State v. Michael T.

Citation194 Conn.App. 598,222 A.3d 105
Decision Date03 December 2019
Docket NumberAC 41053
CourtAppellate Court of Connecticut
Parties STATE of Connecticut v. MICHAEL T.

Judie Marshall, with whom, on the brief, was Freesia Singngam, for the appellant (defendant).

Kathryn W. Bare, assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Patrick J. Griffin, state's attorney, Maxine Wilensky, Meriden, senior assistant state's attorney, and Karen A. Roberg, assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

DiPentima, C.J., and Devlin and Sullivan, Js.

DiPENTIMA, C.J.

The defendant, Michael T., appeals from the judgments of conviction,1 rendered after a jury trial, of assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-59 (a) (2), five counts of risk of injury to a child in violation of General Statutes § 53-21 (a) (1), two counts of unlawful restraint in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-95 (a), criminal attempt to commit assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-49 (a) (2) and 53a-59 (a) (2), and assault in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-60 (a) (2). On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court (1) abused its discretion by admitting into evidence the forensic interviews of the two minor victims, (2) improperly denied his motions for a judgment of acquittal with respect to two counts of risk of injury to a child and (3) improperly precluded the defendant from presenting evidence of third-party culpability. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgments of conviction.

The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. In August, 2015, the defendant lived in a New Haven apartment with N, his girlfriend,2 and her five daughters, including eight year old J and four year old D. J and D shared a bedroom with their sibling, S. In the early afternoon of August 16, 2015, the defendant, N and her five children, one of whom was the defendant's child, were in the apartment when a neighbor came to the door. N spoke to the neighbor and their conversation escalated into an argument over the actions of J, S and D. After this interaction with the neighbor, N went into the bedroom and observed J and D "hanging out of the window." Previously, the defendant had placed screws in the window frame to prevent the children from engaging in this behavior. Upon seeing J and D hanging out of the window, N "yelled" and then "spanked" them each one time with her hand. N then sent the two girls into the living room.

The defendant, after an argument with N, subsequently came out of his bedroom and ordered J, S and D to exit their room. After the three girls came out of their room, the defendant began to yell at them for disobeying the rule about hanging out of their window. He then grabbed J, lifted her off the ground and carried her to the stove in the kitchen. The defendant ignited the front gas burner and placed J's right hand over the flame. J, in pain and crying out, began to kick and, as a result, the defendant dropped her.

The defendant then picked up D and carried her to the stove, where he placed both of her hands "on top of the flame." D yelled and screamed as the defendant kept her hands in the fire for up to one minute. Afterward, the defendant, a former emergency medical technician, instructed N to submerge D's hands into the bathtub filled with warm water. He further instructed N to go to a nearby pharmacy for medical supplies to treat D's burns.

By the time N returned to the apartment from the pharmacy, D had white blisters on her hands, and the defendant indicated that she needed to go to the hospital due to third-degree burns

. The defendant spoke to his mother to obtain transportation to the hospital. He then instructed N, J, S and D to falsely state that D's burns had resulted from an accident. The defendant, N and D went to the hospital, while the other girls stayed with the defendant's mother.

As a result of her burns, D screamed and cried during the car ride to the Saint Raphael Campus of the Yale New Haven Hospital. At this point, N observed that D's hands appeared white and "bubbly." Upon arriving at the emergency department, D received immediate treatment from the medical staff. Mark Shapiro, a physician and the head of the emergency department, observed pronounced burns on both sides of D's hands. Although D's left hand sustained greater damage, Shapiro determined that both hands exhibited second-degree and third-degree burns

.3 He also described the charring under D's fingernails as indicative of a fourth-degree burn.4 After evaluating D and prescribing pain medication, Shapiro arranged for her transfer to the burn treatment unit at Bridgeport Hospital.5 D received medical treatment at Bridgeport Hospital for approximately six weeks, undergoing several surgical procedures, including the amputation of several fingertips.

