State v. Meyers

Citation376 P.2d 710,85 Idaho 129
Decision Date04 December 1962
Docket NumberNo. 9181,9181
PartiesSTATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Leo A. MEYERS, dba Hiway In, Blanchard, County of Bonner, State of Idaho, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Idaho

Hardy C. Lyons, Sandpoint, for appellant.

Frank L. Benson, Atty. Gen., R. LaVar Marsh, Will S. Defenbach, Asst. Attys. Gen., Boise, for respondent.

KNUDSON, Justice.

During 1961 appellant was licensed to sell beer at retail in Bonner County under Idaho State beer license No. 575 and in 1962 under State license No. 987.

On January 8, 1962, the Commissioner of Law Enforcement of the State of Idaho made a determination to suspend appellant's license and caused to be served upon him a Notice of Intention to suspend appellant's retail beer license upon the stated ground that on November 24, 1961, appellant had sold, served or dispensed, or caused to be sold, served or dispensed, beer to a person or persons under the age of 20 years. (In violation of I.C. § 23-1013.)

Thereafter appellant commenced this proceeding to contest the Commissioner's determination and the effective date of suspension of license ordered by the Commissioner's determination was stayed by order of the district court. Hearing was had before the trial court and on April 5, 1962, findings of fact and judgment were entered whereby appellant's retail beer license was suspended for the period of six months. Among the court's findings is the following:

'The Court further finds that on or about the 24th day of November, 1961, an agent and employee of the licensee, Leo A. Meyers, while in the course of his employment as a bartender on the premises known as the Hiway In, licensed for the retail sale of beer, by the said Idaho State Retail Beer License No. 987, sold, served or dispensed beer to three minors under the age of twenty years.'

From such finding of fact the court concluded that by reason of such violation of the provisions of I.C. § 23-1013, the intended action of the Commissioner was proper. Appellant appeals from the judgment suspending his license and the only issue here involved is stated by appellant as follows:

'Does the sale of beer to a minor person by an employee of a person licensed to sell beer constitute a violation of law by such licensee and grounds for revocation or suspension of the beer license of such licensee?'

Appellant calls attention to the trial court's finding that an employee of appellant committed the act and violated the law which is the ground for suspending appellant's license. He then argues that appellant is not penally responsible for the act of his employee. In support of said contention he cites the case of People v. Frankfort, 114 Cal.App.2d 680, 251 P.2d 401 wherein it is stated:

'A principal, in order to be held criminally liable, must be shown to have knowingly and intentionally aided, advised, or encouraged the criminal act committed by the agent.'

We are not in disagreement with such statement of law, however we do not agree that a proceeding to revoke a beer license such as is here in issue is a criminal proceeding. A statement as to the nature of the procedure generally pursued in revoking or suspending such license is set forth in 48 C.J.S. Intoxicating Liquors § 177, p. 288, as:

'Such a proceeding is essentially administrative, although judicial or quasijudicial in nature. It is a civil proceeding, and not a criminal or penal proceeding or action, and, unless required by the statute, judicial process or sanction is not necessary.'

The following are among many well reasoned cases wherein it is specifically held that a proceeding to revoke a liquor license is not a criminal proceeding, nor is such proceeding governed by rules of law applicable to criminal prosecutions. Kearns v. Aragon, 65 N.Mex. 119, 333 P.2d 607; Bradley v. Texas Liquor Control Board (Tex.) 108 S.W.2d 300; Chambers v. Herrick, 172 Kan. 510, 241 P.2d 748. In Cornell v. Reilly, 127 Cal.App.2d 178, 273 P.2d 572, the Court held that:

'The object of an administrative proceeding aimed at revoking a license is to protect the public, that is, to determine whether a licensee has exercised his privilege in derogation of the public interest, and to keep the regulated business clean and wholesome. Such proceedings are not conducted for the primary purpose of punishing an individual. * * * Hence, such proceedings are not criminal in nature.'

The statutes of this state prescribe the proceeding that must be followed in a contest of the Commissioner's determination to suspend a license. (I.C. §§ 23-1038-39.) It is therein specifically provided that the hearing in contest of the Commissioner's determination 'shall be by the court, without jury,' and 'the commissioner, or his representative, shall have the burden of proceeding and of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the charges as set forth in the notice of determination are true.' (emphasis supplied). Whereas, in a criminal prosecution, the offense must be established 'beyond a reasonable doubt.' We therefore conclude that the proceeding here involved is an administrative, disciplinary proceeding, and is not criminal in its nature, nor is it to be judged by the legal standards applicable to criminal prosecutions.

It is acknowledged by appellant in his brief that the license to sell beer is a privilege, not a property right, which the legislature may grant or withhold at its pleasure and according to standards and requisites laid down by the legislature. Appellant also concedes that the legislature may provide that a license may be revoked, suspended or canceled, irrespective of the licensee's personal fault or knowledge of forbidden conduct. He argues that had the legislature intended that a retailer licensed to sell beer would be penally responsible for the acts of his employee, words such as 'his agent or employee' would be contained in I.C. § 23-1037, which section provides:

'In the event of a conviction of any brewer manufacturing beer in this state or of any wholesaler or retailer licensed under the...

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7 cases
  • Dodge City Saloon, Inc. v. Wash. State Liquor Control Bd.
    • United States
    • Washington Court of Appeals
    • May 15, 2012
    ...improper, and/or unlawful actions of the board's licensees in the exercise of the privilege conferred upon them. State v. Meyers, 85 Idaho 129, 376 P.2d 710 (1962).Quan v. Wash. State Liquor Control Bd., 69 Wash.2d 373, 382, 418 P.2d 424 (1966). ¶ 20 Here, Dodge City is not a natural “perso......
  • Uptick Corp. v. Ahlin
    • United States
    • Idaho Supreme Court
    • June 23, 1982
    ...by the state are complied with. Nampa Lodge No. 1389 B. P. O. E. v. Smylie, 71 Idaho 212, 229 P.2d 991 (1951); see State v. Meyers, 85 Idaho 129, 376 P.2d 710 (1962) (beer license); State v. Rorvick, 76 Idaho 58, 277 P.2d 566 (1954) (beer license). A matter of legislative grace, no one has ......
  • Jow Sin Quan v. Washington State Liquor Control Bd., 38084
    • United States
    • Washington Supreme Court
    • September 29, 1966
    ...improper, and/or unlawful actions of the board's licensees in the exercise of the privilege conferred upon them. State v. Meyers, 85 Idaho 129, 376 P.2d 710 (1962); Kearns v. Aragon, supra. A criminal prosecution of the licensee is not a condition precedent to regulatory action by the board......
  • Blue Note, Inc. v. Hopper
    • United States
    • Idaho Supreme Court
    • December 11, 1962
    ...See also: I Administrative Law Treatise p. 594, § 8.16. I.C. § 23-1037 provides an 'administrative, disciplinary proceeding,' (State v. Meyers, Idaho, 376 P.2d 710), which is a special procedure not violative of the guaranty of Idaho Constitution Art. I, § Nor is the procedure established b......
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