State v. Middleton
Decision Date | 16 February 1983 |
Docket Number | No. 7,7 |
Citation | 658 P.2d 555,61 Or.App. 680 |
Parties | STATE of Oregon, Respondent, v. Raymond Edward MIDDLETON, Appellant |
Court | Oregon Court of Appeals |
Ernest E. Estes, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief was Gary D. Babcock, Public Defender, Salem.
Stephen F. Peifer, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salem, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Dave Frohnmayer, Atty. Gen., and William F. Gary, Sol. Gen., Salem.
Defendant appeals his conviction for felony murder committed during a robbery. We reverse.
The state called defendant's accomplice, Shaw, as its witness. On cross-examination, defendant impeached Shaw by offering evidence of prior inconsistent statements and evidence tending to show that the witness changed his story after entering into a plea agreement (which was referred to in the examination as a "deal" ). 1 On redirect examination, the state elicited rehabilitation testimony from the witness that, as conditions of the plea agreement, he was required to testify (presumably against defendant), to give the police information about the location of property stolen during the robbery and "to take a polygraph and pass it."
Defendant's first assignment is that the court erred by permitting the witness to testify that he had been required to take and pass the polygraph test and by denying defendant's motion for mistrial after the testimony was given. Defendant states:
" * * * Although the stated purpose of this testimony was to rebut inferences that his testimony was inaccurate or untruthful, the actual use of the testimony was to unfairly infer to the jury that since the test was a part of the plea agreement, he had taken and passed the examination and because he had done this, his trial testimony was above reproach."
The state argues:
Both parties rely on State v. Green, 271 Or. 153, 531 P.2d 245 (1975), where the court held that it was impermissible for the prosecution, as part of its showing that a confession was voluntary, to use evidence that the defendant had taken a polygraph test before confessing or evidence of the results of that test. After noting that polygraph evidence is not admissible as substantive evidence in criminal cases, because its reliability has not achieved general scientific acceptance, the court stated:
"For these reasons, it is our opinion that the danger of prejudice from the impact of such evidence upon the question of the credibility of a defendant is so great as to ordinarily outweigh the probative value of such evidence as one or more of the circumstances which the state may properly offer in evidence in laying the initial foundation for the admission of a confession during the trial of a criminal case." 271 Or. at 168-69, 531 P.2d 245. (Footnote omitted.)
The question raised by defendant's first assignment is the permissible scope of rehabilitation of a witness. Defendant makes no issue of the witness' testimony concerning giving the police information about the location of the stolen property; it is only the polygraph evidence that is at issue. More specifically, it is the "passing" of the polygraph examination that is the bone of contention, because "passing" implies truthfulness and therefore bolsters the credibility of the witness. That evidence also does one other, more subtle, thing: it permits the prosecutor to vouch for the witness sub silentio by impliedly saying to the jury, "I have confidence in putting this man on the stand because I have gained independent verification that his story is true." Next to being allowed to personally take the stand and swear that his witness is truthful, a prosecutor could hardly ask for more.
This is being done under the rubric of rehabilitation after impeachment for bias or interest. The process of impeachment and rehabilitation is governed by OEC 609-1, which provides:
The crucial phrase in the rule is in subsection (3): limiting evidence to rehabilitate a witness to evidence "showing a lack of bias or interest." The evidence proffered by the prosecutor in this case does not show any "lack" of interest or bias: the witness' interest is manifest. Rather, the proffered evidence is designed to show that, in spite of the interest he admittedly has, this witness is nonetheless telling the truth. The rule excludes such evidence.
Assuming arguendo that it did tend to show a lack of bias or interest, rehabilitation evidence of this specific kind, i.e., polygraph evidence, would still be inadmissible. Evidence of the results of polygraph tests has been rejected in Oregon, because "the polygraph has not yet attained general scientific acceptance as a reliable and accurate means of ascertaining truth or deception * * *." State v. Green, 271 Or. 153, 165-66, 531 P.2d 245 (1975). The state has emphasized this lack of scientific acceptance of the reliability of polygraph tests in successfully convincing us that due process does not require the state to grant an inmate's request for a polygraph test to be used as evidence in a prison...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Middleton v. Cupp
...jury to disregard the expert testimony if "any" of the facts relied upon by an expert had not been established. State v. Middleton, 61 Or.App. 680, 685, 658 P.2d 555, 558 (1983). Middleton's attorney objected to this instruction, but did not point out that its defect lay in failing to limit......
-
State v. Eby, 81-1035
...(1979). In State v. Corgain, 63 Or.App. 26, 663 P.2d 773 (decided this date), we concluded that under the reasoning in State v. Middleton, 61 Or.App. 680, 658 P.2d 555, rev. allowed, --- Or. --- (1983), it is impermissible to use a plea agreement's condition of truthfulness to rehabilitate ......
-
State v. Foster
...received, defendant would have had the opportunity to argue on appeal that the admission of that evidence was error. State v. Middleton, 61 Or App 680, 658 P2d 555 (1983). Although the court indicated how it would rule, it was never actually called upon to make a ruling. There is no error r......
-
State v. Middleton
...his motion for a mistrial should have been granted. The Court of Appeals agreed and reversed defendant's conviction. State v. Middleton, 61 Or.App. 680, 658 P.2d 555 (1983). We also hold that the admission of this fact into evidence was error, but in view of the jury questions and other evi......