In the early morning hours of August 17, 2015, Khristine Cuddy, a New Haven police detective, went to Bridgeport Hospital to investigate the circumstances of D's injuries. N provided Cuddy with consent to search the New Haven apartment. Cuddy proceeded to the apartment, arriving at approximately 7 a.m. After further investigation, Cuddy interviewed J. Cuddy observed a blistered burn on the bottom portion of J's right hand. Later that day, the Department of Children and Families invoked a ninety-six hour hold6 on the five children and obtained an order of temporary custody on August 21, 2015.7

Monica Vidro, a licensed clinical social worker employed by the Yale Child Sexual Abuse Clinic, conducted forensic interviews of J and D on August 28, 2015, and October 13, 2015, respectively. In these recordings, J and D identified the defendant as the individual who had burned their hands on the open flame from the stove burner. Afterward, Vidro recommended that both children receive mental health treatment, which they did.

The state charged the defendant in two long form informations. The first information set forth the following alleged crimes with respect to J: criminal attempt to commit assault in the first degree in violation of §§ 53a-49 (a) (2) and 53a-59 (a) (2) ; assault in the second degree in violation of § 53a-60 (a) (2) ; three counts of risk of injury to a child in violation of § 53-21 (a) (1) by placing J's hand over an open flame, failing to seek medical attention for J and causing J to witness the burning of D; and unlawful restraint in the first degree in violation of § 53a-95 (a). The second information set forth the following alleged crimes with respect to D: assault in the first degree in violation of § 53a-59 (a) (2) ; three counts of risk of injury to a child in violation of § 53-21 (a) (1) by placing D's hand over an open flame, denying D medical attention and causing D to witness the burning of J; and unlawful restraint in the first degree in violation of § 53a-95 (a).

At the conclusion of the trial, held in July, 2017, the jury found the defendant guilty on all counts, with the exception of the count charging risk of injury to a child by failing to seek medical attention for J. The court rendered judgments of conviction in accordance with the verdicts and imposed a total effective sentence of thirty-eight years of incarceration, execution suspended after twenty-eight years, and five years of probation. This appeal followed. Additional facts and procedural history will be set forth as necessary.

I

The defendant first claims that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting into evidence the forensic interviews of the two minor victims. Specifically, he argues that the forensic interviews of J and D (1) did not meet the requirements of the medical diagnosis and treatment exception to the rule against hearsay, (2) were irrelevant and (3) were more prejudicial than probative and were cumulative. The state counters that these arguments are unreviewable, meritless or harmless. We conclude that the defendant cannot prevail on this claim.8

The following additional facts and procedural history are necessary for our discussion. On June 16, 2017, the defendant filed a motion in limine to preclude the state from entering video recordings of the forensic interviews into evidence. In his motion, the defendant primarily argued that the recordings were irrelevant.9 On July 6, 2017, the state filed a memorandum of law in support of admitting the recordings of the forensic interviews into evidence.10 Five days later, the defendant filed a reply, iterating his claim of irrelevance.11

On the first day of trial and outside of the presence of the jury, the court heard argument on the admissibility of the forensic interviews. The prosecutor emphasized that the interviews satisfied the requirements for the medical treatment exception to the rule against hearsay and, thus, were admissible into evidence. Defense counsel argued that forensic interviews were admissible only in cases involving a sexual assault. He further contended that "the reason [forensic interviews] usually are allowed in terms of relevance is because we have this theory of constancy, that a sex assault victim is going—is not going to—or normally is not going to say anything. That's usually the relevance." He also claimed that the present matter, involving physical abuse, was distinguishable from State v. Griswold , 160 Conn. App. 528, 127 A.3d 189, cert. denied, 320 Conn. 907, 128 A.3d 952 (2015), a sexual assault case.12

The prosecutor countered, inter alia, that the existence of sexual abuse is not a prerequisite for the admissibility of a forensic interview.

The court issued a preliminary ruling that, subject to an offer of proof, the forensic interviews of J and D would be admitted into evidence pursuant to the medical treatment hearsay exception and the reasoning set forth in State v. Griswold , supra, 160 Conn. App. 528, 127 A.3d 189. After both J and D had testified, the state called Vidro as a witness outside the presence...

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