 457
• Parties: STATE v. MEYER.
• Court: Vermont Supreme Court

3 A. 195

58 Vt. 457

STATE

v. MEYER.¹

SUPREME COURT OF VERMONT.

Filed April 5, 1886.

Exceptions from Franklin county court.

Indictment for murder, tried at the April term, 1885, of the county court for Franklin county, Royce, C. J., presiding. Verdict, guilty of murder in the first degree. All facts upon which the decision of the cause depends are fully set forth in the opinion.

G. W. Burleson, State's Atty., (A. A. Hall with him,) for the State.

Felix W. McGettrick, for respondent.

The respondent was entitled to a compliance with the fifteenth request: that even if the jury should find the killing of Herman Krause by the respondent, in the absence of any proof of malice or premeditation, they are at liberty to find him guilty of murder in the second degree, manslaughter, or to acquit him. Nowhere in his charge does the court hint at any theory upon which the jury might acquit, or find the prisoner guilty of any less crime than murder in the first degree; but he dwells with zeal and emphasis upon everything that might be implied against the prisoner; presents with minute care and ingenious argument the theory of the prosecution, and every item of evidence bearing against the prisoner; while lie as carefully refrains from the slightest allusion to evidence or arguments attacking, contradicting, or tending to weaken the theory of the state. His definition of murder and manslaughter was calculated to obscure the understanding of the jury with reference to the distinction between murder in the first and second degree. The court was not justified in telling the jury that, in his judgment, it was clearly a case of murder in the first degree. It is the duty of the court, upon common principles of humanity and justice—First, to pronounce the prisoner innocent until he is proven guilty; and, secondly, after he is shown to have committed a homicide, to look for every excuse which may reduce the guilt to the lowest point consistent with the facts proven. State v. McDonnell, 32 Vt. 491. Might not the crime of manslaughter or murder in the second degree be found consistently with the facts proven in this case? And yet the court vouchsafed no distinction to the jury as to the distinction between the degrees of murder, beyond the bare reading of the statute. Furthermore, it must be said that the charge confounded the definition of murder with that of murder in the first degree, especially when we bear in mind the court's opinion volunteered in that connection. The court's attention was called to these defects in his charge; still he refused to correct them. Our objection to the charge, wherein the court tells the jury that, in his opinion, the crime was murder in the first degree, is not limited to the propriety or impropriety of the court's expression of opinion upon an abstract proposition of the law applicable to a proven fact or fact concerning which there was any direct, positive evidence. No mortal eye has witnessed, nor mortal tongue related a word, act, or circumstance preceding the alleged homicide, from which any of these conditions can ever be inferred. Scan the testimony from the beginning to the end, and, except possibly the inference that may be drawn from the character of the weapon used, (and this the court admits, standing alone, is not sufficient,) any fact or circumstances upon which murder in the first degree could be found must be a creation of the fancy,—purely imaginative. And yet the court tells the jury he has no hesitation in saying it is murder in the first degree. He might just as well say that, from the evidence in the case, he has no hesitation in saying that the killing was willful, deliberate, and premeditated, which is an inference of fact, not of law, and is exclusively within the province of the jury to find. And that the jury are left to find that the crime was committed in 'the manner that the evidence tended to show, does not change the law or the logic of this proposition. There remains, in any event, a fact to be inferred; and the court, by expressing his own inference in relation to the province of the jury, is usurping their functions.

