State v. Meyer, 77828
Decision Date | 05 June 1998 |
Docket Number | No. 77828,77828 |
Citation | 25 Kan.App.2d 195,960 P.2d 261 |
Parties | STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Timothy MEYER, Appellant. |
Court | Kansas Court of Appeals |
Syllabus by the Court
The fact that a defendant is found not to be amenable to probation supervision is, if supported by the evidence, a substantial and compelling reason for an upward departure, either dispositional or durational.
Ryan Kipling Elliot, Assistant Appellate Defender, and Jessica R. Kunen, Chief Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Bret Lawson, Assistant County Attorney, and Carla J. Stovall, Attorney General, for appellee.
Before LEWIS, P.J., RULON, J., and JACK A. MURPHY, District Judge, Assigned.
Defendant Timothy Meyer broke into several churches in Coffeyville and committed theft and vandalism. He was ultimately arrested for the crimes and pled guilty to three counts of burglary under a plea agreement. The crimes with which defendant was charged were in grid box C-VII, which called for presumptive probation 29-27-25 months. K.S.A.1997 Supp. 21-4704. The trial court, however, departed upwardly and sentenced defendant to a controlling term of 27 months in the custody of the Secretary of Corrections. Defendant appeals.
The basis of defendant's appeal is that the trial court erred in departing upward. We do not agree.
Our standard of review requires us to determine whether the reasons given by the trial court to support the departure were substantial and compelling and are supported by substantial competent evidence. State v. Salcido-Corral, 262 Kan. 392, 411, 940 P.2d 11 (1997).
Apparently, the trial court gave written notice to both parties of its intention to impose a departure sentence. This written notice, we assume, set forth the reasons to support the departure. There appears to be some question as to whether the reasons given originally to the parties were the same reasons ultimately used. However, we cannot determine that issue. The letter from the trial court is not a part of the record on appeal. In the absence of that letter, we can only assume that the reasons given by the trial court prior to and at the time of sentencing were the same. " " State v. Richardson, 256 Kan. 69, 84, 883 P.2d 1107 (1994).
There are reasons given for departure in the trial court's journal entry, and there were reasons given by the trial court in a written notice to the parties. However, it is established law in Kansas that "[t]he court's comments at the time of sentencing govern as to the reasons for departure." State v. Gideon, 257 Kan. 591, 623, 894 P.2d 850 (1995). As a result, the only comments which we are interested in examining are those set forth in the transcript of the sentencing.
At the time of sentencing, the trial court set forth its findings of fact to support its intent to depart as follows:
We conclude that on the whole, the reasons given by the trial court are substantial and compelling reasons and support his departure sentence. The fact that defendant was not admitted to Labette is not a departure factor, but his nonamenability to probation is.
"The final analysis is not whether any departure factor, in isolation, can be a substantial and compelling reason for departure but whether, as a whole, the factors are substantial and compelling reasons for imposing a departure sentence in this case in light of the offense of conviction, the defendant's criminal history, and the purposes of the sentencing guidelines." State v. Grady, 258 Kan. 72, 89, 900 P.2d 227 (1995).
We hold the trial court's finding that defendant was not amenable to probation supervision was a substantial and compelling reason to justify the departure sentence and was supported by substantial competent evidence. In this regard, we follow State v. Trimble, 21 Kan.App.2d 32, Syl. pp 5, 6, 894 P.2d 920 (1995).
Defendant's record is incredible. In addition to defendant's three convictions from Montgomery County, he has nine additional burglary convictions from Labette County. In State v. Hawes, 22 Kan.App.2d 837, 840, 923 P.2d 1064 (1996), we said that "defendant's excessive nonperson felonies show only that defendant is a persistent criminal." We do not believe the statement in Hawes went far enough as applied to defendant here. Not only do the excessive convictions show that defendant is a persistent criminal, it also shows he is an unremorseful criminal who has not been rehabilitated and from whom society requires protection. We cannot believe the legislature intended to make it impossible for trial courts to put career criminals with 9 to 12 felony convictions on perpetual probation. To release the defendant in this case on probation would have similar results to having the fox guard the henhouse. We conclude...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
State v. Snow, No. 93,749.
...25 Kan. App.2d 731, 732, 971 P.2d 1201 (1998) (approving nonamenability to probation as an aggravating factor); State v. Meyer, 25 Kan. App.2d 195, 197, 960 P.2d 261, rev. denied 265 Kan. 888 (1998) (affirming upward dispositional departure based on nonamenability to probation); State v. Bi......
-
Gonzalez v. Pepsico, Inc.
... ... Shackelford, Jones Day, Los Angeles, CA, Jill P. Meyer, Frost Brown Todd LLC, Cincinnati, OH, Ian K. Boyd, Harvey Siskind LLP, San Francisco, CA, for ... 12(b)(1) and (b)(6), Fed.R.Civ.P., for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted. Rule 12(b)(1) motions generally take the form of facial ... ...
-
State v. Rodriguez, 82,454.
...v. Yardley, 267 Kan. 37, 44, 978 P.2d 886 (1999); State v. Sewell, 25 Kan. App.2d 731, Syl. ¶ 1, 971 P.2d 1201 (1998); State v. Meyer, 25 Kan. App.2d 195, 960 P.2d 261,rev. denied 265 Kan. 888 (1998); State v. Billington, 24 Kan. App.2d 759, 763, 953 P.2d 1059 (1998); State v. Trimble, 21 K......
-
State v. Fevurly
...is not, in and of itself, a substantial and compelling reason to depart from the presumptive guidelines sentence); State v. Meyer, 25 Kan.App.2d 195, 198, 960 P.2d 261, rev. denied 265 Kan. 888 (1998) (court may not base its decision for departure solely upon a defendant's criminal history)......