WALKER, J. 1. The respondent took exceptions to the decision of the county court overruling his challenge for cause of the jurors Nahum Brigham, W. A. Cummings, M. J. Olds, M. L. Whitcombe, F. C. Story, L. C. Lee, C. W. Peckham, W. Stanley, H. C. Roby, and Moses Pattee. Mr. Brigham and Mr. Roby were peremptorily challenged by the respondent, and the others were sworn and served as jurors on the trial. A careful examination of the testimony of these jurors, given on voir dire, shows conclusively that the opinions which they formed, and some say they may have expressed, were founded upon the reports which they had read in the St. Albans Messenger and other county papers, of evidence purporting to have been given upon the examination of the respondent at the time of his arrest, and were dependent upon the correctness of these reports; which opinions, whether expressed by them or not, had not, in the judgment of these jurors, biased their minds so that they could not try the case impartially upon the evidence given in court, and return a verdict of conviction or acquittal thereon accordingly as their minds were convinced by it. The newspaper accounts which they had read had evidently made no abiding bias or conviction in the jurors' minds of the guilt or innocence of the respondent. The opinions which they had formed were merely passing or transitory inclinations of their minds, based upon such accounts as they had read; they had made no inquiry as to the truth of the accounts; they had made no investigation in reference to the crime imputed to the respondent for the purpose of satisfying their minds as to his guilt or innocence. Their opinions were such opinions merely as intelligent men almost irresistibly form from hearing or reading newspaper accounts of crime, relying upon the truthfulness of the published accounts, which are always subject to be changed and altered by contradictory accounts. Such opinions rarely disqualify intelligent men from fairly considering the evidence given on the trial, and rendering an impartial verdict thereon when called upon to act as jurors. The question of the disqualification of a juror by the formation and expression of an opinion upon newspaper reports, etc., has repeatedly been before this court, and the law is well settled on that subject in this state. In State v. Mealcer, 54 Vt. 112, ROSS, J., in delivering the opinion of the court, says that the opinion, in order to disqualify the juror, "must be an abiding bias of the mind, based upon the substantial facts in the case, in the existence of which he believes. Such is the result of our decisions, and of the great majority of the decisions of the courts of last resort in other jurisdictions. * * * Its character must be left largely to the determination of the court before which the trial is had, upon the evidence adduced at the preliminary examination." Following the trend of the decisions in this state, and other decisions, we are satisfied that the opinions of the jurors challenged for cause in this case were not of a disqualifying character.

2. The respondent, in his tenth request, requested the court to charge that "if the jury believe that the evidence, upon any essential point in the case, admits of the slightest doubt, consistent with reason, the prisoner is entitled to the benefit of that doubt, and should be acquitted." In respect to this request the court, after having fully instructed the jury that the prisoner was entitled to the benefit of every reasonable doubt, and having explained to the jury, satisfactorily to the respondent, what constituted a reasonable doubt, instructed the jury as follows: "That request is sound law, with this modification: if the jury believe that the evidence upon any essential point in the case admits of any reasonable doubt,—a doubt consistent with reason,—the prisoner is entitled to the benefit of it." To the court's refusal to charge in the language of the request the defendant excepted. The degree of doubt which has always been recognized by the law which the state must overcome in order to warrant the jury in finding the respondent guilty of the crime charged in the indictment, is one founded upon reason,—a reasonable doubt. The charge of the court modifying the request, if not a substantial compliance therewith, was in conformity with the law, and the respondent was not injured thereby. It was all he was entitled to. This is not an age in which the protection of the accused requires any lowering of this degree of doubt which the law requires to be overcome in order to convict.

3. The respondent's counsel next claims error as to the refusal of the court to comply with his thirteenth request in regard to entertaining doubts as to questions of law. The request was:

"If the jury entertain the slightest doubt upon the questions of law presented by the court, the prisoner is entitled to the benefit of such doubt, and in no instance are they permitted to apply any rule of law more prejudicial to the prisoner than that laid down by the court."

The charge of the court in respect thereto was as follows:

"While it is ray duty to instruct you as to what I deem to be the law, yet it is your right to judge over me. You have the right to adopt your theory of the law instead of mine, if you think proper so to do, with this qualification: you are not to adopt any rule of the law any more prejudicial to the respondent than the law which has been laid down by the court.'"

No more favorable charge to the respondent could have been given upon the subject of the request. The jury were told that they could entirely ignore the court's view of the law, and adopt their own, except that they could not adopt any rule more prejudicial to the respondent. The instruction did not even require the jury to have any doubt of the...